Zakat and Wakaf as Economic Buffers Amid Global Uncertainty

Global economic pressures are no longer mere rhetoric but a tangible reality in the form of weakening exchange rates, fluctuating energy prices, and prolonged geopolitical uncertainties. For Indonesia, this situation presents a serious test, especially as the government under Prabowo Subianto’s leadership begins implementing various priority programmes that require substantial fiscal space.

The Prabowo Subianto administration arrives with grand ambitions: accelerating economic growth, strengthening food security, and improving human resource quality through massive-scale social programmes such as free nutritious meals. The narrative clearly states that the state must be more present, more active, and more expansive in promoting welfare.

However, behind these ambitions lies a fundamental question that is rarely addressed seriously: how strong is Indonesia’s economic buffer? So far, this buffer has almost always been equated with the State Budget (APBN). When a crisis strikes, the state increases social spending, expands subsidies, or provides fiscal stimulus. The problem is that this approach has limits. Deficits must be controlled, debt cannot surge, and market confidence must be maintained.

Ironically, at a time when the state faces fiscal constraints, there is a vast resource that is almost entirely absent from the national economic architecture: zakat and wakaf. Yet, if managed seriously, both could serve as economic buffers that are not only effective but also sustainable. Unfortunately, to this day, zakat and wakaf are still more often positioned as moral and religious matters rather than strategic economic instruments.

Indonesia is not a country lacking in social funds. Various studies show that the national zakat potential ranges from Rp250 trillion to Rp320 trillion per year. Meanwhile, the potential for cash waqf is estimated at Rp180 trillion per year. If combined with infak and sedekah, the total potential of community funds could exceed Rp400 trillion per year, a figure not far from the social protection spending in the APBN.

However, realisations remain far from adequate. National zakat collection is only around Rp40 trillion to Rp45 trillion per year. Cash waqf has not even reached 1% of its potential. This indicates that more than 80% of zakat potential and nearly all wakaf potential remain untapped.

This condition is not just an ordinary gap but reveals a systemic failure. Furthermore, it shows that Indonesia actually possesses a large community-based “economic buffer” that is left functioning suboptimally. In the context of public policy, this is an expensive form of inefficiency.

In Indonesia’s economic structure, household consumption is the backbone, contributing more than half of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). When purchasing power weakens, economic growth follows suit. It is here that zakat plays a strategic role.

Unlike fiscal stimulus, which often requires time, zakat works directly. The funds collected are immediately channelled to mustahik groups, who tend to have high consumption propensity.

This means that every rupiah of zakat almost certainly returns to the economic circulation. In times of economic pressure, zakat serves as a supporter of lower-income purchasing power, an informal social safety net, and a community-based economic stimulus.

However, its effectiveness is still limited because most zakat is channelled in the form of short-term consumptive aid. Zakat is still dominated by consumptive assistance, direct grants, and short-term distributions.

This model is indeed important in emergencies. But if it remains the primary approach, zakat will only function as a “fire extinguisher”, alleviating symptoms without addressing root causes.

From an economic perspective, this approach has three serious weaknesses. First, it does not create economic independence. Mustahik remain dependent on aid without productive capacity building.

Second, it does not produce long-term effects. Once the aid is depleted, problems resurface. Third, it is not connected to the broader economic system. Zakat operates in isolation, without integration into development policies.

Yet, if directed towards productive sectors such as SME financing or economic empowerment, zakat could have a much greater impact. In this context, zakat should not only be seen as a redistribution tool but also as an economic transformation instrument.

If zakat is a short-term buffer, wakaf is a long-term one. The problem is that wakaf has not yet entered the main radar of national economic policy. While zakat is trapped in a charitable approach, wakaf faces a different issue: structural stagnation.

Most waqf assets in Indonesia are still in the form of land used for mosques, cemeteries, and non-productive social facilities. There is nothing wrong with these functions. However, when almost all waqf stops there, its economic potential remains undeveloped. In Islamic history, waqf was actually the primary instrument for economic development, such as funding universities, building hospitals, and providing sustainable public services.

Amid the grand agenda of the Prabowo Subianto administration—from human resource development to food security—waqf could actually serve as an alternative financing source. Imagine if a portion of the Rp180 trillion annual waqf potential were managed productively, such as for building schools, hospitals, or even supporting the national food ecosystem.

Waqf can function as an eternal community fund that reduces dependency