{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1304130,
        "msgid": "aceh-more-challenges-from-geneva-1447893297",
        "date": "2000-05-17 00:00:00",
        "title": "Aceh: More challenges from Geneva",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Aceh: More challenges from Geneva By Aboeprijadi Santoso GENEVA (JP): It is a breathing space in what could become a long journey toward a final solution for Aceh. The agreement signed by the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Geneva last Friday (May 12), marks President Abdurrahman Wahid's (Gus Dur's) new approach to dealing with Indonesia's trouble spots -- a new chapter after East Timor.",
        "content": "<p>Aceh: More challenges from Geneva<\/p>\n<p>By Aboeprijadi Santoso<\/p>\n<p>GENEVA (JP): It is a breathing space in what could become a<br>\nlong journey toward a final solution for Aceh. The agreement<br>\nsigned by the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement<br>\n(GAM) in Geneva last Friday (May 12), marks President Abdurrahman<br>\nWahid's (Gus Dur's) new approach to dealing with Indonesia's<br>\ntrouble spots -- a new chapter after East Timor.<\/p>\n<p>After only three meetings since January -- and only three<br>\nmonths after Gus Dur took power -- a silent diplomacy has<br>\nresulted in an agreement. The talks started on Jan. 27 in a<br>\nsurprisingly good atmosphere, sources here disclosed.<\/p>\n<p>With the help of the Swiss based Henry Dunant Centre for<br>\nHumanitarian Dialogue, a dozen or so people representing the two<br>\nsides had several meetings and lunches -- sometimes privately<br>\nusing and joking in Bahasa Indonesia -- for four months to<br>\ndiscuss the situation in Aceh, on which they ultimately held<br>\nopposite views on its future.<\/p>\n<p>But the diplomatic process is a reminder of the ongoing<br>\npainful reality on the ground. It was the pressing needs of<br>\nhumanitarian aid for refugees and other victims of violence and<br>\nthe Acehnese people's quest for a lasting peace, that pushed<br>\nJakarta and GAM to put their differences aside and sign \"a Joint<br>\nUnderstanding on Humanitarian Pause\".<\/p>\n<p>To carry out the accord, two Aceh-based joint committees will<br>\nfacilitate humanitarian aid and monitor the security situation;<br>\nanother team will observe the implementation; and a Joint Forum<br>\nin Geneva will decide on the progress.<\/p>\n<p>In stark contrast to the fate of the East Timorese, who,<br>\ndespite their similar tragedy, were treated by the New Order as<br>\n(in the words of former president Soeharto) \"a pimple on our<br>\nface\", Acehnese rebels in Sweden were dealt with as brothers of a<br>\ndifferent political persuasion.<\/p>\n<p>Only a few slips of tongue at high levels in Jakarta<br>\noccasionally led to angry responses from GAM. Given the<br>\nsensitivity, the talks were clothed in secrecy.<\/p>\n<p>GAM leader Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro was always present in the<br>\nsame building and while he never took part in the talks, he was<br>\nregularly consulted by his men. As GAM chose a low profile, so<br>\ntoo did Jakarta diplomats. The two sides respected each other<br>\nwhile engaging in discussions, sources said.<\/p>\n<p>Under President Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia, therefore, faces<br>\nits rebels with dignity. For the first time since independence,<br>\nthe central government has been willing to hold direct talks with<br>\nrebels. In the past, rebellions always ended with military means.<br>\nNo dialogues were held with Darul Islam and the regional rebels<br>\nin the 1950s.<\/p>\n<p>Left-wingers were massacred in the mid-1960s. In East Timor, a<br>\ncease-fire, secretly agreed by Fretilin's commander Jose<br>\nAlexandre \"Xanana\" Gusmao and Col. Poerwanto in 1983, was only<br>\nshort lived: it was the example par excellence of the New Order's<br>\nbelief in military solutions.<\/p>\n<p>In the case of Maluku, by contrast, Gus Dur started a dialogue<br>\nto deal with the political-humanitarian problems by involving<br>\nMaluku people from the Netherlands, including some ministers of<br>\nRMS, the South Maluku Republic -- a separatist group, who may not<br>\neven be politically representative of the Maluku people today.<\/p>\n<p>As for Papua, officially Irian Jaya, \"we will have a dialogue<br>\nin Timika,\" the President promised OPM (Free Papua Movement)<br>\nleader Victor Kasiepo when he visited the Netherlands recently.<\/p>\n<p>In a symbolic-reconciliatory gesture, Gus Dur added jokingly,<br>\n\"We will have meals together, but for me it will not be babi<br>\nguling (Papua dishes with pork are forbidden for Muslims), but<br>\nayam guling (fried chicken).