New complexity, leaders and art of leadership<\/p>\n
Rizal Sukma<\/p>\n
This article examines recent changes in Indonesia's politics,
\nperceived and real, since the election of President Susilo
\nBambang Yudhoyono, affectionately called SBY, as Indonesia's
\nsixth president in October 2004.<\/p>\n
These changes have brought about additional elements to the
\nalready complex political scene in the country. In such a
\ncircumstance, the need to create change is easier said than done.<\/p>\n
The first, and most significant change, is the peaceful
\nconclusion of year-long elections. While not perfect, the process
\nwas relatively smooth. The 2004 elections clearly reflect a
\ngreater maturity of the Indonesian people, the
\ninstitutionalization of the rules of the game.<\/p>\n
When disputes regarding the results occurred, for example,
\nparticipants in the elections took the case to the newly
\nestablished Constitutional Court, instead of to the streets,
\nwhich adjudicated on the disputes in a civilized manner. A degree
\nof maturity was proven when the decisions by the Court were all
\naccepted by parties involved in the disputes. Indeed, the
\nelections suggest that we, as a nation, have come to realize that
\nwe need to abide by the democratic rules of the game.<\/p>\n
Second, while the majority of voters were still filled with
\nemotional allegiance to parties and individual leaders, the 2004
\nelections marked the beginning of a new pattern of voting
\nbehavior in society. The results of legislative elections, for
\nexample, demonstrate the growing number of autonomous voters who
\nplayed an important role as a bloc of \"swing votes\".<\/p>\n
The new political parties, the Islamic-based Prosperous
\nJustice Party (PKS) and the Democratic Party (PD), owe their
\nsurprising rise to this bloc. Most of these swing votes come from
\nthe middle-class in urban areas.<\/p>\n
Given this phenomena, political parties can no longer assume
\nthat they can continue to draw support from traditional support
\nbases. The voters have now demonstrated the ability to \"reward\"
\ngood candidates in the elections.<\/p>\n
The third is the breakdown of traditional and patrimonial
\nauthority in politics. Despite their affiliation with mass-based
\norganizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah,
\na significant number of voters no longer feel compelled and
\nobliged to vote for candidates who their parent organization and
\nleaders officially endorse. Despite the call by Abdurrahman Wahid
\nfor members of the NU to vote for the duet of Gen. (ret) Wiranto-
\nSolahudin Wahid, it was Susilo-Jusuf Kalla who won the election
\nin the NU stronghold of East Java. A survey also found that
\ndespite the official endorsement by Muhammadiyah of Amien Rais,
\nless than 70 percent of Muhammadiyah members and sympathizers
\nvoted for Amien.<\/p>\n
Fourth, an embryonic \"balance of power\" relationship between
\nthe executive and the legislative branches has emerged. The
\nresults of the elections, while it is still too early to say,
\nseems to have created a foundation for a stronger check-and-
\nbalance system between the President and the House. The House, in
\nwhich the coalition of pro-government parties constitutes the
\nminority, would be in a better position to play a greater
\noversight role. The problem, however, is that the basis of
\ncoalition in the legislature is not always based on party lines,
\nbut can also be based on certain issues, personalities and vested
\ninterests.<\/p>\n
The fifth is the phasing out of the so-called reformed
\ngeneration of leaders. Since the ouster of President Abdurrahman
\nWahid from office, and the defeat of both Amien Rais and Megawati
\nin the presidential elections, the key leaders of reformasi no
\nlonger hold any government positions. While they are still in a
\nposition to influence the political process, the election of SBY
\nas president clearly marks the beginning of the emergence of new
\ngeneration of leaders in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
However, it is important to note that SBY himself does not
\nrepresent a new generation of leaders, but he certainly can be
\nseen as a bridging figure between the reform era and the next
\none; an era which will probably take a clearer form by 2009.<\/p>\n
The implications of these changes have been significant, and
\nlead to the emergence of a more complex political landscape in
\nIndonesia. Indeed, there is a greater proliferation of political
\nactors and power centers. Before the 2004 elections, the
\nstructure of constituencies in Indonesia's politics tended to be
\ncharacterized by division along ideological and party
\npreferences. Now, while the previous structure remains intact, we
\nbegin to witness the emergence of more diversified political
\nactors.<\/p>\n
For example, the role of the House of Representatives, wherein
\nthe supporters of President SBY are a minority bloc, and the
\nHouse has clearly become more important in balancing the power of
\nthe executive. Non-ideological groups of voters -- the swing
\nvoters -- will grow larger. New political figures, such as
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly Speaker Hidayat Nurwahid, House
\nSpeaker Agung Laksono and media baron Surya Paloh, can be
\nexpected to play greater political roles in the months to come.<\/p>\n
The effects of such political complexities became evident soon
\nafter President Susilo took office on Oct. 20. For example, the
\ncontext for decision-making processes has become more difficult
\nfor an authoritative process.<\/p>\n
The President, despite the direct mandate from the people,
\nseems unsure of how to use his victory and political capital. The
\nprocess of presidential institution-building is a case in point.<\/p>\n
The formation of the Cabinet, for example, was reported to
\nhave been dictated by the imperative of compromise. Despite his
\nearlier promise to strengthen the presidential office, the plan
\nhas not been realized. The President, for example, has yet to
\nestablish the National Defense Council and National Economic
\nCouncil. Not much is heard now about the \"West Wing\" of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
How, then, can the new government lead the changes? First, it
\nis imperative that the government, especially the President,
\nchanges the mode of governing. The period of campaigning has
\nended, and it is now the period of working. The government should
\nnot see the five-year term as merely a period of campaigning for
\nthe reelection in 2009.<\/p>\n
In conducting business, the government should not merely base
\nits decisions on the overriding need to preserve the regime's
\npopularity and maintain the regime's security, at the expense of
\nstate survivability. This will require the government to tackle
\nmajor issues head-on, including making unpopular decisions such
\nas the reduction in fuel subsidies and the privatization of
\nineffective state-owned companies.<\/p>\n
Good policies, along with delivering on campaign promises,
\nwould by themselves provide the political capital needed by SBY
\nshould he wish to run again in the next election.<\/p>\n
Second, there is a need for the government to facilitate the
\nemergence of a constituency for change. While parliamentary
\nsupport is imperative, President Susilo should also make use of
\nhis popularity to get direct support from the people for his
\npolicies.<\/p>\n
This will require a greater precision in prioritizing what
\nchanges the government wants to target. For example, if the
\npresident is really serious about the eradication of corruption,
\nhe should strengthen the constituency for the anticorruption
\ndrive within the society. The support and active participation
\nfrom mass-based organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama and
\nMuhammadiyah, is clearly essential in this regard.<\/p>\n
Third, there is a need to strengthen the communication
\nstrategy. The explanation of the government's policies, for
\nexample, should be done professionally and with greater
\nprecision. The habit of giving excuses, which has become too
\nfrequent, has to be avoided. Otherwise, the public trust in the
\ngovernment will rapidly deteriorate.<\/p>\n
Indonesia can no longer afford a government that does not know
\nhow to govern. The cost of muddling-through and indecisiveness,
\nas we have experienced over the last four years, would be too
\ngreat. Indonesia needs to recover the lost years, and recover
\nthem fast. At this point, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is
\nstill in a position to do so.<\/p>\n
Rizal Sukma, Director of Studies of the Centre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies (CSIS)<\/p>",
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