Terrorism in Indonesia

Terrorism in Indonesia

Sidney Jones
Jakarta

2005 brought a sobering reminder of the lethal power of
terrorism:

* 6 Indonesians shot as they slept in Ceram, Maluku on May 16;

* 22 Indonesians killed by a bomb in a crowded Saturday
morning market in Tentena, Central Sulawesi on May 28;

* 14 Indonesians and 6 foreigners killed by suicide bombers in
Bali on 1 October.

Other attacks on civilians in Maluku and Poso during the year
pushed the death toll higher, although many of these were locally
inspired and harder to link to any concept of global jihad.

The year also brought welcome indications of the increasing
efficacy of the Indonesian police to track down suspects and
break up terrorist networks. The Nov. 9 killing of "master
bomber" Dr Azhari Husin and the arrest of other members of the
suicide brigade that he and Noordin Mohamad Top helped create
were the most spectacular examples of this, but there were many
others.

In the aftermath of the Ceram attack, for example, police were
not only able to arrest three of the perpetrators in very short
order. They also were able to piece together the elements of a
mujahidin-preman alliance that has been responsible acts of
lethal violence going back to 2001.

But 2005 was not just about action and reaction. It was also
about the evolution of terrorist organizations and shifts in
public perceptions.

It became increasingly clear during the year that Jamaah
Islamiyah, the largest of Indonesia's jihadist organizations but
by no means the only one, was divided. A small faction, inspired
by but not directed by al-Qaeda, seeks to continue to wage a
jihad against the U.S. and its allies -- especially Australia --
on Indonesian soil.

The ideological justification for that jihad might be
summarized as follows:

* The U.S. and its allies are leading a Christian-Zionist
conspiracy to destroy Islam

* Non-Muslims are kafir (infidels) and therefore by definition
enemies of Islam; a defensive jihad entails attacks on kafirs
either to pre-empt attacks by them or to take revenge for losses
already incurred.

* Muslim rulers who ally with the U.S. and its allies are
thought, by definition acting against Islam and therefore for all
practical purposes kafir. (This would be the ideological basis
for attacks on Indonesian officials and institutions, which have
thus far been rare.)

* All Americans and civilians of countries allied with the
U.S. are enemies because they pay taxes that finance the war
machine against Muslims or elect representatives and officials
who are spearheading that effort. The division between civilians
and military is irrelevant.

* Kafir deaths are justified as an appropriate response to the
millions of Muslims killed, injured, or rendered homeless by the
U.S. and its lackeys in Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya,
Bosnia, the Sudan, and elsewhere.

* The killing of innocent Muslims in order to attain victory
over kafirs is acceptable collateral damage.

This view was associated most closely with the Indonesians
associated with the Lukman al-Hakiem pesantren in Malaysia, like
Hambali, Muchlas, Dulmatin, Abu Dujana and Imam Samudra, as well
as Noordin and Azhari. It never had strong support within the
rest of JI, and it appears to be losing ground.

The other faction of JI is more committed to dakwah as a means
of building a mass base and working toward the establishment an
Islamic state, more along the lines of the original Darul Islam
movement from which JI emerged. It opposes the bombers not only
because it regards their interpretation of jihad as wrong, but
also because it believes they have engaged in activities that
squandered resources and weakened the organization. This faction
may be more "benign" in the short term, but its members are still
committed to acquiring the military capacity to take on enemies
-- defined as including those who actively try to prevent the
gradual expansion of their influence. Once young recruits develop
skills in bomb-making and precision shooting, even if for
different aims than Noordin and company, they are going to be a
problem.

But that's just JI. One of the things 2005 taught us was how
complex mujahidin networks are. The year saw the trials of Rois
and others involved in the Kuningan bombing. They weren't JI,
they were from a splinter of Darul Islam known as Ring Banten --
but they had trained with JI in Poso and worked with Noordin and
Azhari on the embassy attack.

The attack in Ceram involved three men from Poso linked to
Mujahidin Kayamanya; a Darul Islam member from Riau; a KOMPAK-
affiliated man from Tasikmalaya; and a few local thugs. None was
JI. But the men from Poso had trained in Ambon, and the Darul
Islam and KOMPAK men had fought in Poso.

More than ever before, we began to understand how important
those conflict areas were in producing new recruits, new
linkages, and a new generation of jihadist leaders with real
combat experience. After all, the Afghan alumni are now aging;
the first Indonesians began training on the Afghan border in
1985, and the skills of many are rusty. The Maluku-Poso
generation is fresher, battle-hardened, and probably more
militant. We are not talking about large numbers of men, but
neither are they just a handful of hardliners concentrated in
Solo. Their network, as the Ceram attack shows, is nationwide.

The year also brought home the realization to many here that
suicide bombing has taken root here as a standard terrorist
technique. In Bali II, for the first time ever, we had three
young men used in a single attack. It's not enough to disseminate
teachings showing that suicide is forbidden under Islamic law,
because those who promote the practice do not consider it
suicide. More important is understanding who they are, what their
backgrounds are, how they get recruited, what arguments are used,
and what criteria the recruiters are looking for. We now have ten
men who have killed themselves while engaged in terrorist
attacks, or in one case in an accident while planning one (two in
Bali I, one in the Makassar bombs of December 2002; one in the
Marriott, one in Kuningan, one accidentally in Poso, and three in
Bali II; and one who blew himself up rather than be captured by
police at the time that Azhari was killed). We also have
detainees, such as Wiwid, arrested in November, who reportedly
was being trained as a suicide bomber, men in prison known to
have helped recruit candidate bombers. This is a substantial data
set that needs an in-depth analysis so programs to prevent new
recruitment can be developed.

If 2005 brought change and mutation within terrorist networks,
it also brought a real shift in public perceptions -- especially
after Bali II. It was the videotape found of the suicide bombers
that seems to have turned the tide, led Vice President Jusuf
Kalla to take the important step of inviting ulama to his home to
watch and discuss it and led the ulama themselves to decide to
take action. Why only now? It was not the first time that
jihadist videotapes had been found, but it was the first time
that such compelling evidence had been so quickly shown on
national television. It was also the first time anyone had seen
very young Indonesians talk about martyrdom, knowing that by the
time they were watching, the men were already dead.

Since May 2000 when the first JI bombing attack took place in
Medan until late 2005, all counter-terror efforts had focused on
intelligence and law enforcement. With Bali II, it looked as
though the Indonesian government was going to put more effort in
understanding why this phenomenon was happening, not just react
to the violence.

The international climate during 2005 made counter-terror
efforts in Indonesia more difficult. Daily images of suicide
attacks in Iraq, revelations about the use of white phosphorous
in Falluja, atrocities in Abu Ghraib and other U.S.-controlled
detention centers, "ghost" prisons, and other horrors
unquestionably helped the jihadist cause. But with few
exceptions, anger over international events alone does not
produce terrorists. If it did, then Indonesia really would be a
hotbed. Local factors are always more important, and if in 1999-
2000, Ambon and Poso were the driving forces, we need to
understand what took their place in 2005.

Likewise, poverty is not the root cause. Yes, two of the three
suicide bombers came from very poor families, and neither Iqbal
in Bali I, nor Heri Golun, in the Kuningan attack, were well-off.
But people who join mujahidin networks come from across the
socioeconomic spectrum. If poverty drives young men into
terrorism, how do we explain why Heri Golun, and not his friends
allowed himself to become a "bridegroom" as suicide bombers are
called? And why have we seen so few terrorists emerge from the
underclass of Jakarta?

2005 did not bring answers. But by year's end, more and more
people were beginning to ask the right questions.

The writer is Director of the Southeast Asia Project of
International Crisis Group, Jakarta.