Wiranto, Golkar Party & militarism

Wiranto, Golkar Party & militarism

Indra J. Piliang
Jakarta

The general election of 2004 is the first golden gate leading
to civilian supremacy as well as sovereignty, after the past
dominance of a hybrid regime combining authoritarianism and
democracy. Besides, it is also part of the effort to phase out
political veterans so far limitedly controlling the top of
Indonesia's power pyramid.

Meanwhile, the opportunity is open for the process of
political regeneration and at the same time recruitment of new
political leaders, with new visions of leadership. In the context
of change, the election serves as a driving force of political
institutionalization to promote reform principles for public
interests.

In terms of leadership, the election is a medium to secure
leaders capable of boosting political stability while
incorporating cultural affiliations and elements of leadership
into the institutional political system. Indonesia requires
figures having not only strong personal character but also the
ability to convince people of the policy to be pursued.

This ideal, however, is difficult to achieve. The monopoly of
power in the hands of Sukarno and Soeharto for over 50 years of
Indonesian independence created stagnation in leadership
regeneration and competition.

So far, the most important source of leaders has comprised
intellectuals, civilian politicians and military figures.
Civilian politicians and intellectuals held sway in the first 20
years of the republic.

The next 30 years saw the military's political control over
all government levels, leaving only limited areas to civilians in
political parties, campuses and ideologically crammed
social/religious organizations.

As a consequence, government power only circulated around
Soeharto. Sadly, this power kept growing to the extent that
Soeharto found it hard to control, covering political, economic
and even intellectual spheres. Those whom wished to become
professors had to obtain Soeharto's approval and signature.
Indonesia finally underwent intellectual, political and economic
degradation as a result of the declining skill of Soeharto in
maneuvering his big power.

The portrait of political leaders over the last five years has
indicated their weak and low-quality leadership performance. The
political elite have served merely as a cosmetic of democracy
instead of carrying out its true essence.

Indonesia's failure to get rid of the present multi-
dimensional crisis is virtually due to the inferior quality of
the current leadership. Hardly any effort has won public
confidence through detailed explanations about past and future
policies, while inter-agency coordination is ineffective.

It is this very dimension that could be noticed in Wiranto's
victory over Akbar Tandjung in the Golkar Party's national
convention on April 20.

Akbar failed to gain support from Golkar politicians because
he belongs to the country's political elite, as speaker of the
House of Representatives (DPR) with a poor institutional
performance. With this awareness among regental/municipal boards,
they cast more votes for Wiranto and Aburizal Bakrie in the first
round of the candidate election. Akbar's first-round lead was
considerably helped by 18 votes from the central board and over
45 from provincial boards.

Golkar Party politicians, known for their perseverance and
even their better performance (in certain cases) in the DPR and
regional legislatures than other parties, of course made profound
consideration of the consequences of their choice in this
convention. They elected a Golkar presidential nominee rather
than party leader. In making Akbar the loser, they actually still
have high respect for Akbar because under his leadership the
Golkar Party will remain consolidated.

The biggest question over the last few days has been: Why
Wiranto? The Golkar Party apparently overlooked the subjective
factor in Wiranto's track record. This party might not consider
his track record a national problem, because when Wiranto was
military commander, Golkar was also dominant in legislative and
executive institutions.

It means that even if Wiranto was seen as flawed, the mistake
was shared collectively in the House and the executive body.
Golkar's courage to choose Wiranto was naturally in the spirit of
its contention that the various subjective issues affecting
Wiranto constituted a collective problem.

The other matter arousing the anxiety of pro-democracy
activists is the possible return of militarism through the legal
and constitutional path of democracy, i.e. general elections.
This fear is certainly reasonable because the past 30 years of
militarism brought leadership regeneration, scientific
developments and democratization to a standstill.

Press freedom, the transition from military to civilian
supremacy and institutionalization of civilian rights will be at
stake if militarism becomes widespread. The trauma of lost
freedom of speech keeps haunting all those once victimized by
militarism.

Wiranto and of course Golkar Party supporting him should
therefore present a platform and outlines of their presidential
working program for handling such public apprehensions. Moreover,
the biggest trauma of militarism is the failure to resolve the
issues of Aceh and Papua peacefully.

Martial law in Aceh, which has claimed human victims on both
sides and impoverished Aceh people, should be included in the
program with a pledge for peaceful settlement. As long as these
commitments to humanity remain unfulfilled, Wiranto and the
Golkar Party will be seen as a political structure rising from
the ashes, but with very slim hope for further transformation.

The writer is Political Analyst at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS).