Positioning the Police within Democracy

The idea of placing the Indonesian National Police (Polri) under a ministry has emerged as an alternative discourse on security governance. This proposal is driven by the desire to strengthen administrative control and prevent domination by a single executive body. However, constitutionally and philosophically, this idea contains fundamental problems.

The police is not merely an administrative unit of government, but rather the holder of the state’s coercive power, which cannot be treated the same as a technical agency within a ministry. The central question arises: where should Polri be positioned within the governmental structure of a democratic state that respects the rule of law and civil supremacy?

The Constitution and Executive Sphere

The 1945 Constitution affirms that the President holds governmental power in accordance with the Constitution (Article 4, paragraph 1), which encompasses all executive instruments, including the police as a state apparatus in the field of security and public order. In various literature on the separation of powers, the executive is understood as the implementer and enforcer of the law, so law enforcement bodies are conceptually placed with a clear chain of command to the head of the executive.

Montesquieu in The Spirit of Laws asserted the necessity of separating legislative, executive, and judicial functions to protect political freedom from the concentration of power. This idea was subsequently adopted in various modern constitutions, including Indonesia, which adopted the Trias Politica doctrine. M.J.C. Vile in Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers demonstrated that this doctrine became one of the most central principles in the evolution of governance, with the aim of preventing tyranny, ensuring checks and balances, and ensuring that the executive branch, including law enforcement, operates within the bounds of the law.

From a constitutional perspective, the 1945 Constitution does not recognise Polri as subordinate to a ministry. Article 30, paragraph 4, explicitly refers to Polri as a state apparatus, not a ministry apparatus, whilst Article 17, paragraph 1, affirms that ministries are merely assistants to the President, not holders of direct mandate from the people. Placing Polri under a ministry would mean adding a layer of bureaucracy not mandated by the constitution and potentially obscuring the chain of command and accountability.

Article 8 of Law No. 2 of 2002 affirms that Polri is under the President. This placement is not a temporary political choice, but rather a logical consequence of the 1945 Constitutional design. This relationship is institutional: between the holder of governmental power and the state apparatus that performs coercive functions.

Democratic Policing, Reform, and Civil Control

This positioning is aligned with the principle of democratic policing developed by David H. Bayley. Bayley emphasises that police in a democracy must be “accountable to the law rather than government”, protect human rights, and work transparently and accountably to the public. To achieve this, the position of the police must be placed within a structure that guarantees strong civilian control, whilst simultaneously limiting political interference in the handling of specific cases.

The President, as the holder of a mandate from the people whose power is limited by the constitution, plays the role of establishing policy direction, whilst Polri implements operational functions and law enforcement in accordance with democratic and constitutional policing principles. Placing Polri directly under the President strengthens unity of loyalty, prevents the fragmentation of sectoral interests, and clarifies who should be held accountable when deviations occur.

Policy Control, Not Intervention

Polri being under the President does not mean the President has the right to intervene in the process of law enforcement. In a rule-of-law state, law enforcement must be free from the interference of power in the handling of specific cases. This freedom is functional rather than structural: the President controls policy, not cases.

The concept of constitutional policing places adherence to the constitution, protection of rights, and accountability as the basis for police legitimacy. The President establishes priorities and standards for security policy, whilst Polri carries out investigation, prosecution, and daily police activities without political pressure on specific cases. Judicial and parliamentary oversight, clear regulation, and participation by civil society become key to preventing the abuse of the state’s coercive power. Polri’s position under the President must be accompanied by strengthening ethics, accountability, and a civil culture within the police.

Ministries Assisting, Not Replacing

From a human rights perspective, clarity in structure strengthens human rights protection. Restrictions on human rights are only valid if carried out by legitimate, responsible, and accountable power. The President, as holder of executive power, is responsible for security policies that have an impact on human rights, whilst Polri becomes the implementer of that policy. If violations occur, responsibility does not stop with those in the field, but rises to the level of policy and national leadership.

Placing Polri directly under the President also affirms the principle of unity of command at the national level. The security sector cannot be pulled into the interests of sectoral ministries, which could create overlapping policies and fragmentation of loyalty. Within this framework, ministries play a role in assisting the President, not replacing his position as the direct superior of Polri.

The Core Problem: Oversight and Ethics

The discourse about moving Polri under a ministry generally stems from concerns about the potential for abuse of power or political bias. However, the main problem is not the structural position of Polri under the President, but rather weak oversight and enforcement of ethics, both internal and external. In their report Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature, published by the Vera Institute, J. Miller and colleagues summarise various models of civilian oversight, ranging from ombudsmen to complaints commissions, and demonstrate that the effectiveness of police accountability depends not on the structural arrangement, but on the robustness of oversight mechanisms and the commitment of political and police leadership to upholding democratic principles.