Fri, 14 Nov 2003

East Timor's future in the balance

Damien Kingsbury, Senior Lecturer, International Development, Deakin University, Victoria, Australia

As the United Nations winds down in East Timor ahead of next May's departure, this fledgling state is wrestling with forces that could offer it a stable future or, should matters not be well managed, tear it apart. More than ever, East Timor's future is in the balance.

Since its vote for independence from Indonesia and subsequent destruction by TNI-backed militias in 1999, East Timor has in many respects staged a remarkable recovery. In large part this has been due to United Nations and foreign NGO assistance. Most buildings have now been repaired, businesses thrive and there are more cars, trucks and motorbikes than ever before.

However, development is not just about material progress, but also social and political participation, representation, accountability and freedom. And it is upon such political development that the growth and security of material progress depends.

Perhaps key to political development is that, in their wisdom, the East Timorese chose to have a ceremonial rather than executive president. This means that critical state decisions are not in the hands of one person, even if that person is Xanana Gusmao. The reality is that Gusmao will not be president forever, and his eventual replacement might be much less benign or genuinely popular.

The moral authority of the presidency, though, weighs well against the government executive, which in turn is balanced by the elected legislature from which it is drawn. An executive drawn from an elected legislature remains accountable, and must always perform at a level that retains the confidence of the legislature.

The rule of an independent legal system, without which no state can effectively function, is also in place as a balance against legislative or executive caprice. However, with little time for training, this branch is not yet living up to its full potential.

No state can claim political development without a loyal but critically active opposition. The Democratic Party and Social Democrats in particular provide a socially progressive alternative to the governing Fretilin, and may force Fretilin into a coalition after the next elections.

After two positive experiences of voting, East Timor's people, too, have taken the democratic process to heart. This alone is perhaps the most positive sign for the future.

However, against these positive attributes, East Timor's political ledger also records some serious negatives, which together have the potential to leave the country in chaos.

Most potentially damaging is the growing unpopularity of the Fretilin government, due to its perceived arrogance, elitism and allegations of abuses of power. Although Fretilin has around two- thirds of the seats in the legislature, it achieved them largely due to representing the core of the pro-independence movement. The gloss of that status is now fading.

In that the Democrats and Social Democrats are a viable opposition, neither party has developed any coherent set of policies, other than succumbing to World Bank pressure to borrow. East Timor has little capacity to repay such loans, the potential benefits of which are not clear.

East Timor will also likely undergo a slump in professional expertise when the UN leaves. Given the sometimes uncooperative responses of the Fretilin government to international organizations, this slump is not likely to be picked up by non-UN agencies.

In particular, elements of the former Internal Political Front, the clandestine urban wing of the armed resistance under Indonesian rule, have not accommodated well to civilian rule. Certain members of this former organization believe they remain a law unto themselves.

In an environment in which there are grievances against the government, and in which many expectations remain unfulfilled, there is also fertile ground for destabilization, This task has been undertaken by the so-called Committee for the Popular Defense of the Republic of Democratic Timor L'este (CPD-RDTL). Not surprisingly, while the CPD-RDTL draws on some disaffected East Timorese youth and a few ex-members of the guerrilla force Falintil, it is also notable for its significant numbers of ex- militia members.

The CPD-RDTL does promote issues of genuine concern to ordinary East Timorese, but its tactics are violence, intimidation and extortion. Populism linked to violence is the stuff of fascism, and the CPD-RDTL is similar to neo-Nazi in all but name.

Cross-border smuggling and threats by members of the Integration Struggle Troops (PPI) militia to again "plant the red and white in East Timor" also adds to instability. This reflects the underlying tension that exists between Indonesian and East Timor, not least among sections of the TNI, despite official Indonesian pronouncements to the contrary.

Having made a large and costly investment, the international community is unlikely to watch East Timor be overtly destabilized. The strategic location of East Timor also means that the United States in particular will want to see the place remain stable, which in turn means having an accountable government. The recent presence of U.S. warships just off Dili, including an aircraft carrier, was a clear sign that U.S. strategic interest remains high.

Australia, too, remains committed to East Timor, although wary of offending Indonesia by retaining a robust presence along the border. Australia's army battalion is due to be withdrawn in 2004, but there are already calls from border communities for a military company to remain in each district. East Timor's Border Patrol Unit has a limited capability.

Most probably, East Timor will bump along after May 2004, certainly with many problems but also with some strengths. If the major political groups can continue to respect the rule of law then the future of East Timor should be more rather than less positive. However, abandoning the rule of law, or failing to have it properly applied, will almost certainly spell disaster for the fledgling state.

If East Timorese need any motivation to remain on the path of tolerance and respect for the law, they need only to recall their own history. The cost in lives, to 1999, was staggering by any standard -- Harvard genocide expert Ben Kiernan estimates 150,000 of 650,000 died between 1975 and the mid-1980s -- apart from the destruction and death of 1999. As with Indonesia itself, the price of going back to the bad old days is too high to contemplate.

Dr Damien Kingsbury is head of Philosophical, Political and International Studies at Deakin University.