New complexity, leaders and art of leadership

New complexity, leaders and art of leadership

Rizal Sukma

This article examines recent changes in Indonesia's politics,
perceived and real, since the election of President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, affectionately called SBY, as Indonesia's
sixth president in October 2004.

These changes have brought about additional elements to the
already complex political scene in the country. In such a
circumstance, the need to create change is easier said than done.

The first, and most significant change, is the peaceful
conclusion of year-long elections. While not perfect, the process
was relatively smooth. The 2004 elections clearly reflect a
greater maturity of the Indonesian people, the
institutionalization of the rules of the game.

When disputes regarding the results occurred, for example,
participants in the elections took the case to the newly
established Constitutional Court, instead of to the streets,
which adjudicated on the disputes in a civilized manner. A degree
of maturity was proven when the decisions by the Court were all
accepted by parties involved in the disputes. Indeed, the
elections suggest that we, as a nation, have come to realize that
we need to abide by the democratic rules of the game.

Second, while the majority of voters were still filled with
emotional allegiance to parties and individual leaders, the 2004
elections marked the beginning of a new pattern of voting
behavior in society. The results of legislative elections, for
example, demonstrate the growing number of autonomous voters who
played an important role as a bloc of "swing votes".

The new political parties, the Islamic-based Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS) and the Democratic Party (PD), owe their
surprising rise to this bloc. Most of these swing votes come from
the middle-class in urban areas.

Given this phenomena, political parties can no longer assume
that they can continue to draw support from traditional support
bases. The voters have now demonstrated the ability to "reward"
good candidates in the elections.

The third is the breakdown of traditional and patrimonial
authority in politics. Despite their affiliation with mass-based
organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah,
a significant number of voters no longer feel compelled and
obliged to vote for candidates who their parent organization and
leaders officially endorse. Despite the call by Abdurrahman Wahid
for members of the NU to vote for the duet of Gen. (ret) Wiranto-
Solahudin Wahid, it was Susilo-Jusuf Kalla who won the election
in the NU stronghold of East Java. A survey also found that
despite the official endorsement by Muhammadiyah of Amien Rais,
less than 70 percent of Muhammadiyah members and sympathizers
voted for Amien.

Fourth, an embryonic "balance of power" relationship between
the executive and the legislative branches has emerged. The
results of the elections, while it is still too early to say,
seems to have created a foundation for a stronger check-and-
balance system between the President and the House. The House, in
which the coalition of pro-government parties constitutes the
minority, would be in a better position to play a greater
oversight role. The problem, however, is that the basis of
coalition in the legislature is not always based on party lines,
but can also be based on certain issues, personalities and vested
interests.

The fifth is the phasing out of the so-called reformed
generation of leaders. Since the ouster of President Abdurrahman
Wahid from office, and the defeat of both Amien Rais and Megawati
in the presidential elections, the key leaders of reformasi no
longer hold any government positions. While they are still in a
position to influence the political process, the election of SBY
as president clearly marks the beginning of the emergence of new
generation of leaders in Indonesia.

However, it is important to note that SBY himself does not
represent a new generation of leaders, but he certainly can be
seen as a bridging figure between the reform era and the next
one; an era which will probably take a clearer form by 2009.

The implications of these changes have been significant, and
lead to the emergence of a more complex political landscape in
Indonesia. Indeed, there is a greater proliferation of political
actors and power centers. Before the 2004 elections, the
structure of constituencies in Indonesia's politics tended to be
characterized by division along ideological and party
preferences. Now, while the previous structure remains intact, we
begin to witness the emergence of more diversified political
actors.

For example, the role of the House of Representatives, wherein
the supporters of President SBY are a minority bloc, and the
House has clearly become more important in balancing the power of
the executive. Non-ideological groups of voters -- the swing
voters -- will grow larger. New political figures, such as
People's Consultative Assembly Speaker Hidayat Nurwahid, House
Speaker Agung Laksono and media baron Surya Paloh, can be
expected to play greater political roles in the months to come.

The effects of such political complexities became evident soon
after President Susilo took office on Oct. 20. For example, the
context for decision-making processes has become more difficult
for an authoritative process.

The President, despite the direct mandate from the people,
seems unsure of how to use his victory and political capital. The
process of presidential institution-building is a case in point.

The formation of the Cabinet, for example, was reported to
have been dictated by the imperative of compromise. Despite his
earlier promise to strengthen the presidential office, the plan
has not been realized. The President, for example, has yet to
establish the National Defense Council and National Economic
Council. Not much is heard now about the "West Wing" of
Indonesia.

How, then, can the new government lead the changes? First, it
is imperative that the government, especially the President,
changes the mode of governing. The period of campaigning has
ended, and it is now the period of working. The government should
not see the five-year term as merely a period of campaigning for
the reelection in 2009.

In conducting business, the government should not merely base
its decisions on the overriding need to preserve the regime's
popularity and maintain the regime's security, at the expense of
state survivability. This will require the government to tackle
major issues head-on, including making unpopular decisions such
as the reduction in fuel subsidies and the privatization of
ineffective state-owned companies.

Good policies, along with delivering on campaign promises,
would by themselves provide the political capital needed by SBY
should he wish to run again in the next election.

Second, there is a need for the government to facilitate the
emergence of a constituency for change. While parliamentary
support is imperative, President Susilo should also make use of
his popularity to get direct support from the people for his
policies.

This will require a greater precision in prioritizing what
changes the government wants to target. For example, if the
president is really serious about the eradication of corruption,
he should strengthen the constituency for the anticorruption
drive within the society. The support and active participation
from mass-based organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah, is clearly essential in this regard.

Third, there is a need to strengthen the communication
strategy. The explanation of the government's policies, for
example, should be done professionally and with greater
precision. The habit of giving excuses, which has become too
frequent, has to be avoided. Otherwise, the public trust in the
government will rapidly deteriorate.

Indonesia can no longer afford a government that does not know
how to govern. The cost of muddling-through and indecisiveness,
as we have experienced over the last four years, would be too
great. Indonesia needs to recover the lost years, and recover
them fast. At this point, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is
still in a position to do so.

Rizal Sukma, Director of Studies of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)