Terrorism in Indonesia<\/p>\n
Sidney Jones
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
2005 brought a sobering reminder of the lethal power of
\nterrorism:<\/p>\n
* 6 Indonesians shot as they slept in Ceram, Maluku on May 16;<\/p>\n
* 22 Indonesians killed by a bomb in a crowded Saturday
\nmorning market in Tentena, Central Sulawesi on May 28;<\/p>\n
* 14 Indonesians and 6 foreigners killed by suicide bombers in
\nBali on 1 October.<\/p>\n
Other attacks on civilians in Maluku and Poso during the year
\npushed the death toll higher, although many of these were locally
\ninspired and harder to link to any concept of global jihad.<\/p>\n
The year also brought welcome indications of the increasing
\nefficacy of the Indonesian police to track down suspects and
\nbreak up terrorist networks. The Nov. 9 killing of \"master
\nbomber\" Dr Azhari Husin and the arrest of other members of the
\nsuicide brigade that he and Noordin Mohamad Top helped create
\nwere the most spectacular examples of this, but there were many
\nothers.<\/p>\n
In the aftermath of the Ceram attack, for example, police were
\nnot only able to arrest three of the perpetrators in very short
\norder. They also were able to piece together the elements of a
\nmujahidin-preman alliance that has been responsible acts of
\nlethal violence going back to 2001.<\/p>\n
But 2005 was not just about action and reaction. It was also
\nabout the evolution of terrorist organizations and shifts in
\npublic perceptions.<\/p>\n
It became increasingly clear during the year that Jamaah
\nIslamiyah, the largest of Indonesia's jihadist organizations but
\nby no means the only one, was divided. A small faction, inspired
\nby but not directed by al-Qaeda, seeks to continue to wage a
\njihad against the U.S. and its allies -- especially Australia --
\non Indonesian soil.<\/p>\n
The ideological justification for that jihad might be
\nsummarized as follows:<\/p>\n
* The U.S. and its allies are leading a Christian-Zionist
\nconspiracy to destroy Islam<\/p>\n
* Non-Muslims are kafir (infidels) and therefore by definition
\nenemies of Islam; a defensive jihad entails attacks on kafirs
\neither to pre-empt attacks by them or to take revenge for losses
\nalready incurred.<\/p>\n
* Muslim rulers who ally with the U.S. and its allies are
\nthought, by definition acting against Islam and therefore for all
\npractical purposes kafir. (This would be the ideological basis
\nfor attacks on Indonesian officials and institutions, which have
\nthus far been rare.)<\/p>\n
* All Americans and civilians of countries allied with the
\nU.S. are enemies because they pay taxes that finance the war
\nmachine against Muslims or elect representatives and officials
\nwho are spearheading that effort. The division between civilians
\nand military is irrelevant.<\/p>\n
* Kafir deaths are justified as an appropriate response to the
\nmillions of Muslims killed, injured, or rendered homeless by the
\nU.S. and its lackeys in Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya,
\nBosnia, the Sudan, and elsewhere.<\/p>\n
* The killing of innocent Muslims in order to attain victory
\nover kafirs is acceptable collateral damage.<\/p>\n
This view was associated most closely with the Indonesians
\nassociated with the Lukman al-Hakiem pesantren in Malaysia, like
\nHambali, Muchlas, Dulmatin, Abu Dujana and Imam Samudra, as well
\nas Noordin and Azhari. It never had strong support within the
\nrest of JI, and it appears to be losing ground.<\/p>\n
The other faction of JI is more committed to dakwah as a means
\nof building a mass base and working toward the establishment an
\nIslamic state, more along the lines of the original Darul Islam
\nmovement from which JI emerged. It opposes the bombers not only
\nbecause it regards their interpretation of jihad as wrong, but
\nalso because it believes they have engaged in activities that
\nsquandered resources and weakened the organization. This faction
\nmay be more \"benign\" in the short term, but its members are still
\ncommitted to acquiring the military capacity to take on enemies
\n-- defined as including those who actively try to prevent the
\ngradual expansion of their influence. Once young recruits develop
\nskills in bomb-making and precision shooting, even if for
\ndifferent aims than Noordin and company, they are going to be a
\nproblem.<\/p>\n
But that's just JI. One of the things 2005 taught us was how
\ncomplex mujahidin networks are. The year saw the trials of Rois
\nand others involved in the Kuningan bombing. They weren't JI,
\nthey were from a splinter of Darul Islam known as Ring Banten --
\nbut they had trained with JI in Poso and worked with Noordin and
\nAzhari on the embassy attack.<\/p>\n
The attack in Ceram involved three men from Poso linked to
\nMujahidin Kayamanya; a Darul Islam member from Riau; a KOMPAK-
\naffiliated man from Tasikmalaya; and a few local thugs. None was
\nJI. But the men from Poso had trained in Ambon, and the Darul
\nIslam and KOMPAK men had fought in Poso.<\/p>\n
More than ever before, we began to understand how important
\nthose conflict areas were in producing new recruits, new
\nlinkages, and a new generation of jihadist leaders with real
\ncombat experience. After all, the Afghan alumni are now aging;
\nthe first Indonesians began training on the Afghan border in
\n1985, and the skills of many are rusty. The Maluku-Poso
\ngeneration is fresher, battle-hardened, and probably more
\nmilitant. We are not talking about large numbers of men, but
\nneither are they just a handful of hardliners concentrated in
\nSolo. Their network, as the Ceram attack shows, is nationwide.<\/p>\n
The year also brought home the realization to many here that
\nsuicide bombing has taken root here as a standard terrorist
\ntechnique. In Bali II, for the first time ever, we had three
\nyoung men used in a single attack. It's not enough to disseminate
\nteachings showing that suicide is forbidden under Islamic law,
\nbecause those who promote the practice do not consider it
\nsuicide. More important is understanding who they are, what their
\nbackgrounds are, how they get recruited, what arguments are used,
\nand what criteria the recruiters are looking for. We now have ten
\nmen who have killed themselves while engaged in terrorist
\nattacks, or in one case in an accident while planning one (two in
\nBali I, one in the Makassar bombs of December 2002; one in the
\nMarriott, one in Kuningan, one accidentally in Poso, and three in
\nBali II; and one who blew himself up rather than be captured by
\npolice at the time that Azhari was killed). We also have
\ndetainees, such as Wiwid, arrested in November, who reportedly
\nwas being trained as a suicide bomber, men in prison known to
\nhave helped recruit candidate bombers. This is a substantial data
\nset that needs an in-depth analysis so programs to prevent new
\nrecruitment can be developed.<\/p>\n
If 2005 brought change and mutation within terrorist networks,
\nit also brought a real shift in public perceptions -- especially
\nafter Bali II. It was the videotape found of the suicide bombers
\nthat seems to have turned the tide, led Vice President Jusuf
\nKalla to take the important step of inviting ulama to his home to
\nwatch and discuss it and led the ulama themselves to decide to
\ntake action. Why only now? It was not the first time that
\njihadist videotapes had been found, but it was the first time
\nthat such compelling evidence had been so quickly shown on
\nnational television. It was also the first time anyone had seen
\nvery young Indonesians talk about martyrdom, knowing that by the
\ntime they were watching, the men were already dead.<\/p>\n
Since May 2000 when the first JI bombing attack took place in
\nMedan until late 2005, all counter-terror efforts had focused on
\nintelligence and law enforcement. With Bali II, it looked as
\nthough the Indonesian government was going to put more effort in
\nunderstanding why this phenomenon was happening, not just react
\nto the violence.<\/p>\n
The international climate during 2005 made counter-terror
\nefforts in Indonesia more difficult. Daily images of suicide
\nattacks in Iraq, revelations about the use of white phosphorous
\nin Falluja, atrocities in Abu Ghraib and other U.S.-controlled
\ndetention centers, \"ghost\" prisons, and other horrors
\nunquestionably helped the jihadist cause. But with few
\nexceptions, anger over international events alone does not
\nproduce terrorists. If it did, then Indonesia really would be a
\nhotbed. Local factors are always more important, and if in 1999-
\n2000, Ambon and Poso were the driving forces, we need to
\nunderstand what took their place in 2005.<\/p>\n
Likewise, poverty is not the root cause. Yes, two of the three
\nsuicide bombers came from very poor families, and neither Iqbal
\nin Bali I, nor Heri Golun, in the Kuningan attack, were well-off.
\nBut people who join mujahidin networks come from across the
\nsocioeconomic spectrum. If poverty drives young men into
\nterrorism, how do we explain why Heri Golun, and not his friends
\nallowed himself to become a \"bridegroom\" as suicide bombers are
\ncalled? And why have we seen so few terrorists emerge from the
\nunderclass of Jakarta?<\/p>\n
2005 did not bring answers. But by year's end, more and more
\npeople were beginning to ask the right questions.<\/p>\n
The writer is Director of the Southeast Asia Project of
\nInternational Crisis Group, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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