East Timor's future in the balance<\/p>\n
Damien Kingsbury
\nHead
\nPhilosophical, Political
\nand International Studies
\nDeakin University
\nVictoria, Australia<\/p>\n
As the United Nations winds down in East Timor ahead of next
\nMay's departure, this fledgling state is wrestling with forces
\nthat could offer it a stable future or, should matters not be
\nwell managed, tear it apart. More than ever, East Timor's future
\nis in the balance.<\/p>\n
Since its vote for independence from Indonesia and subsequent
\ndestruction by TNI-backed militias in 1999, East Timor has in
\nmany respects staged a remarkable recovery. In large part this
\nhas been due to United Nations and foreign NGO assistance. Most
\nbuildings have now been repaired, businesses thrive and there are
\nmore cars, trucks and motorbikes than ever before.<\/p>\n
However, development is not just about material progress, but
\nalso social and political participation, representation,
\naccountability and freedom. And it is upon such political
\ndevelopment that the growth and security of material progress
\ndepends.<\/p>\n
Perhaps key to political development is that, in their wisdom,
\nthe East Timorese chose to have a ceremonial rather than
\nexecutive president. This means that critical state decisions are
\nnot in the hands of one person, even if that person is Xanana
\nGusmao. The reality is that Gusmao will not be president forever,
\nand his eventual replacement might be much less benign or
\ngenuinely popular.<\/p>\n
The moral authority of the presidency, though, weighs well
\nagainst the government executive, which in turn is balanced by
\nthe elected legislature from which it is drawn. An executive
\ndrawn from an elected legislature remains accountable, and must
\nalways perform at a level that retains the confidence of the
\nlegislature.<\/p>\n
The rule of an independent legal system, without which no
\nstate can effectively function, is also in place as a balance
\nagainst legislative or executive caprice. However, with little
\ntime for training, this branch is not yet living up to its full
\npotential.<\/p>\n
No state can claim political development without a loyal but
\ncritically active opposition. The Democratic Party and Social
\nDemocrats in particular provide a socially progressive
\nalternative to the governing Fretilin, and may force Fretilin
\ninto a coalition after the next elections.<\/p>\n
After two positive experiences of voting, East Timor's people,
\ntoo, have taken the democratic process to heart. This alone is
\nperhaps the most positive sign for the future.<\/p>\n
However, against these positive attributes, East Timor's
\npolitical ledger also records some serious negatives, which
\ntogether have the potential to leave the country in chaos.<\/p>\n
Most potentially damaging is the growing unpopularity of the
\nFretilin government, due to its perceived arrogance, elitism and
\nallegations of abuses of power. Although Fretilin has around two-
\nthirds of the seats in the legislature, it achieved them largely
\ndue to representing the core of the pro-independence movement.
\nThe gloss of that status is now fading.<\/p>\n
In that the Democrats and Social Democrats are a viable
\nopposition, neither party has developed any coherent set of
\npolicies, other than succumbing to World Bank pressure to borrow.
\nEast Timor has little capacity to repay such loans, the potential
\nbenefits of which are not clear.<\/p>\n
East Timor will also likely undergo a slump in professional
\nexpertise when the UN leaves. Given the sometimes uncooperative
\nresponses of the Fretilin government to international
\norganizations, this slump is not likely to be picked up by non-UN
\nagencies.<\/p>\n
In particular, elements of the former Internal Political
\nFront, the clandestine urban wing of the armed resistance under
\nIndonesian rule, have not accommodated well to civilian rule.
\nCertain members of this former organization believe they remain a
\nlaw unto themselves.<\/p>\n
In an environment in which there are grievances against the
\ngovernment, and in which many expectations remain unfulfilled,
\nthere is also fertile ground for destabilization, This task has
\nbeen undertaken by the so-called Committee for the Popular
\nDefense of the Republic of Democratic Timor L'este (CPD-RDTL).
\nNot surprisingly, while the CPD-RDTL draws on some disaffected
\nEast Timorese youth and a few ex-members of the guerrilla force
\nFalintil, it is also notable for its significant numbers of ex-
\nmilitia members.<\/p>\n
The CPD-RDTL does promote issues of genuine concern to
\nordinary East Timorese, but its tactics are violence,
\nintimidation and extortion. Populism linked to violence is the
\nstuff of fascism, and the CPD-RDTL is similar to neo-Nazi in all
\nbut name.<\/p>\n
Cross-border smuggling and threats by members of the
\nIntegration Struggle Troops (PPI) militia to again \"plant the red
\nand white in East Timor\" also adds to instability. This reflects
\nthe underlying tension that exists between Indonesian and East
\nTimor, not least among sections of the TNI, despite official
\nIndonesian pronouncements to the contrary.<\/p>\n
Having made a large and costly investment, the international
\ncommunity is unlikely to watch East Timor be overtly
\ndestabilized. The strategic location of East Timor also means
\nthat the United States in particular will want to see the place
\nremain stable, which in turn means having an accountable
\ngovernment. The recent presence of U.S. warships just off Dili,
\nincluding an aircraft carrier, was a clear sign that U.S.
\nstrategic interest remains high.<\/p>\n
Australia, too, remains committed to East Timor, although wary
\nof offending Indonesia by retaining a robust presence along the
\nborder. Australia's army battalion is due to be withdrawn in
\n2004, but there are already calls from border communities for a
\nmilitary company to remain in each district. East
\nTimor's Border Patrol Unit has a limited capability.<\/p>\n
Most probably, East Timor will bump along after May 2004,
\ncertainly with many problems but also with some strengths. If the
\nmajor political groups can continue to respect the rule of law
\nthen the future of East Timor should be more rather than less
\npositive. However, abandoning the rule of law, or failing to have
\nit properly applied, will almost certainly spell disaster for the
\nfledgling state.<\/p>\n
If East Timorese need any motivation to remain on the path of
\ntolerance and respect for the law, they need only to recall their
\nown history. The cost in lives, to 1999, was staggering by any
\nstandard -- Harvard genocide expert Ben Kiernan estimates 150,000
\nof 650,000 died between 1975 and the mid-1980s -- apart from the
\ndestruction and death of 1999. As with Indonesia itself, the
\nprice of going back to the bad old days is too high to
\ncontemplate.<\/p>",
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