\"<\/p>\n<p>Now, the Acehnese from GAM \"are not enemies, they are our<br>\nbrothers,\" Indonesian diplomats said, echoing Gus Dur's open and<br>\nreconciliatory spirit.<\/p>\n<p>But differences, of course, remain. According to Indonesia,<br>\nthe accord is a \"joint understanding on humanitarian pause\", not<br>\nan agreement and no mention of \"cease fire\", but GAM calls it an<br>\n\"agreement for humanitarian pause and cease-fire\".<\/p>\n<p>With Jakarta treating GAM as \"siblings\" and GAM viewing<br>\nJakarta as a \"successor of Dutch colonial rulers\", it should be<br>\nclear that there can be no question of mutual, diplomatic or de<br>\njure recognition since neither side would be interested in it.<\/p>\n<p>The concept of \"humanitarian pause\" is seen as a means to<br>\navoid legal problems. To avoid complications, Foreign Minister<br>\nAlwi Shihab canceled his plan to attend the ceremony.<\/p>\n<p>At best, the accord implies that Jakarta de facto cannot avoid<br>\nGAM -- just as GAM, now weakened by division and international<br>\nisolation, needs Jakarta.<\/p>\n<p>But, doubts arise whether the talks will go further beyond<br>\nhumanitarian and security topics per se and enter into<br>\nsubstantive political issues, since Indonesia basically wants to<br>\nkeep Aceh on board, but GAM claims a right to independence.<\/p>\n<p>The accord is just \"an initial step,\" GAM says. But, it's \"an<br>\nearly step of a hundred-step journey\" to find a final solution,<br>\nconcurred ambassador N. Hassan Wirajuda, who, a few years ago,<br>\nmediated the Manila-Moro conflict.<\/p>\n<p>\"In Mindanao (now acquiring a greater autonomy instead of<br>\nindependence), we met about 80 times,\" he explained with guarded<br>\noptimism.<\/p>\n<p>Peace and security will only come if all armed units -- the<br>\nIndonesian army (TNI), AGAM (GAM's army) and what the accord<br>\ncalls \"the third party\" -- can be disciplined and controlled.<\/p>\n<p>With some Aceh districts increasingly militarized since last<br>\nJanuary (the end of the Ramadhan holy month) by many parties, the<br>\n\"Velvet\" peaceful public protests, seen until December, have now<br>\ngone.<\/p>\n<p>If violence continues, an Acehnese has argued, it will only<br>\nremind many Acehnese with anticolonial sentiments, of what they<br>\nstill call (after the Dutch term) the era of Atjeh Moord (Aceh<br>\nKillings) early last century when political killings happened<br>\nalmost every day.<\/p>\n<p>The crux of the problem is that no one has been able to map<br>\nout this \"third party\", which reportedly includes TNI's \"GAM\"<br>\nelements, GAM's \"wild\" elements or whoever are known as<br>\n\"provocateurs\".<\/p>\n<p>According to the accord, TNI and other armed units will not be<br>\nwithdrawn, but the police should function to maintain the rule of<br>\nlaw. Since the Geneva accord aim is to stop any military action,<br>\nthe key factors will be how and when to curtail these various<br>\n\"provocateurs\".<\/p>\n<p>So, as one local observer, Humam Hamid, has argued, \"once the<br>\nIndonesian Police and AGAM units are ready to patrol together,<br>\nthen, and only then, there would be an important sign toward<br>\npeace and security\".<\/p>\n<p>If, therefore, the accord is fruitful, it may crucially<br>\nstrengthen the Geneva parties. For the weakened and isolated<br>\nHasan di Tiro-led GAM, it will strengthen its position vis a vis<br>\nother GAM factions and push them to unite.<\/p>\n<p>Equally, the success of \"Geneva\" will be a kind of leverage,<br>\nstrengthening the efforts of the President -- \"the man behind the<br>\nchess board\", one diplomat said -- to control the recalcitrant<br>\nmilitary elements in Jakarta and Aceh.<\/p>\n<p>It will certainly enhance his credibility to resolve the<br>\ntrouble spots. With \"Geneva\", Jakarta now concurs with GAM to<br>\nregain the trust of the Acehnese by reducing violence. In three<br>\nmonths, as the first phase of the truce ends, it may also help<br>\nthe President face challenges at the People's Consultative<br>\nAssembly (MPR) in August.<\/p>\n<p>But the stakes may equally be high. For any great failure will<br>\ncomplicate the matter and endanger the solution for Aceh. The<br>\nGeneva accord is, thus, a challenge for the elite of all sides,<br>\nand a hope for the Acehnese people.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is an Amsterdam-based journalist.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/aceh-more-challenges-from-geneva-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}