{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1500000,
        "msgid": "wiranto-golkar-party-militarism-1447899208",
        "date": "2004-04-27 00:00:00",
        "title": "Wiranto, Golkar Party & militarism",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Wiranto, Golkar Party & militarism Indra J. Piliang Jakarta The general election of 2004 is the first golden gate leading to civilian supremacy as well as sovereignty, after the past dominance of a hybrid regime combining authoritarianism and democracy. Besides, it is also part of the effort to phase out political veterans so far limitedly controlling the top of Indonesia's power pyramid.",
        "content": "<p>Wiranto, Golkar Party &amp; militarism<\/p>\n<p>Indra J. Piliang<br>\nJakarta<\/p>\n<p>The general election of 2004 is the first golden gate leading <br>\nto civilian supremacy as well as sovereignty, after the past <br>\ndominance of a hybrid regime combining authoritarianism and <br>\ndemocracy. Besides, it is also part of the effort to phase out <br>\npolitical veterans so far limitedly controlling the top of <br>\nIndonesia's power pyramid.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the opportunity is open for the process of <br>\npolitical regeneration and at the same time recruitment of new <br>\npolitical leaders, with new visions of leadership. In the context <br>\nof change, the election serves as a driving force of political <br>\ninstitutionalization to promote reform principles for public <br>\ninterests.<\/p>\n<p>In terms of leadership, the election is a medium to secure <br>\nleaders capable of boosting political stability while <br>\nincorporating cultural affiliations and elements of leadership <br>\ninto the institutional political system. Indonesia requires <br>\nfigures having not only strong personal character but also the <br>\nability to convince people of the policy to be pursued.<\/p>\n<p>This ideal, however, is difficult to achieve. The monopoly of <br>\npower in the hands of Sukarno and Soeharto for over 50 years of <br>\nIndonesian independence created stagnation in leadership <br>\nregeneration and competition.<\/p>\n<p>So far, the most important source of leaders has comprised <br>\nintellectuals, civilian politicians and military figures. <br>\nCivilian politicians and intellectuals held sway in the first 20 <br>\nyears of the republic.<\/p>\n<p>The next 30 years saw the military's political control over <br>\nall government levels, leaving only limited areas to civilians in <br>\npolitical parties, campuses and ideologically crammed <br>\nsocial\/religious organizations.<\/p>\n<p>As a consequence, government power only circulated around <br>\nSoeharto. Sadly, this power kept growing to the extent that <br>\nSoeharto found it hard to control, covering political, economic <br>\nand even intellectual spheres. Those whom wished to become <br>\nprofessors had to obtain Soeharto's approval and signature. <br>\nIndonesia finally underwent intellectual, political and economic <br>\ndegradation as a result of the declining skill of Soeharto in <br>\nmaneuvering his big power.<\/p>\n<p>The portrait of political leaders over the last five years has <br>\nindicated their weak and low-quality leadership performance. The <br>\npolitical elite have served merely as a cosmetic of democracy <br>\ninstead of carrying out its true essence.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia's failure to get rid of the present multi-<br>\ndimensional crisis is virtually due to the inferior quality of <br>\nthe current leadership. Hardly any effort has won public <br>\nconfidence through detailed explanations about past and future <br>\npolicies, while inter-agency coordination is ineffective.<\/p>\n<p>It is this very dimension that could be noticed in Wiranto's <br>\nvictory over Akbar Tandjung in the Golkar Party's national <br>\nconvention on April 20.<\/p>\n<p>Akbar failed to gain support from Golkar politicians because <br>\nhe belongs to the country's political elite, as speaker of the <br>\nHouse of Representatives (DPR) with a poor institutional <br>\nperformance. With this awareness among regental\/municipal boards, <br>\nthey cast more votes for Wiranto and Aburizal Bakrie in the first <br>\nround of the candidate election. Akbar's first-round lead was <br>\nconsiderably helped by 18 votes from the central board and over <br>\n45 from provincial boards.<\/p>\n<p>Golkar Party politicians, known for their perseverance and <br>\neven their better performance (in certain cases) in the DPR and <br>\nregional legislatures than other parties, of course made profound <br>\nconsideration of the consequences of their choice in this <br>\nconvention. They elected a Golkar presidential nominee rather <br>\nthan party leader. In making Akbar the loser, they actually still <br>\nhave high respect for Akbar because under his leadership the <br>\nGolkar Party will remain consolidated.<\/p>\n<p>The biggest question over the last few days has been: Why <br>\nWiranto? The Golkar Party apparently overlooked the subjective <br>\nfactor in Wiranto's track record. This party might not consider <br>\nhis track record a national problem, because when Wiranto was <br>\nmilitary commander, Golkar was also dominant in legislative and <br>\nexecutive institutions.<\/p>\n<p>It means that even if Wiranto was seen as flawed, the mistake <br>\nwas shared collectively in the House and the executive body. <br>\nGolkar's courage to choose Wiranto was naturally in the spirit of <br>\nits contention that the various subjective issues affecting <br>\nWiranto constituted a collective problem.<\/p>\n<p>The other matter arousing the anxiety of pro-democracy <br>\nactivists is the possible return of militarism through the legal <br>\nand constitutional path of democracy, i.e. general elections. <br>\nThis fear is certainly reasonable because the past 30 years of <br>\nmilitarism brought leadership regeneration, scientific <br>\ndevelopments and democratization to a standstill.<\/p>\n<p>Press freedom, the transition from military to civilian <br>\nsupremacy and institutionalization of civilian rights will be at <br>\nstake if militarism becomes widespread. The trauma of lost <br>\nfreedom of speech keeps haunting all those once victimized by <br>\nmilitarism.<\/p>\n<p>Wiranto and of course Golkar Party supporting him should <br>\ntherefore present a platform and outlines of their presidential <br>\nworking program for handling such public apprehensions. Moreover, <br>\nthe biggest trauma of militarism is the failure to resolve the <br>\nissues of Aceh and Papua peacefully.<\/p>\n<p>Martial law in Aceh, which has claimed human victims on both <br>\nsides and impoverished Aceh people, should be included in the <br>\nprogram with a pledge for peaceful settlement. As long as these <br>\ncommitments to humanity remain unfulfilled, Wiranto and the <br>\nGolkar Party will be seen as a political structure rising from <br>\nthe ashes, but with very slim hope for further transformation.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is Political Analyst at the Center for Strategic <br>\nand International Studies (CSIS).<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/wiranto-golkar-party-militarism-1447899208",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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