Peace in Aceh: The long road to peace

Peace in Aceh: The long road to peace

Abdul Halim Mahally
Islamabad

The Aceh conflict could never be resolved if a lack of
sincerity, honesty and trust between the government of Indonesia
and the Aceh rebels remains unreciprocated. Beginning from the
Sukarno era when Teuku Daud Beureuh waged an Islam-based uprising
against Jakarta in 1953, followed by the subsequent emergence of
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in December 1976 where Hasan Tiro
resumed the struggle, while Soeharto was in power. It continued
up to the era of Megawati Soekarnoputri and is now a problem for
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's government.

And yet, separatist sentiment in Aceh has not been resolved,
despite the fact that the Military Operation Area (DOM) was
removed by president B.J. Habibie (1998-1999) and dialogs were
pursued by president Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001).

It is nevertheless important to take a close look at the
recent talks in Helsinki. The second round of peace talks, which
concluded on Feb. 23, 2005 was facilitated by the Crisis
Management Initiative (CMI), a global mediator headed by former
president of Finland, Martti Ahtissari. To a great degree, the
CMI has succeeded, just by bringing the parties in dispute to the
negotiating table for the first time since Megawati launched a
massive military operation in Aceh on May 19, 2003.

The Indonesian delegation, including three ministers, seemed
satisfied that the RI-GAM talks have reached a new understanding
on issues pending among them. The delegation is still offering "a
special autonomy status" while GAM prefers the use of the term
"self-rule". They agreed on another round of negotiations, which
will take place in Finland next month.

After the failures of so many talks in the past, GAM and the
government of Indonesia seem to have fully realized that "the
language of the gun" has proved ineffective to settle their
conflicts. The tidal waves that hit Aceh on Dec. 26, 2004,
claiming more than 230,000 people while leaving about 400.000
others homeless were perhaps another reason why the two sides got
closer and agreed to a dialog. Hundreds of GAM members died or
went missing when the tsunami swept away Meulaboh and Banda Aceh,
while relatives of GAM's Sweden-based high command may have been
affected too.

I suddenly remembered while watching local Indonesian TV news,
how the government of Megawati, in April 2003, accused GAM of
violating the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). On the
other side, GAM denied the allegations and stated through its
spokesman in Sweden, Bachtiar Abdullah, that it was still abiding
by the COHA, an agreement signed in Geneva on Dec. 9, 2002. It is
difficult to judge which side was the first cease-fire violator
of the COHA. What was very clear, not only the Indonesians, but
also the world, was that the deadlock in the COHA was leading
inevitably to the imposition of a military operation in Aceh,
which occurred a month later in May 2003.

However, many observers predicted that the Megawati
government's bold decision to deploy soldiers to Aceh was because
she was so inspired by the success of the US invasion of Iraq.

President George W. Bush launched the attack on Iraq on March
20, 2003 and on April 9, Saddam's regime fell. Megawati's policy-
makers seemingly knew very well that military force could solve
the Aceh conflict as Washington did in the Iraqi issue. It was
probably based on this fact that Jakarta's negotiations with GAM
were cut off. As a result of what they saw in Baghdad, the
rooting out of separatism in Aceh by military means was
considered the best option.

Unfortunately, Megawati along with her government's inner-
circle in Jakarta had clearly underestimated GAM. In spite of
repeated statements by Army chief Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu,
recently replaced, in the first days of military operation in
Aceh that all rebels would have been crushed quickly, GAM remains
strong even if Jakarta subsequently extended the operation for
another six months.

The presence of thousands of TNI troops in Aceh, backed by
both air power and naval power has not meant the killing of even
half of the Aceh rebels, whom Indonesian Military Headquarters in
Cilangkap, East Jakarta estimated at 6,000.

I personally believe in Ryamizard's sincerity, but he might
not have come to the full knowledge that keeping a few hundreds
separatists alive would likely be in the interests of some top
officers within the TNI.

The GAM-RI efforts to end their long-standing disputes, as we
have now seen, are showing positive signs. When guns are no
longer effective, then dialogs and talks should be again looked
at. This progress must be kept intact. Additionally, what Wiryono
Sastrohandoyo, formerly Head of RI's Negotiating Team, and Zaini
Abdullah of GAM reached in Geneva's agreement in December 2002
should be included in the forthcoming scheduled talks in Finland.
That "the government of Indonesia and GAM share the common
objective to meet the aspirations of the people of Aceh to live
in security with dignity, peace, prosperity and justice". This
must become the fundamental commitment of both the government and
GAM. Failing to carefully stick to that would only yield to
meaningless further peace negotiations.

Whatever the commitments are made in Finland, the government
of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement must honor them. The
failure of both President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Muhammad
Hasan Tiro to learn from the past mistakes as well as the
"Tragedy of the Tsunami" would only worsen the situation of
already devastated Aceh. They must also learn from what the
Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, once said, "there is no
instance of any nation having gained a benefit from prolonged
war".

In short, peace can prevail in Serambi Mekah (Veranda of
Mecca) if traits such as sincerity, honesty, trust and what Sun
Tzu concluded are also deeply embedded in the hearts of both
Jakarta and GAM. Good Luck!

The writer recently completed his M.A. in Political Science
(International Relations) at the International Islamic University
in Islamabad, and is now pursuing a Ph.D at Harvard University.
He is the author of Membongkar Ambisi Global AS (A Disclosure of
U.S. Global Ambition), 2003.