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Aceh: Militias in trouble, still a threat?
JP/6/ABOE

Aceh: Militias in trouble, still a threat?

Aboeprijadi Santoso
Langsa, Eastern Aceh

A new chapter has begun for the region along the southeastern
coast of Aceh, a district with a tumultuous past, which has long
been the bastion of pro-government militias. Similar conditions
occurred in the ethnically more diverse highland of Central Aceh.
But what made eastern Aceh unique is, unlike Central Aceh, it had
been an important stronghold of GAM (Aceh Free Movement) rebels
as well.

Now, with a considerable number of Indonesian Army and police
units being withdrawn in accordance with the Helsinki peace
accord, the militias -- much to the relief of local human rights
workers -- are losing their protective umbrella. Still, it isn't
clear whether they will no longer pose a threat to peace.

Real peace has finally arrived even if local worries remain.
Serious incidents, as in Peudawa, have still occurred. Reports
said, soldiers, including members of the joint military
intelligence unit (SGI), now often sit together with former GAM
rebels in cafes and marines no longer extort fishermen,
indicating a new atmosphere in the town. SGI, a typical Army
institution in conflict areas, has renamed its "office" in
Langsa, where they used to train informants, "Pos Kodim"
(military checkpoint). Faces of the SGI agents are known to all
as are the black-clothed militias, but the latter are now
conspicuous by their absence, "They used to exhibit a show of
force in the town, now they are silent," say locals.

GAM too has changed. As its fighters return home, it has
reportedly instructed its members to halt the collection of pajak
nanggroe (state tax) on behalf of the GAM, an extortion that
continued until late August. The second phase of the
decommissioning of GAM weapons and the redeployment of the non-
local army units last week means that this region, arguably one
of Aceh's most strategic areas, has been demilitarized -- save
the illegally armed militias.

Militias, of course, have become an embarrassment, a dirty
word worldwide since they went on a killing spree in East Timor
in 1999. But that's not the reason why the authorities adamantly
deny their existence. The militias are viewed as a spontaneous
initiative that would help defend the country and preserve
national security in the best tradition of Indonesia's people's
army during the independence struggle -- as if, sixty years on,
we are still fighting against the Japanese and the Dutch.
However, it serves to justify and support military campaign.
Hence, like in the 1940s, they are called "front" and "laskar"
(people's unit).

In reality, though, they are armed civilian units, which grew
out of state-linked militant organizations such as the Pemuda
Pancasila (Pancasila Youth). Like in East Timor, they are
organized by area and basically function as proxies. Unlike in
East Timor, they consist of close circuits, and are often
organized along ethnic lines. They are very secretive, and
fanatical in terms of their "patriotism".

A group of journalists, including this writer, who visited
Takengon, Central Aceh in 2003, noted the militias' strong links,
like in Eastern Aceh, with local civil and military authorities.
Acting as the Army's front line in the search and persecution of
rebels, they become part and parcel of counterinsurgency
operations in areas around the urban centers -- like in the
Philippines and Latin America in the 1980s.

In Aceh, however, they had been particularly active during
every military campaign since the Red Net Operation began in
1989. Unlike a regular army, they cannot be expected to make
distinctions between combatants and non-combatant civilians and
are not subject to any formal convention. A considerable number
of civilians have consequently been the victims of militia
actions.

According to the International Crisis Group and Kontras, there
are at present about 17 to 18 militia groups in Aceh, mostly
founded in 2003, totaling, they claim, thousands of members.

What exactly the two biggest militia units in Eastern Aceh --
the Front of Red-White Defenders (FPMP) and Go Parang (Hold the
Cleaver) -- are doing now is unclear. Typical of militias'
secrecy, their organizations are hard to access. But one
experienced local human rights activist, Jusuf Puteh, better
known as Ne' Suh, is quite sure that they are now caught by fear.

"They no longer have any activity, no more loud actions. I'm
sure they are afraid. After all, they did bad things in the past.
They used to persecute people and bring them to the military.
They were even worse than the Army. So, they are afraid of
retribution, but also of the AMM (the European Union-Asean led
Aceh Monitoring Mission) who are now in charge," explained Jusuf.

Yet, given their past atrocities, many remain worried about
what the militias plan. Few dare to enter the militia controlled
area of Rantau Peurelak and Paya Bili, where past massacres are
said to have taken place as late as July, when the Helsinki deal
was only waiting to be signed, they brutally killed one of their
own fellows they suspected of treason.

The militias have thus failed to keep pace with peace. The
kind of loyalty the Army insisted on has apparently not resulted
in respect for the Helsinki pact the two parties on the ground
have generally shown. Most likely, the militias would be left in
limbo, if those who should share responsibility for what they
did, either leave Aceh or simply ignore them.

Observers like Jusuf Puteh believe, once peace is
institutionalized and ex-GAM members settled, there will be no
more space for the militias. But there are fears that the local
elections (Pilkada) next April might open new chances for the
militias to disrupt the peace as they did in Langsa and Takengon
in 2003.

If what happened to the forgotten former East Timorese
militias, who were offered a lot of counterfeit money but
subsequently neglected in West Timor, is any indication, a
similar prospect might await the Acehnese militias. That could be
a bad omen.

Since the Helsinki deal doesn't allow the existence of any
civilian armed group, the AMM should prevent any militia action
and solve the problem before they leave Aceh in March 2006. It's
a litmus test for the local civilian and military authorities'
commitment to the deal, to dissolve them.

The writer is journalist with Radio Netherlands.