Aceh: More challenges from Geneva

Aceh: More challenges from Geneva

By Aboeprijadi Santoso

GENEVA (JP): It is a breathing space in what could become a
long journey toward a final solution for Aceh. The agreement
signed by the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM) in Geneva last Friday (May 12), marks President Abdurrahman
Wahid's (Gus Dur's) new approach to dealing with Indonesia's
trouble spots -- a new chapter after East Timor.

After only three meetings since January -- and only three
months after Gus Dur took power -- a silent diplomacy has
resulted in an agreement. The talks started on Jan. 27 in a
surprisingly good atmosphere, sources here disclosed.

With the help of the Swiss based Henry Dunant Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue, a dozen or so people representing the two
sides had several meetings and lunches -- sometimes privately
using and joking in Bahasa Indonesia -- for four months to
discuss the situation in Aceh, on which they ultimately held
opposite views on its future.

But the diplomatic process is a reminder of the ongoing
painful reality on the ground. It was the pressing needs of
humanitarian aid for refugees and other victims of violence and
the Acehnese people's quest for a lasting peace, that pushed
Jakarta and GAM to put their differences aside and sign "a Joint
Understanding on Humanitarian Pause".

To carry out the accord, two Aceh-based joint committees will
facilitate humanitarian aid and monitor the security situation;
another team will observe the implementation; and a Joint Forum
in Geneva will decide on the progress.

In stark contrast to the fate of the East Timorese, who,
despite their similar tragedy, were treated by the New Order as
(in the words of former president Soeharto) "a pimple on our
face", Acehnese rebels in Sweden were dealt with as brothers of a
different political persuasion.

Only a few slips of tongue at high levels in Jakarta
occasionally led to angry responses from GAM. Given the
sensitivity, the talks were clothed in secrecy.

GAM leader Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro was always present in the
same building and while he never took part in the talks, he was
regularly consulted by his men. As GAM chose a low profile, so
too did Jakarta diplomats. The two sides respected each other
while engaging in discussions, sources said.

Under President Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia, therefore, faces
its rebels with dignity. For the first time since independence,
the central government has been willing to hold direct talks with
rebels. In the past, rebellions always ended with military means.
No dialogues were held with Darul Islam and the regional rebels
in the 1950s.

Left-wingers were massacred in the mid-1960s. In East Timor, a
cease-fire, secretly agreed by Fretilin's commander Jose
Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao and Col. Poerwanto in 1983, was only
short lived: it was the example par excellence of the New Order's
belief in military solutions.

In the case of Maluku, by contrast, Gus Dur started a dialogue
to deal with the political-humanitarian problems by involving
Maluku people from the Netherlands, including some ministers of
RMS, the South Maluku Republic -- a separatist group, who may not
even be politically representative of the Maluku people today.

As for Papua, officially Irian Jaya, "we will have a dialogue
in Timika," the President promised OPM (Free Papua Movement)
leader Victor Kasiepo when he visited the Netherlands recently.

In a symbolic-reconciliatory gesture, Gus Dur added jokingly,
"We will have meals together, but for me it will not be babi
guling (Papua dishes with pork are forbidden for Muslims), but
ayam guling (fried chicken)."

Now, the Acehnese from GAM "are not enemies, they are our
brothers," Indonesian diplomats said, echoing Gus Dur's open and
reconciliatory spirit.

But differences, of course, remain. According to Indonesia,
the accord is a "joint understanding on humanitarian pause", not
an agreement and no mention of "cease fire", but GAM calls it an
"agreement for humanitarian pause and cease-fire".

With Jakarta treating GAM as "siblings" and GAM viewing
Jakarta as a "successor of Dutch colonial rulers", it should be
clear that there can be no question of mutual, diplomatic or de
jure recognition since neither side would be interested in it.

The concept of "humanitarian pause" is seen as a means to
avoid legal problems. To avoid complications, Foreign Minister
Alwi Shihab canceled his plan to attend the ceremony.

At best, the accord implies that Jakarta de facto cannot avoid
GAM -- just as GAM, now weakened by division and international
isolation, needs Jakarta.

But, doubts arise whether the talks will go further beyond
humanitarian and security topics per se and enter into
substantive political issues, since Indonesia basically wants to
keep Aceh on board, but GAM claims a right to independence.

The accord is just "an initial step," GAM says. But, it's "an
early step of a hundred-step journey" to find a final solution,
concurred ambassador N. Hassan Wirajuda, who, a few years ago,
mediated the Manila-Moro conflict.

"In Mindanao (now acquiring a greater autonomy instead of
independence), we met about 80 times," he explained with guarded
optimism.

Peace and security will only come if all armed units -- the
Indonesian army (TNI), AGAM (GAM's army) and what the accord
calls "the third party" -- can be disciplined and controlled.

With some Aceh districts increasingly militarized since last
January (the end of the Ramadhan holy month) by many parties, the
"Velvet" peaceful public protests, seen until December, have now
gone.

If violence continues, an Acehnese has argued, it will only
remind many Acehnese with anticolonial sentiments, of what they
still call (after the Dutch term) the era of Atjeh Moord (Aceh
Killings) early last century when political killings happened
almost every day.

The crux of the problem is that no one has been able to map
out this "third party", which reportedly includes TNI's "GAM"
elements, GAM's "wild" elements or whoever are known as
"provocateurs".

According to the accord, TNI and other armed units will not be
withdrawn, but the police should function to maintain the rule of
law. Since the Geneva accord aim is to stop any military action,
the key factors will be how and when to curtail these various
"provocateurs".

So, as one local observer, Humam Hamid, has argued, "once the
Indonesian Police and AGAM units are ready to patrol together,
then, and only then, there would be an important sign toward
peace and security".

If, therefore, the accord is fruitful, it may crucially
strengthen the Geneva parties. For the weakened and isolated
Hasan di Tiro-led GAM, it will strengthen its position vis a vis
other GAM factions and push them to unite.

Equally, the success of "Geneva" will be a kind of leverage,
strengthening the efforts of the President -- "the man behind the
chess board", one diplomat said -- to control the recalcitrant
military elements in Jakarta and Aceh.

It will certainly enhance his credibility to resolve the
trouble spots. With "Geneva", Jakarta now concurs with GAM to
regain the trust of the Acehnese by reducing violence. In three
months, as the first phase of the truce ends, it may also help
the President face challenges at the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) in August.

But the stakes may equally be high. For any great failure will
complicate the matter and endanger the solution for Aceh. The
Geneva accord is, thus, a challenge for the elite of all sides,
and a hope for the Acehnese people.

The writer is an Amsterdam-based journalist.