The idea of placing the Indonesian National Police (Polri) under a\nministry has emerged as an alternative discourse on security governance.\nThis proposal is driven by the desire to strengthen administrative\ncontrol and prevent domination by a single executive body. However,\nconstitutionally and philosophically, this idea contains fundamental\nproblems.<\/p>\n
The police is not merely an administrative unit of government, but\nrather the holder of the state\u2019s coercive power, which cannot be treated\nthe same as a technical agency within a ministry. The central question\narises: where should Polri be positioned within the governmental\nstructure of a democratic state that respects the rule of law and civil\nsupremacy?<\/p>\n
The Constitution and Executive Sphere<\/p>\n
The 1945 Constitution affirms that the President holds governmental\npower in accordance with the Constitution (Article 4, paragraph 1),\nwhich encompasses all executive instruments, including the police as a\nstate apparatus in the field of security and public order. In various\nliterature on the separation of powers, the executive is understood as\nthe implementer and enforcer of the law, so law enforcement bodies are\nconceptually placed with a clear chain of command to the head of the\nexecutive.<\/p>\n
Montesquieu in The Spirit of Laws asserted the necessity of\nseparating legislative, executive, and judicial functions to protect\npolitical freedom from the concentration of power. This idea was\nsubsequently adopted in various modern constitutions, including\nIndonesia, which adopted the Trias Politica doctrine. M.J.C. Vile in\nConstitutionalism and the Separation of Powers demonstrated that this\ndoctrine became one of the most central principles in the evolution of\ngovernance, with the aim of preventing tyranny, ensuring checks and\nbalances, and ensuring that the executive branch, including law\nenforcement, operates within the bounds of the law.<\/p>\n
From a constitutional perspective, the 1945 Constitution does not\nrecognise Polri as subordinate to a ministry. Article 30, paragraph 4,\nexplicitly refers to Polri as a state apparatus, not a ministry\napparatus, whilst Article 17, paragraph 1, affirms that ministries are\nmerely assistants to the President, not holders of direct mandate from\nthe people. Placing Polri under a ministry would mean adding a layer of\nbureaucracy not mandated by the constitution and potentially obscuring\nthe chain of command and accountability.<\/p>\n
Article 8 of Law No.\u00a02 of 2002 affirms that Polri is under the\nPresident. This placement is not a temporary political choice, but\nrather a logical consequence of the 1945 Constitutional design. This\nrelationship is institutional: between the holder of governmental power\nand the state apparatus that performs coercive functions.<\/p>\n
Democratic Policing, Reform, and Civil Control<\/p>\n
This positioning is aligned with the principle of democratic policing\ndeveloped by David H. Bayley. Bayley emphasises that police in a\ndemocracy must be \u201caccountable to the law rather than government\u201d,\nprotect human rights, and work transparently and accountably to the\npublic. To achieve this, the position of the police must be placed\nwithin a structure that guarantees strong civilian control, whilst\nsimultaneously limiting political interference in the handling of\nspecific cases.<\/p>\n
The President, as the holder of a mandate from the people whose power\nis limited by the constitution, plays the role of establishing policy\ndirection, whilst Polri implements operational functions and law\nenforcement in accordance with democratic and constitutional policing\nprinciples. Placing Polri directly under the President strengthens unity\nof loyalty, prevents the fragmentation of sectoral interests, and\nclarifies who should be held accountable when deviations occur.<\/p>\n
Policy Control, Not Intervention<\/p>\n
Polri being under the President does not mean the President has the\nright to intervene in the process of law enforcement. In a rule-of-law\nstate, law enforcement must be free from the interference of power in\nthe handling of specific cases. This freedom is functional rather than\nstructural: the President controls policy, not cases.<\/p>\n
The concept of constitutional policing places adherence to the\nconstitution, protection of rights, and accountability as the basis for\npolice legitimacy. The President establishes priorities and standards\nfor security policy, whilst Polri carries out investigation,\nprosecution, and daily police activities without political pressure on\nspecific cases. Judicial and parliamentary oversight, clear regulation,\nand participation by civil society become key to preventing the abuse of\nthe state\u2019s coercive power. Polri\u2019s position under the President must be\naccompanied by strengthening ethics, accountability, and a civil culture\nwithin the police.<\/p>\n
Ministries Assisting, Not Replacing<\/p>\n
From a human rights perspective, clarity in structure strengthens\nhuman rights protection. Restrictions on human rights are only valid if\ncarried out by legitimate, responsible, and accountable power. The\nPresident, as holder of executive power, is responsible for security\npolicies that have an impact on human rights, whilst Polri becomes the\nimplementer of that policy. If violations occur, responsibility does not\nstop with those in the field, but rises to the level of policy and\nnational leadership.<\/p>\n
Placing Polri directly under the President also affirms the principle\nof unity of command at the national level. The security sector cannot be\npulled into the interests of sectoral ministries, which could create\noverlapping policies and fragmentation of loyalty. Within this\nframework, ministries play a role in assisting the President, not\nreplacing his position as the direct superior of Polri.<\/p>\n
The Core Problem: Oversight and Ethics<\/p>\n
The discourse about moving Polri under a ministry generally stems\nfrom concerns about the potential for abuse of power or political bias.\nHowever, the main problem is not the structural position of Polri under\nthe President, but rather weak oversight and enforcement of ethics, both\ninternal and external. In their report Civilian Oversight of Policing:\nLessons from the Literature, published by the Vera Institute, J. Miller\nand colleagues summarise various models of civilian oversight, ranging\nfrom ombudsmen to complaints commissions, and demonstrate that the\neffectiveness of police accountability depends not on the structural\narrangement, but on the robustness of oversight mechanisms and the\ncommitment of political and police leadership to upholding democratic\nprinciples.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/positioning-the-police-within-democracy-1772165517", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }