Indonesia needs show-case for good governance

Indonesia needs show-case for good governance

W. Scott Thompson, Gianyar, Bali

There is often almost a sense of despair in the analyses by
Indonesian writers in these pages. Their country's KKN
(corruption, collusion and cronysm), traffic, pollution,
terrorism, sectarian violence "you name it, it's been here in the
past few years, at least in newspaper reports. The country most
like Indonesia, the Philippines, has had all of the same
problems, but it is surprising how little the two countries try
to learn from each other's experience.
Both sprawling multi-ethnic archipelagos of mostly Malay blood,
they both had long experience with rapacious leadership who left
a terrible heritage of mismanagement and inequality. Amazingly,
both countries now are led by daughters of former presidentsboth
of whom lost power in the same year, almost four decades ago.

But one thing the Philippines has had that Indonesia has not,
is a professional, competent managerial and incorruptible
president - one who to boot was (and is) a self-taught economist.
General Fidel V. Ramos was president 1992-98, and was limited --
and self-limited - from further terms by a constitution that was
itself a reaction to the unconstitutionality of Ferdinand Marcos.

But with or without a leader of Ramos's world-class leadership
capability, there are lessons from the Ramos presidency. One of
the first that comes to mind was his creation of 'islands of
excellence'. The point was that the problems overall seemed so
monumental as to be unsolvable and so dispiriting as to
discourage reform. So why not take the very worst areas within
the system of governance and clean them up totally making them
beacons, from which 'spill-over benefits' could come, as the
economists would say. The first one chosen was -- this should
not surprise an Indonesian -- the bureau of customs, almost
always the most irredeemably corrupt arena for presidential
cronies and political hacks.

Ramos stunned even his own circle by appointing to the bureau
his very closest associate, the renowned and formidable General
Jose Almonte, one of Asia's foremost political strategists - but
also, as one of the key organizers of the People Power revolution
of 1986, a man of street smarts. He then send Almonte a formal
presidential letter, giving him the full names of his wife and
five daughters, with the instructions that, were any of these to
go to him for special intercession at the bureau, he was not to
come to him, the president, but to "go to the police". At that
point everyone in Manila knew Ramos was what the French call
homme serieux or man of awesome seriousness.

Of course Almonte soon moved on to run Ramos's national
security establishment, but not until he had set in motion a
transparent system in which the steps required for customs
processing had been reduced nine-fold. A subsequent World Bank
report gave the customs bureau one of the highest marks in the
world.

It was all undone like so much else by the pitiful presidency
of the now-jailed successor, "Erap" Estrada. The bureau became
once again a place where the cronies imported their slick
merchandise duty-free and where the computer-driven system was
replaced by the old hands-on (and pocket-replenishing) system of
old.

But Filipinos came to see, and to believe, that reform was
possible, necessary, and inevitable. It became almost fashionable
for cabinet ministers to compare notes on how they had turned
down implicit or explicit bribes. Ramos had taught them, in any
case, that they had far more to gain from an economically vibrant
Philippines, and took most of them on his several-dozen foreign
trips: and these were not pleasure junkets but highly-organized
investment-search ventures, in which the president held nightly
reviews with his entourage to see how much new money had been
promised that day. The way to the presidential heart was finding
new investment -- which soared during his presidency.

So reform occurred in virtually every area of Philippines
governance. Tax collection soared, land reform was essentially
completed, and infrastructural projects spread across the
archipelago. Exports in computer parts and other high-end
manufactures were growing sometimes by 45% a year. Small wonder
that it was the only large Southeast Asian economy that didn't
even briefly go under during the 1997 catastrophe. The
Philippines economy actually grew slightly in 1997 - thanks to
shrewd and cautious management by the palace and department of
finance.

Of course the differences between these two countries are
substantial and no serious analyst would try to market identical
processes. For one thing, the economic crisis hit when Soeharto
was still in power - but all but moribund. It has made recovery
so very much more difficult. And there never was the positive
effect of a "clean sweep" - the picture of Ferdinand Marcos
climbing aboard a Huey helicopter into permanent exile, a
revolution from the streets removing all fear of lingering Marcos
influence.

But still, does anyone seriously believe Indonesia lacks
talented and competent reformers, capable - if given the chance -
of instituting the kind of reforms Ramos achieved in six years in
the Philippines? Does anyone believe that Filipinos are more
capable than Indonesians? Surely not. The question is not
competence or even experience. It is political will, and belief
that it is possible.

One huge difference between the two archipelagos is that
Indonesians as a whole are far more self-confident in their
nationalism and national identity than Filipinos. This alone
should make it easier to achieve here what the Philippines
managed to do so magnificently in six short years.