The masquerade of U.S. exercises<\/p>\n
Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asia News Network<\/p>\n
The Balikatan 02-1 joint RP-U.S. military exercises, launched
\nlast January, are nearly halfway through their six-month time
\nframe, but the troops have not been involved in serious
\nencounters with the Abu Sayyaf.<\/p>\n
The slow progress of the operations is fueling a public demand
\nfor action and also the perception that the exercises have
\ndeveloped into a "phony war." From American sources who have
\nvisited the Basilan "front," the objective seems to be to spring
\nthe three hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf -- an American couple
\nand a Filipino -- following which the troops would pour in to
\nflush out the Abu Sayyaf.<\/p>\n
In this scenario, it is considered important for the Americans
\nto show results and deliver the message not only to Filipino
\ngroups but also foreign groups linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist
\nnetworks that sure retribution follows attacks on the U.S.
\nheartland, as well as American citizens anywhere in the world --
\na reminder of the protection the Roman empire accorded Roman
\ncitizens in its far-flung conquered territories.<\/p>\n
The time, however, for staying on the periphery of combat
\nzones is running out. If no decisive action is taken within a few
\nweeks, the public support for Balikatan 02-1 will erode.<\/p>\n
Despite the euphemism of "training exercises," few Filipinos
\nare fooled by this description; they consider them as war or
\ncombat primarily designed to eradicate the Abu Sayyaf and
\nsecondarily only to improve the fighting ability of Filipino
\nsoldiers aided by American high-tech weaponry.<\/p>\n
Let's call a spade a spade. The public favors the American
\nmilitary presence in Basilan for a limited and focused objective.
\nThe exercises are targeted at live enemies and are not just a
\ndisplay of new weaponry. Public opinion has ignored the
\ncriticisms raised by nationalists and the Left over issues of
\nsovereignty and the specter of a prolonged American military
\npresence in Mindanao.<\/p>\n
The test is the result in wiping out the Abu Sayyaf armed
\ncomponent, following which civic action projects could follow to
\nattack the root causes of outlawry and terrorism.<\/p>\n
Once the exercises can deliver swift military victory, all the
\ncriticisms against the exercises and the semantical description
\nof the exercises will just die.<\/p>\n
The government's initiative in allowing U.S. military
\nintervention in the Abu Sayyaf campaign has the benefit of public
\nopinion momentum.<\/p>\n
If the exercises fail to produce a military victory, they
\nwould end up as a paper exhibition of military technology and
\ntroop movements.<\/p>\n
Even as the special forces and Filipino troops are probing
\ninto the heart of the Abu Sayyaf positions, there is already talk
\nof expanding the Balikatan 02-1 into Balikatan 02-2, with more
\ntroops and shifting the venue to Luzon. Also, the defense
\ndepartment is planning for expanded multinational exercises, in
\nwhich troops from other countries will participate.<\/p>\n
There's nothing wrong with forward military planning as a
\ncontinuity of Balikatan 02-1, but the next Balikatan and the
\nexpanded multinational exercises will require the amendment of
\nthe terms of reference that now govern the current Basilan
\nexercises.<\/p>\n
Already, the contemplated expansion of the Balikatan exercises
\ninvolving a larger number of U.S. troops than the 600 now
\ninvolved in the Basilan operations is fueling criticism and
\nsuspicion of American intentions to use the Philippines as a
\nstaging ground for anti-terrorist actions in neighboring
\ncountries tagged by President George W. Bush as sanctuaries of
\nal-Qaeda terrorist cells.<\/p>\n
The defense department, as well as its U.S. sponsors, is
\nbiting morsels too large to swallow. The current exercises should
\nfirst deliver military results to pave the way for public
\nacceptance and support of expanded exercises. The build-up on
\nBalikatan 02-1 has whetted the public appetite for action. If it
\nsucceeds, it would be easier to justify the expanded exercises.
\nNothing validates foreign policy initiatives better than success.<\/p>",
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