The masquerade of U.S. exercises
The masquerade of U.S. exercises
Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asia News Network
The Balikatan 02-1 joint RP-U.S. military exercises, launched
last January, are nearly halfway through their six-month time
frame, but the troops have not been involved in serious
encounters with the Abu Sayyaf.
The slow progress of the operations is fueling a public demand
for action and also the perception that the exercises have
developed into a "phony war." From American sources who have
visited the Basilan "front," the objective seems to be to spring
the three hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf -- an American couple
and a Filipino -- following which the troops would pour in to
flush out the Abu Sayyaf.
In this scenario, it is considered important for the Americans
to show results and deliver the message not only to Filipino
groups but also foreign groups linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist
networks that sure retribution follows attacks on the U.S.
heartland, as well as American citizens anywhere in the world --
a reminder of the protection the Roman empire accorded Roman
citizens in its far-flung conquered territories.
The time, however, for staying on the periphery of combat
zones is running out. If no decisive action is taken within a few
weeks, the public support for Balikatan 02-1 will erode.
Despite the euphemism of "training exercises," few Filipinos
are fooled by this description; they consider them as war or
combat primarily designed to eradicate the Abu Sayyaf and
secondarily only to improve the fighting ability of Filipino
soldiers aided by American high-tech weaponry.
Let's call a spade a spade. The public favors the American
military presence in Basilan for a limited and focused objective.
The exercises are targeted at live enemies and are not just a
display of new weaponry. Public opinion has ignored the
criticisms raised by nationalists and the Left over issues of
sovereignty and the specter of a prolonged American military
presence in Mindanao.
The test is the result in wiping out the Abu Sayyaf armed
component, following which civic action projects could follow to
attack the root causes of outlawry and terrorism.
Once the exercises can deliver swift military victory, all the
criticisms against the exercises and the semantical description
of the exercises will just die.
The government's initiative in allowing U.S. military
intervention in the Abu Sayyaf campaign has the benefit of public
opinion momentum.
If the exercises fail to produce a military victory, they
would end up as a paper exhibition of military technology and
troop movements.
Even as the special forces and Filipino troops are probing
into the heart of the Abu Sayyaf positions, there is already talk
of expanding the Balikatan 02-1 into Balikatan 02-2, with more
troops and shifting the venue to Luzon. Also, the defense
department is planning for expanded multinational exercises, in
which troops from other countries will participate.
There's nothing wrong with forward military planning as a
continuity of Balikatan 02-1, but the next Balikatan and the
expanded multinational exercises will require the amendment of
the terms of reference that now govern the current Basilan
exercises.
Already, the contemplated expansion of the Balikatan exercises
involving a larger number of U.S. troops than the 600 now
involved in the Basilan operations is fueling criticism and
suspicion of American intentions to use the Philippines as a
staging ground for anti-terrorist actions in neighboring
countries tagged by President George W. Bush as sanctuaries of
al-Qaeda terrorist cells.
The defense department, as well as its U.S. sponsors, is
biting morsels too large to swallow. The current exercises should
first deliver military results to pave the way for public
acceptance and support of expanded exercises. The build-up on
Balikatan 02-1 has whetted the public appetite for action. If it
succeeds, it would be easier to justify the expanded exercises.
Nothing validates foreign policy initiatives better than success.