Indonesia needs show-case for good governance<\/p>\n
W. Scott Thompson, Gianyar, Bali<\/p>\n
There is often almost a sense of despair in the analyses by
\nIndonesian writers in these pages. Their country's KKN
\n(corruption, collusion and cronysm), traffic, pollution,
\nterrorism, sectarian violence "you name it, it's been here in the
\npast few years, at least in newspaper reports. The country most
\nlike Indonesia, the Philippines, has had all of the same
\nproblems, but it is surprising how little the two countries try
\nto learn from each other's experience.
\n Both sprawling multi-ethnic archipelagos of mostly Malay blood,
\nthey both had long experience with rapacious leadership who left
\na terrible heritage of mismanagement and inequality. Amazingly,
\nboth countries now are led by daughters of former presidentsboth
\nof whom lost power in the same year, almost four decades ago.<\/p>\n
But one thing the Philippines has had that Indonesia has not,
\nis a professional, competent managerial and incorruptible
\npresident - one who to boot was (and is) a self-taught economist.
\nGeneral Fidel V. Ramos was president 1992-98, and was limited --
\nand self-limited - from further terms by a constitution that was
\nitself a reaction to the unconstitutionality of Ferdinand Marcos.<\/p>\n
But with or without a leader of Ramos's world-class leadership
\ncapability, there are lessons from the Ramos presidency. One of
\nthe first that comes to mind was his creation of 'islands of
\nexcellence'. The point was that the problems overall seemed so
\nmonumental as to be unsolvable and so dispiriting as to
\ndiscourage reform. So why not take the very worst areas within
\nthe system of governance and clean them up totally making them
\nbeacons, from which 'spill-over benefits' could come, as the
\neconomists would say. The first one chosen was -- this should
\nnot surprise an Indonesian -- the bureau of customs, almost
\nalways the most irredeemably corrupt arena for presidential
\ncronies and political hacks.<\/p>\n
Ramos stunned even his own circle by appointing to the bureau
\nhis very closest associate, the renowned and formidable General
\nJose Almonte, one of Asia's foremost political strategists - but
\nalso, as one of the key organizers of the People Power revolution
\nof 1986, a man of street smarts. He then send Almonte a formal
\npresidential letter, giving him the full names of his wife and
\nfive daughters, with the instructions that, were any of these to
\ngo to him for special intercession at the bureau, he was not to
\ncome to him, the president, but to "go to the police". At that
\npoint everyone in Manila knew Ramos was what the French call
\nhomme serieux or man of awesome seriousness.<\/p>\n
Of course Almonte soon moved on to run Ramos's national
\nsecurity establishment, but not until he had set in motion a
\ntransparent system in which the steps required for customs
\nprocessing had been reduced nine-fold. A subsequent World Bank
\nreport gave the customs bureau one of the highest marks in the
\nworld.<\/p>\n
It was all undone like so much else by the pitiful presidency
\nof the now-jailed successor, "Erap" Estrada. The bureau became
\nonce again a place where the cronies imported their slick
\nmerchandise duty-free and where the computer-driven system was
\nreplaced by the old hands-on (and pocket-replenishing) system of
\nold.<\/p>\n
But Filipinos came to see, and to believe, that reform was
\npossible, necessary, and inevitable. It became almost fashionable
\nfor cabinet ministers to compare notes on how they had turned
\ndown implicit or explicit bribes. Ramos had taught them, in any
\ncase, that they had far more to gain from an economically vibrant
\nPhilippines, and took most of them on his several-dozen foreign
\ntrips: and these were not pleasure junkets but highly-organized
\ninvestment-search ventures, in which the president held nightly
\nreviews with his entourage to see how much new money had been
\npromised that day. The way to the presidential heart was finding
\nnew investment -- which soared during his presidency.<\/p>\n
So reform occurred in virtually every area of Philippines
\ngovernance. Tax collection soared, land reform was essentially
\ncompleted, and infrastructural projects spread across the
\narchipelago. Exports in computer parts and other high-end
\nmanufactures were growing sometimes by 45% a year. Small wonder
\nthat it was the only large Southeast Asian economy that didn't
\neven briefly go under during the 1997 catastrophe. The
\nPhilippines economy actually grew slightly in 1997 - thanks to
\nshrewd and cautious management by the palace and department of
\nfinance.<\/p>\n
Of course the differences between these two countries are
\nsubstantial and no serious analyst would try to market identical
\nprocesses. For one thing, the economic crisis hit when Soeharto
\nwas still in power - but all but moribund. It has made recovery
\nso very much more difficult. And there never was the positive
\neffect of a "clean sweep" - the picture of Ferdinand Marcos
\nclimbing aboard a Huey helicopter into permanent exile, a
\nrevolution from the streets removing all fear of lingering Marcos
\ninfluence.<\/p>\n
But still, does anyone seriously believe Indonesia lacks
\ntalented and competent reformers, capable - if given the chance -
\nof instituting the kind of reforms Ramos achieved in six years in
\nthe Philippines? Does anyone believe that Filipinos are more
\ncapable than Indonesians? Surely not. The question is not
\ncompetence or even experience. It is political will, and belief
\nthat it is possible.<\/p>\n
One huge difference between the two archipelagos is that
\nIndonesians as a whole are far more self-confident in their
\nnationalism and national identity than Filipinos. This alone
\nshould make it easier to achieve here what the Philippines
\nmanaged to do so magnificently in six short years.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/indonesia-needs-show-case-for-good-governance-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}