Wrong assumptions behind guerrilla warfare

Wrong assumptions behind guerrilla warfare

Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Former Governor, National Resilience Institute
(Lemhanas), Jakarta

The capture of Saddam Hussein made the American leaders very
happy. It was not only that one of their objectives in fighting a
war against Iraq was achieved, but they also thought that it
would end the physical resistance and guerrilla warfare on the
part of some Iraqi groups.

It is, however, a mistake to assume that the capture of Saddam
Hussein will automatically finish the guerrilla war against the
Americans. That assumption is wrong because it has been far from
clear all along that the guerrillas were really led by Saddam
Hussein and that their effectiveness depended very much on
Saddam's leadership.

Moreover, the continuation of a guerrilla war is in the first
place not decided by its leadership, although the role of an
effective leader can have a significant influence on a guerrilla
war.

The Dutch colonial government made a similar mistake when they
came up against Indonesian resistance in 1948. They thought that
by capturing President Sukarno, Vice President Mohamad Hatta and
almost the entire cabinet, the Indonesian armed forces and the
people would stop fighting. They did not understand that the main
motivation of the resistance against the Dutch was the
achievement of the full independence of Indonesia.

That could only become a reality when the Dutch were forced to
leave Indonesia or were willing to recognize the sovereignty of
the newly born Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch were, therefore,
very disappointed when the fight continued, in spite of Sukarno's
capture.

The continuation and effectiveness of a guerrilla war is more
dependent on the minds and the tenacity of the guerrilla fighters
to pursue their objectives and the support they receive from the
people in the area of operations. In the case of Iraq, the
motivation to fight a guerrilla war against the Americans and its
allies is very much influenced by the patriotic and nationalistic
sentiments of some Iraqi people, who cannot accept the occupation
of their country by foreign forces.

As long as the Americans cannot change this mental attitude
among such Iraqis, they will continue to encounter physical
resistance and guerrilla warfare. The capture of Saddam Hussein,
however significant for maintaining a positive mood among the
American people, is far from enough to have the fighting in Iraq
terminated.

The most important strategic achievement that the Americans
could make to end the resistance is to create a change in mental
attitudes among those who are resisting. And that means that the
Americans and other occupation forces must be able to fight a
counter-insurgency war and win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi
people as the number-one objective. All activities, whether
purely military operations or political and economic operations,
must be geared to achieving that number one objective.

In Indonesian Army terms, these are called territorial
operations, and involve physical and psychological aspects. These
kind of operations require harmonization between all activities
of the civilian government and military forces. Everybody
involved in the counter-insurgency must understand fully that the
main objective is to win the hearts and minds of the people.

It is amazing that the Americans with their bloody Vietnam
experience do not know or understand this reality. With their
well-known capabilities in research and development the Americans
should have known better and prepared themselves for the troubles
they now face in Iraq. In Vietnam, the Americans had total air
control and used all their technological superiority in their
attempt to defeat the Vietnamese guerrillas.

However, the use of all kinds of weapons systems except
nuclear weapons, including the use of the defoliant Agent Orange
and the methodical carpet bombing of North Vietnam, was still not
able to make the Vietnamese surrender. What happened was instead
the strengthening of Vietnamese resistance and ultimately the
capture of Saigon and the defeat of the Americans, with all the
traumatic effects that have ensued until today.

However, the other side also seems to be making wrong
assumptions about guerrilla warfare. Until today, al-Qaeda and
its affiliates, like the organization that calls itself Jamaah
Islamiyah (this name for a terrorist organization is an insult to
the Muslim community!) are doing their fighting through terrorist
actions.

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare may actually be placed in the
same category. Namely, both cannot achieve their political
objectives by themselves.

While guerrilla warfare and terror are certainly able to harm
societies and their peoples, they cannot achieve their political
objectives unless the guerrilla actions are supported by
diplomatic efforts in the international arena. Without this
parallel endeavor, a guerrilla force is just a nuisance for the
occupation force or the ruling government.

Indonesia achieved Dutch recognition of its independence and
sovereignty because of its effective diplomatic efforts in the UN
and other international bodies. Of course, the guerrilla fighting
was very instrumental in strengthening the international
diplomacy. But it was at the diplomatic table that the Dutch were
forced to leave Indonesia. It was a harmonious game of guerrilla
warfare and diplomacy that ultimately secured Indonesian
independence and national sovereignty.

If guerrilla forces become so effective that they can
establish regular military capabilities, victory can also be
secured through military means. Such regular forces must be able
to defeat the occupation forces and achieve a decisive military
result by forcing the occupation force to surrender or make them
flee the country. That happened in Vietnam when the Vietnamese
tank units entered Saigon and forced the Americans and their
Vietnamese supporters to hastily leave the country.

Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) are not availing of either
of these two alternatives to achieve their political objectives.
They seem to be satisfied with bomb attacks that might cause a
lot of consternation but do not have a distinct political effect.
The political objective of JI is reportedly to establish a new
caliphate in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, some
parts of Thailand and the Philippines, and even some parts of
Australia.

But how can JI achieve this political objective if it is only
fighting a terrorist war, mostly involving bomb attacks. Of
course, the Bali and Marriott bomb attacks caused a lot of
problems for Indonesia. But they did not change the political
situation in any way that could be to the advantage of achieving
JI's political objectives.

On the contrary, they hardened the stance of moderate Muslims
against the terrorists. Indonesia is not coming under any
diplomatic pressure that could encourage it to accommodate JI's
political objectives. The same goes for the other Southeast Asian
nations and Australia. Also, JI does not seem to have the
capability to build a regular military force that could be used
as an instrument to achieve a decisive political victory.

If this situation does not change, JI will definitely
degenerate into a mere criminal organization that can harm the
region very badly, but which is nevertheless nothing more than
that. Would that suite the JI leaders who always propagate their
"holy" intentions? It would perhaps be more effective for them to
try to achieve their political objectives through peaceful means.

Having said that, it must be recognized that in the minds of
Muslim people in Southeast Asia, there is no intention at all
among the majority of establishing a nation of Islam (Darul
Islam), let alone a new caliphate.