;JP;CD;
\nANPAk..r..<\/p>\n
Aceh: Militias in trouble, still a threat?
\nJP\/6\/ABOE<\/p>\n
Aceh: Militias in trouble, still a threat?<\/p>\n
Aboeprijadi Santoso
\nLangsa, Eastern Aceh<\/p>\n
A new chapter has begun for the region along the southeastern
\ncoast of Aceh, a district with a tumultuous past, which has long
\nbeen the bastion of pro-government militias. Similar conditions
\noccurred in the ethnically more diverse highland of Central Aceh.
\nBut what made eastern Aceh unique is, unlike Central Aceh, it had
\nbeen an important stronghold of GAM (Aceh Free Movement) rebels
\nas well.<\/p>\n
Now, with a considerable number of Indonesian Army and police
\nunits being withdrawn in accordance with the Helsinki peace
\naccord, the militias -- much to the relief of local human rights
\nworkers -- are losing their protective umbrella. Still, it isn't
\nclear whether they will no longer pose a threat to peace.<\/p>\n
Real peace has finally arrived even if local worries remain.
\nSerious incidents, as in Peudawa, have still occurred. Reports
\nsaid, soldiers, including members of the joint military
\nintelligence unit (SGI), now often sit together with former GAM
\nrebels in cafes and marines no longer extort fishermen,
\nindicating a new atmosphere in the town. SGI, a typical Army
\ninstitution in conflict areas, has renamed its "office" in
\nLangsa, where they used to train informants, "Pos Kodim"
\n(military checkpoint). Faces of the SGI agents are known to all
\nas are the black-clothed militias, but the latter are now
\nconspicuous by their absence, "They used to exhibit a show of
\nforce in the town, now they are silent," say locals.<\/p>\n
GAM too has changed. As its fighters return home, it has
\nreportedly instructed its members to halt the collection of pajak
\nnanggroe (state tax) on behalf of the GAM, an extortion that
\ncontinued until late August. The second phase of the
\ndecommissioning of GAM weapons and the redeployment of the non-
\nlocal army units last week means that this region, arguably one
\nof Aceh's most strategic areas, has been demilitarized -- save
\nthe illegally armed militias.<\/p>\n
Militias, of course, have become an embarrassment, a dirty
\nword worldwide since they went on a killing spree in East Timor
\nin 1999. But that's not the reason why the authorities adamantly
\ndeny their existence. The militias are viewed as a spontaneous
\ninitiative that would help defend the country and preserve
\nnational security in the best tradition of Indonesia's people's
\narmy during the independence struggle -- as if, sixty years on,
\nwe are still fighting against the Japanese and the Dutch.
\nHowever, it serves to justify and support military campaign.
\nHence, like in the 1940s, they are called "front" and "laskar"
\n(people's unit).<\/p>\n
In reality, though, they are armed civilian units, which grew
\nout of state-linked militant organizations such as the Pemuda
\nPancasila (Pancasila Youth). Like in East Timor, they are
\norganized by area and basically function as proxies. Unlike in
\nEast Timor, they consist of close circuits, and are often
\norganized along ethnic lines. They are very secretive, and
\nfanatical in terms of their "patriotism".<\/p>\n
A group of journalists, including this writer, who visited
\nTakengon, Central Aceh in 2003, noted the militias' strong links,
\nlike in Eastern Aceh, with local civil and military authorities.
\nActing as the Army's front line in the search and persecution of
\nrebels, they become part and parcel of counterinsurgency
\noperations in areas around the urban centers -- like in the
\nPhilippines and Latin America in the 1980s.<\/p>\n
In Aceh, however, they had been particularly active during
\nevery military campaign since the Red Net Operation began in
\n1989. Unlike a regular army, they cannot be expected to make
\ndistinctions between combatants and non-combatant civilians and
\nare not subject to any formal convention. A considerable number
\nof civilians have consequently been the victims of militia
\nactions.<\/p>\n
According to the International Crisis Group and Kontras, there
\nare at present about 17 to 18 militia groups in Aceh, mostly
\nfounded in 2003, totaling, they claim, thousands of members.<\/p>\n
What exactly the two biggest militia units in Eastern Aceh --
\nthe Front of Red-White Defenders (FPMP) and Go Parang (Hold the
\nCleaver) -- are doing now is unclear. Typical of militias'
\nsecrecy, their organizations are hard to access. But one
\nexperienced local human rights activist, Jusuf Puteh, better
\nknown as Ne' Suh, is quite sure that they are now caught by fear.<\/p>\n
"They no longer have any activity, no more loud actions. I'm
\nsure they are afraid. After all, they did bad things in the past.
\nThey used to persecute people and bring them to the military.
\nThey were even worse than the Army. So, they are afraid of
\nretribution, but also of the AMM (the European Union-Asean led
\nAceh Monitoring Mission) who are now in charge," explained Jusuf.<\/p>\n
Yet, given their past atrocities, many remain worried about
\nwhat the militias plan. Few dare to enter the militia controlled
\narea of Rantau Peurelak and Paya Bili, where past massacres are
\nsaid to have taken place as late as July, when the Helsinki deal
\nwas only waiting to be signed, they brutally killed one of their
\nown fellows they suspected of treason.<\/p>\n
The militias have thus failed to keep pace with peace. The
\nkind of loyalty the Army insisted on has apparently not resulted
\nin respect for the Helsinki pact the two parties on the ground
\nhave generally shown. Most likely, the militias would be left in
\nlimbo, if those who should share responsibility for what they
\ndid, either leave Aceh or simply ignore them.<\/p>\n
Observers like Jusuf Puteh believe, once peace is
\ninstitutionalized and ex-GAM members settled, there will be no
\nmore space for the militias. But there are fears that the local
\nelections (Pilkada) next April might open new chances for the
\nmilitias to disrupt the peace as they did in Langsa and Takengon
\nin 2003.<\/p>\n
If what happened to the forgotten former East Timorese
\nmilitias, who were offered a lot of counterfeit money but
\nsubsequently neglected in West Timor, is any indication, a
\nsimilar prospect might await the Acehnese militias. That could be
\na bad omen.<\/p>\n
Since the Helsinki deal doesn't allow the existence of any
\ncivilian armed group, the AMM should prevent any militia action
\nand solve the problem before they leave Aceh in March 2006. It's
\na litmus test for the local civilian and military authorities'
\ncommitment to the deal, to dissolve them.<\/p>\n
The writer is journalist with Radio Netherlands.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jpcd-1447899208", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }