Indonesia's changing role in OIC

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Department of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, banyu@home.unpar.ac.id

As reported by The Jakarta Post (Feb. 27, 2003), President Megawati Soekarnoputri has called on the United States not to unilaterally attack Iraq. This statement, made during the informal consultation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Kuala Lumpur, reflects a stronger stance of Indonesia on the U.S.'s intention to use force against Iraq.

Of course, this statement also marked a more significant Indonesian policy toward the OIC.

But how far can Indonesia change its position toward the OIC? In the first two decades of Indonesia's involvement with the OIC into the late 1980s, Indonesia had no strong political commitment in enhancing its relations with the Muslim world.

In the eyes of Indonesia's foreign policy makers, a deep involvement with the Muslim world would only create new problems in Indonesia's relations with Western countries. This minimum political contact with the OIC also enabled Indonesia to have more flexibility in its relationship with both Islamic and Western countries.

Indonesia also perceived that the OIC did not have enough power to settle all issues related to Islam. This was mainly due to the ideological barriers and internal weaknesses of the OIC.

The lack of strong internal cohesion among its members pushed Indonesia to limit its political commitment to the OIC. Moreover, OIC was divided into two main groups: The revolutionary (progressive) and the conservative. It was good for Indonesia to stay away from these two groups in order to lessen internal conflict among members.

OIC would only be effective in settling international problems pertinent to Islamic issues, as long as these problems did not involve the interests of the Western world -- in particular, the U.S.

A more cynical comment about the OIC argued that the organization was a mere toothless tiger in world politics. Again, it was because of the internal political problems among members that the OIC could not face the international challenges of global politics.

As a result, Indonesia did not prioritize its involvement in OIC at the top of its foreign policy. Even though Indonesia has long historical ties with the Muslim world, particularly the Arab states, the government tends to be cautious in facing the West. In comparison to Indonesia's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesia's involvement in OIC was quite low-key.

This minimum political interaction with the organization was due to the perception that Indonesia did not want to be perceived by Western countries of giving room to Islamic radicalism in the Muslim world.

However, the end of the Cold War and changes in the domestic political map and world politics, also heralded changes to Indonesia's role within the OIC. Since the late 1980s, there have been some subtle shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world. These shifts, to a large extent, were motivated by the changing domestic, as well as international, environment.

The rising political role of Indonesia within OIC became apparent when it proposed ways of improving the world's image of Islam. In the post-Cold War era, Islam has often associated with terrorism and violence throughout the world, ensuing in the negative image of Islam in the West.

In today's development of global politics, it is also a "necessity of foreign policy" for Indonesia to play a more significant role in the OIC, so that Indonesia can apply its bebas aktif (free and active) foreign policy to pursue its national interests.