{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1149420,
        "msgid": "peace-in-aceh-the-long-road-to-peace-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-03-05 00:00:00",
        "title": "Peace in Aceh: The long road to peace",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Peace in Aceh: The long road to peace Abdul Halim Mahally Islamabad The Aceh conflict could never be resolved if a lack of sincerity, honesty and trust between the government of Indonesia and the Aceh rebels remains unreciprocated. Beginning from the Sukarno era when Teuku Daud Beureuh waged an Islam-based uprising against Jakarta in 1953, followed by the subsequent emergence of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in December 1976 where Hasan Tiro resumed the struggle, while Soeharto was in power.",
        "content": "<p>Peace in Aceh: The long road to peace<\/p>\n<p>Abdul Halim Mahally<br>\nIslamabad<\/p>\n<p>The Aceh conflict could never be resolved if a lack of <br>\nsincerity, honesty and trust between the government of Indonesia <br>\nand the Aceh rebels remains unreciprocated. Beginning from the <br>\nSukarno era when Teuku Daud Beureuh waged an Islam-based uprising <br>\nagainst Jakarta in 1953, followed by the subsequent emergence of <br>\nFree Aceh Movement (GAM) in December 1976 where Hasan Tiro <br>\nresumed the struggle, while Soeharto was in power. It continued <br>\nup to the era of Megawati Soekarnoputri and is now a problem for <br>\nSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono's government.<\/p>\n<p>And yet, separatist sentiment in Aceh has not been resolved, <br>\ndespite the fact that the Military Operation Area (DOM) was <br>\nremoved by president B.J. Habibie (1998-1999) and dialogs were <br>\npursued by president Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001).<\/p>\n<p>It is nevertheless important to take a close look at the <br>\nrecent talks in Helsinki. The second round of peace talks, which <br>\nconcluded on Feb. 23, 2005 was facilitated by the Crisis <br>\nManagement Initiative (CMI), a global mediator headed by former <br>\npresident of Finland, Martti Ahtissari. To a great degree, the <br>\nCMI has succeeded, just by bringing the parties in dispute to the <br>\nnegotiating table for the first time since Megawati launched a <br>\nmassive military operation in Aceh on May 19, 2003.<\/p>\n<p>The Indonesian delegation, including three ministers, seemed <br>\nsatisfied that the RI-GAM talks have reached a new understanding <br>\non issues pending among them. The delegation is still offering \"a <br>\nspecial autonomy status\" while GAM prefers the use of the term <br>\n\"self-rule\". They agreed on another round of negotiations, which <br>\nwill take place in Finland next month.<\/p>\n<p>After the failures of so many talks in the past, GAM and the <br>\ngovernment of Indonesia seem to have fully realized that \"the <br>\nlanguage of the gun\" has proved ineffective to settle their <br>\nconflicts. The tidal waves that hit Aceh on Dec. 26, 2004, <br>\nclaiming more than 230,000 people while leaving about 400.000 <br>\nothers homeless were perhaps another reason why the two sides got <br>\ncloser and agreed to a dialog. Hundreds of GAM members died or <br>\nwent missing when the tsunami swept away Meulaboh and Banda Aceh, <br>\nwhile relatives of GAM's Sweden-based high command may have been <br>\naffected too.<\/p>\n<p>I suddenly remembered while watching local Indonesian TV news, <br>\nhow the government of Megawati, in April 2003, accused GAM of <br>\nviolating the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). On the <br>\nother side, GAM denied the allegations and stated through its <br>\nspokesman in Sweden, Bachtiar Abdullah, that it was still abiding <br>\nby the COHA, an agreement signed in Geneva on Dec. 9, 2002. It is <br>\ndifficult to judge which side was the first cease-fire violator <br>\nof the COHA. What was very clear, not only the Indonesians, but <br>\nalso the world, was that the deadlock in the COHA was leading <br>\ninevitably to the imposition of a military operation in Aceh, <br>\nwhich occurred a month later in May 2003.<\/p>\n<p>However, many observers predicted that the Megawati <br>\ngovernment's bold decision to deploy soldiers to Aceh was because <br>\nshe was so inspired by the success of the US invasion of Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>President George W. Bush launched the attack on Iraq on March <br>\n20, 2003 and on April 9, Saddam's regime fell. Megawati's policy-<br>\nmakers seemingly knew very well that military force could solve <br>\nthe Aceh conflict as Washington did in the Iraqi issue. It was <br>\nprobably based on this fact that Jakarta's negotiations with GAM <br>\nwere cut off. As a result of what they saw in Baghdad, the <br>\nrooting out of separatism in Aceh by military means was <br>\nconsidered the best option.<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately, Megawati along with her government's inner-<br>\ncircle in Jakarta had clearly underestimated GAM. In spite of <br>\nrepeated statements by Army chief Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, <br>\nrecently replaced, in the first days of military operation in <br>\nAceh that all rebels would have been crushed quickly, GAM remains <br>\nstrong even if Jakarta subsequently extended the operation for <br>\nanother six months.<\/p>\n<p>The presence of thousands of TNI troops in Aceh, backed by <br>\nboth air power and naval power has not meant the killing of even <br>\nhalf of the Aceh rebels, whom Indonesian Military Headquarters in <br>\nCilangkap, East Jakarta estimated at 6,000.<\/p>\n<p>I personally believe in Ryamizard's sincerity, but he might <br>\nnot have come to the full knowledge that keeping a few hundreds <br>\nseparatists alive would likely be in the interests of some top <br>\nofficers within the TNI.<\/p>\n<p>The GAM-RI efforts to end their long-standing disputes, as we <br>\nhave now seen, are showing positive signs. When guns are no <br>\nlonger effective, then dialogs and talks should be again looked <br>\nat. This progress must be kept intact. Additionally, what Wiryono <br>\nSastrohandoyo, formerly Head of RI's Negotiating Team, and Zaini <br>\nAbdullah of GAM reached in Geneva's agreement in December 2002 <br>\nshould be included in the forthcoming scheduled talks in Finland. <br>\nThat \"the government of Indonesia and GAM share the common <br>\nobjective to meet the aspirations of the people of Aceh to live <br>\nin security with dignity, peace, prosperity and justice\". This <br>\nmust become the fundamental commitment of both the government and <br>\nGAM. Failing to carefully stick to that would only yield to <br>\nmeaningless further peace negotiations.<\/p>\n<p>Whatever the commitments are made in Finland, the government <br>\nof Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement must honor them. The <br>\nfailure of both President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Muhammad <br>\nHasan Tiro to learn from the past mistakes as well as the <br>\n\"Tragedy of the Tsunami\" would only worsen the situation of <br>\nalready devastated Aceh. They must also learn from what the <br>\nChinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, once said, \"there is no <br>\ninstance of any nation having gained a benefit from prolonged <br>\nwar\".<\/p>\n<p>In short, peace can prevail in Serambi Mekah (Veranda of <br>\nMecca) if traits such as sincerity, honesty, trust and what Sun <br>\nTzu concluded are also deeply embedded in the hearts of both <br>\nJakarta and GAM. Good Luck!<\/p>\n<p>The writer recently completed his M.A. in Political Science <br>\n(International Relations) at the International Islamic University <br>\nin Islamabad, and is now pursuing a Ph.D at Harvard University. <br>\nHe is the author of Membongkar Ambisi Global AS (A Disclosure of <br>\nU.S. Global Ambition), 2003.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/peace-in-aceh-the-long-road-to-peace-1447893297",
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