Taking the fight against terrorism to the high seas

Taking the fight against terrorism to the high seas

Graham Gerard Ong
Research Associate
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
The Straits Times
Asia News Network
Singapore

The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) meeting on
maritime security that opens in London today could not have been
more timely.

There is increasing evidence that al-Qaeda's terrorist network
has taken sail through their attempts on ports and ships
worldwide. The Association of Southeast Asian's (ASEAN) maritime
states have a crucial interest in seeing that maritime terrorism
is kept at bay.

Terrorism expert David Claridge of Janusian Securities
believes that the Bali attack on Oct. 12 was a declaration of war
on the global economy. Taped statements by two top leaders of al-
Qaeda have also alluded to attacks on "economic lifelines". These
immediately refer to commercial shipping lanes as a key avenue.

If we delve deeper into Claridge's reading of the Bali attack,
then the subtext in the main message becomes apparent: We will
take to the waters; your ships will not be safe at port or sea.

Coincidentally or not, the Bali attack corresponded with the
second anniversary of al-Qaeda's devastating assault on the USS
Cole at a port in Yemen in 2000. The suicide bombing of a French-
flagged ship, the Limburg, off Yemen on Oct. 6 this year serves
as additional forewarning.

In a recent discovery of a collection of poems written by
supporters of al-Qaeda that was meant for public distribution,
one piece signed by Mukhtar Said hails the attack on the USS
Cole. He urges other young men to follow the path of those "who
plunged into the seas steadfastly".

The sudden spate of terrorist plots on ships in Southeast Asia
tempers symbolism and verse with reality. According to
intelligence sources, masterminds of the USS Cole attack planned
another attack on a U.S. ship visiting a Malaysian port in 2000.
Earlier this year, Singapore intelligence disrupted an al-Qaeda
plot to attack another U.S. ship.

Detained senior al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq, who helped
set up several terrorist training camps in Southeast Asia, also
told officials of plans to attack an American naval ship in
Surabaya, Indonesia's second-largest port.

The utility of maritime attacks in Southeast Asia and,
critically, in the Malacca Straits, the jugular of the region's
maritime trade, is unmistakable. The Malacca Straits is a highly
strategic sea-lane that handles voluminous amounts of regional
import and export cargo, as well as 80 percent of Japan's oil.
Between 150 and 900 ships pass through it daily.

Singapore's harbor, the world's busiest transit port, sits on
this strait as a hub in the global economic lifeline.

However, maritime terrorism attempts in the region so far have
failed.

There may be various reasons explaining their lack of
achievement. One of them is the lack of expertise in getting it
right. While al-Qaeda may have the material resources to conduct
maritime attacks, they do not necessarily possess the skills in
maritime craft and seafaring.

Regional authorities should not exclude a nexus between
terrorism and piracy. It makes sense for terrorists to co-opt
pirates' expertise into their training program. One should not
forget that the Sept. 11 attacks were successful largely because
the perpetrators were trained as skilled airline pilots.

Pirates in Southeast Asia have already proven themselves.
According to the International Maritime Bureau, pirates have
carried out 20 successful attacks and hijackings along the
Malacca Straits and 72 such activities around Indonesia between
Jan. 1 to Sept. 30.

In the end, even if terrorists decide to go it alone,
technology will arbitrate the prospect for further failure.
According to maritime security analyst Vijay Sakhuja, dual-use
technologies such as the Global Positioning System (GPS),
satellite communications systems, sea-sport scooters, scuba
diving equipment and mini-submarines are being added to the
inventory list of maritime terrorists. These items are within al-
Qaeda's purchasing power.

Naval escorts and anti-boarding measures should be the last
line of prevention. The frontline of defense is good
intelligence.

The safest gauge of success for states is one that increases
the margin between the initial intention of terrorists and their
execution of a plan. The best attack is to hunt them down
viciously.

The IMO conference would do well to tackle threats to maritime
security in several ways.

First, there is an even greater need right now to enhance the
cooperative efforts between intelligence agencies across states.

Second, it would do well to reclassify piracy under maritime
terrorism. This would ratchet the threat of an age-old criminal
activity into a crucial security issue. While the two activities
operate on different aims, they share a similar medium for action
and create a near equal impact on political and economic
stability.

Thirdly, the fight against piracy should become the point of
entry in the fight against maritime terrorism as both activities
are carried out through similar media and tactics. This avoids
duplication in formulating counteractive strategies and use of
resources.

The intelligence community would also do well to move beyond
the conventional calculus in uncovering the next move of
terrorists. A stronger grounding in culture and history and a
dose of imagination can serve as a bridge over prevailing
information gaps. As long as analysts and officials hold on to
predictable assumptions about the next step terrorists will take,
they will continue to be stumped.

Amid the heat of speculation about how Osama bin Laden would
flee Afghanistan, no one suspected that he would utilize his
family links with the tribesmen of the Hadhra Maug to assist him
in his journey towards Yemen by traditional dhow across the
Arabian Sea. This was obviously a means of transport too
uninteresting to receive notice by intelligence agencies.

The point here is that all possible avenues and links between
militant Islamic groups and other actors such as pirates and
organized criminals must be investigated. Analysts must leave
nothing to chance.

For the moment, to use Sakhuja's words, Southeast Asia's
"maritime infrastructure" will continue to be "the soft belly of
states that can be attacked with little effort". An attack to the
belly is enough to cause the strongest of people to keel over in
incapacitation and defeat.