Indonesia's changing role in OIC<\/p>\n
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Department of International Relations,
\nParahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, banyu@home.unpar.ac.id<\/p>\n
As reported by The Jakarta Post (Feb. 27, 2003), President
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri has called on the United States not to
\nunilaterally attack Iraq. This statement, made during the
\ninformal consultation of the Organization of Islamic Conference
\n(OIC) in Kuala Lumpur, reflects a stronger stance of Indonesia on
\nthe U.S.'s intention to use force against Iraq.<\/p>\n
Of course, this statement also marked a more significant
\nIndonesian policy toward the OIC.<\/p>\n
But how far can Indonesia change its position toward the OIC?
\nIn the first two decades of Indonesia's involvement with the OIC
\ninto the late 1980s, Indonesia had no strong political commitment
\nin enhancing its relations with the Muslim world.<\/p>\n
In the eyes of Indonesia's foreign policy makers, a deep
\ninvolvement with the Muslim world would only create new problems
\nin Indonesia's relations with Western countries. This minimum
\npolitical contact with the OIC also enabled Indonesia to have
\nmore flexibility in its relationship with both Islamic and
\nWestern countries.<\/p>\n
Indonesia also perceived that the OIC did not have enough
\npower to settle all issues related to Islam. This was mainly due
\nto the ideological barriers and internal weaknesses of the OIC.<\/p>\n
The lack of strong internal cohesion among its members pushed
\nIndonesia to limit its political commitment to the OIC. Moreover,
\nOIC was divided into two main groups: The revolutionary
\n(progressive) and the conservative. It was good for Indonesia to
\nstay away from these two groups in order to lessen internal
\nconflict among members.<\/p>\n
OIC would only be effective in settling international problems
\npertinent to Islamic issues, as long as these problems did not
\ninvolve the interests of the Western world -- in particular, the
\nU.S.<\/p>\n
A more cynical comment about the OIC argued that the
\norganization was a mere toothless tiger in world politics. Again,
\nit was because of the internal political problems among members
\nthat the OIC could not face the international challenges of
\nglobal politics.<\/p>\n
As a result, Indonesia did not prioritize its involvement in
\nOIC at the top of its foreign policy. Even though Indonesia has
\nlong historical ties with the Muslim world, particularly the Arab
\nstates, the government tends to be cautious in facing the West.
\nIn comparison to Indonesia's participation in the Non-Aligned
\nMovement (NAM), Indonesia's involvement in OIC was quite low-key.<\/p>\n
This minimum political interaction with the organization was
\ndue to the perception that Indonesia did not want to be perceived
\nby Western countries of giving room to Islamic radicalism in the
\nMuslim world.<\/p>\n
However, the end of the Cold War and changes in the domestic
\npolitical map and world politics, also heralded changes to
\nIndonesia's role within the OIC. Since the late 1980s, there have
\nbeen some subtle shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the
\nMuslim world. These shifts, to a large extent, were motivated by
\nthe changing domestic, as well as international, environment.<\/p>\n
The rising political role of Indonesia within OIC became
\napparent when it proposed ways of improving the world's image of
\nIslam. In the post-Cold War era, Islam has often associated with
\nterrorism and violence throughout the world, ensuing in the
\nnegative image of Islam in the West.<\/p>\n
In today's development of global politics, it is also a
\n"necessity of foreign policy" for Indonesia to play a more
\nsignificant role in the OIC, so that Indonesia can apply its
\nbebas aktif (free and active) foreign policy to pursue its
\nnational interests.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/indonesias-changing-role-in-oic-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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