East Timor's future in the balance

East Timor's future in the balance

Damien Kingsbury
Head
Philosophical, Political
and International Studies
Deakin University
Victoria, Australia

As the United Nations winds down in East Timor ahead of next
May's departure, this fledgling state is wrestling with forces
that could offer it a stable future or, should matters not be
well managed, tear it apart. More than ever, East Timor's future
is in the balance.

Since its vote for independence from Indonesia and subsequent
destruction by TNI-backed militias in 1999, East Timor has in
many respects staged a remarkable recovery. In large part this
has been due to United Nations and foreign NGO assistance. Most
buildings have now been repaired, businesses thrive and there are
more cars, trucks and motorbikes than ever before.

However, development is not just about material progress, but
also social and political participation, representation,
accountability and freedom. And it is upon such political
development that the growth and security of material progress
depends.

Perhaps key to political development is that, in their wisdom,
the East Timorese chose to have a ceremonial rather than
executive president. This means that critical state decisions are
not in the hands of one person, even if that person is Xanana
Gusmao. The reality is that Gusmao will not be president forever,
and his eventual replacement might be much less benign or
genuinely popular.

The moral authority of the presidency, though, weighs well
against the government executive, which in turn is balanced by
the elected legislature from which it is drawn. An executive
drawn from an elected legislature remains accountable, and must
always perform at a level that retains the confidence of the
legislature.

The rule of an independent legal system, without which no
state can effectively function, is also in place as a balance
against legislative or executive caprice. However, with little
time for training, this branch is not yet living up to its full
potential.

No state can claim political development without a loyal but
critically active opposition. The Democratic Party and Social
Democrats in particular provide a socially progressive
alternative to the governing Fretilin, and may force Fretilin
into a coalition after the next elections.

After two positive experiences of voting, East Timor's people,
too, have taken the democratic process to heart. This alone is
perhaps the most positive sign for the future.

However, against these positive attributes, East Timor's
political ledger also records some serious negatives, which
together have the potential to leave the country in chaos.

Most potentially damaging is the growing unpopularity of the
Fretilin government, due to its perceived arrogance, elitism and
allegations of abuses of power. Although Fretilin has around two-
thirds of the seats in the legislature, it achieved them largely
due to representing the core of the pro-independence movement.
The gloss of that status is now fading.

In that the Democrats and Social Democrats are a viable
opposition, neither party has developed any coherent set of
policies, other than succumbing to World Bank pressure to borrow.
East Timor has little capacity to repay such loans, the potential
benefits of which are not clear.

East Timor will also likely undergo a slump in professional
expertise when the UN leaves. Given the sometimes uncooperative
responses of the Fretilin government to international
organizations, this slump is not likely to be picked up by non-UN
agencies.

In particular, elements of the former Internal Political
Front, the clandestine urban wing of the armed resistance under
Indonesian rule, have not accommodated well to civilian rule.
Certain members of this former organization believe they remain a
law unto themselves.

In an environment in which there are grievances against the
government, and in which many expectations remain unfulfilled,
there is also fertile ground for destabilization, This task has
been undertaken by the so-called Committee for the Popular
Defense of the Republic of Democratic Timor L'este (CPD-RDTL).
Not surprisingly, while the CPD-RDTL draws on some disaffected
East Timorese youth and a few ex-members of the guerrilla force
Falintil, it is also notable for its significant numbers of ex-
militia members.

The CPD-RDTL does promote issues of genuine concern to
ordinary East Timorese, but its tactics are violence,
intimidation and extortion. Populism linked to violence is the
stuff of fascism, and the CPD-RDTL is similar to neo-Nazi in all
but name.

Cross-border smuggling and threats by members of the
Integration Struggle Troops (PPI) militia to again "plant the red
and white in East Timor" also adds to instability. This reflects
the underlying tension that exists between Indonesian and East
Timor, not least among sections of the TNI, despite official
Indonesian pronouncements to the contrary.

Having made a large and costly investment, the international
community is unlikely to watch East Timor be overtly
destabilized. The strategic location of East Timor also means
that the United States in particular will want to see the place
remain stable, which in turn means having an accountable
government. The recent presence of U.S. warships just off Dili,
including an aircraft carrier, was a clear sign that U.S.
strategic interest remains high.

Australia, too, remains committed to East Timor, although wary
of offending Indonesia by retaining a robust presence along the
border. Australia's army battalion is due to be withdrawn in
2004, but there are already calls from border communities for a
military company to remain in each district. East
Timor's Border Patrol Unit has a limited capability.

Most probably, East Timor will bump along after May 2004,
certainly with many problems but also with some strengths. If the
major political groups can continue to respect the rule of law
then the future of East Timor should be more rather than less
positive. However, abandoning the rule of law, or failing to have
it properly applied, will almost certainly spell disaster for the
fledgling state.

If East Timorese need any motivation to remain on the path of
tolerance and respect for the law, they need only to recall their
own history. The cost in lives, to 1999, was staggering by any
standard -- Harvard genocide expert Ben Kiernan estimates 150,000
of 650,000 died between 1975 and the mid-1980s -- apart from the
destruction and death of 1999. As with Indonesia itself, the
price of going back to the bad old days is too high to
contemplate.