Wiranto in the storm

Wiranto in the storm

Pitan Daslani
Contributor
Jakarta
pitand@singapore.com

When Gen. (ret) Wiranto defeated Akbar Tandjung in the vote to
become the Golkar Party's presidential candidate on April 21, I
recalled the days when he could have taken over the national
leadership without too much difficulty.

Wiranto intentionally let pass at least three golden
opportunities to grab power during the reigns of Soeharto and
Habibie even though he had all the means and power to do so.

When the nation's stability was in question prior to
Soeharto's downfall, the strongman gave Wiranto unlimited power
to restore order --- the same scope of power that Soeharto
received from Megawati's late father Sukarno, which paved the way
for the birth of Soeharto's iron-handed control of the New Order.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was among the generals who asked
Wiranto whether he would grab power having received Soeharto's
mandate to restore stability and order.

After letting these opportunities to seize power pass, which
to many observers demonstrated his sincere desire to promote
democracy, Wiranto's attention was focused on efforts to counter
foreign media reports on his role in the violence in East Timor.

Since then the general's reputation has been tainted by mass
media stories that portray him as being responsible for "gross
violations of human rights" in the former Indonesian province.

The term "gross violations of human rights" itself has been
widely misunderstood, even by many human rights campaigners in
the foreign media, more so by those in the local media. Everybody
put the blame on Wiranto, as well as on the Indonesian Military
(TNI) and the police, despite their self-sacrificing dedication
to the conception of the Republic of Timor Leste.

Not surprisingly, Wiranto deemed it necessary to emphasize
during Golkar's recent convention the need for his countrymen not
to be blindly influenced by mass media verdicts, especially those
based on unfounded rumors, at the expense of Indonesia's own
dignity and national interests.

Wiranto has anyhow countered all such allegations in his book
Bersaksi di Tengah Badai (Witness to the Storm). If Golkar really
wishes to put Wiranto in Indonesia's No. 1 position, perhaps one
way to rehabilitate Wiranto's international reputation would be
to distribute this book everywhere, not as a defense but as
clarification.

Wiranto's former subordinate, Susilo, may pose a serious
challenge in the presidential race. But of no less significance
is the challenge that foreign media opinion could pose to Wiranto
given the fact that Golkar is still somewhat split over its
leader Akbar's humiliating defeat, so it may not fully back
Wiranto in restoring his image on the international front.

Given this, it would not be surprising to see a substantial
number of Golkar voters shifting their support to the Democratic
Party's Susilo or to presidential candidates from other parties.
This will be the biggest test of Golkar's solidarity and concern
for national interests.

If Indonesia wishes to have a strong government, its next
president must be backed by a strong legislative bastion. In
other words, if Golkar's legislative election victory is to mean
anything, like it or not, it must remain solid in escorting
Wiranto to the presidency. If this is not the case, Wiranto's
victory in Golkar's presidential convention could be
counterproductive to Golkar's own image.

This leads us to a very important question: are the regional
chapters of Golkar and the party's central executive board,
especially those who did not support Wiranto at the convention,
sincere about wanting to see Wiranto climb the ladder of power?
More critically, can we expect the same degree of sincerity from
Akbar, who may be worried that he is witnessing the end of his
own political career?

The first challenge Wiranto needs to overcome is to bring
unity back to Golkar, especially given the fact that he does not
have direct command over the party lines. The degree of sincerity
in the relationship between the Golkar Party's structure and its
presidential nominee will determine the extent to which Wiranto
can maneuver to establish a solid legislative platform for
himself.

Another challenge Wiranto faces is finding the right candidate
for the position of vice president. Susilo has already picked
Jusuf Kalla and the pair seems to have gained substantial
popularity among the political elite. To match this pair, Wiranto
may have to pick a candidate from Abdurrahman Wahid's Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), if the former president is willing to give others a
chance and does not insist on pressing on against all odds to try
and regain the palace.

Wahid would perhaps feel a bit satisfied if Wiranto embraced
the NU's top man to be his vice presidential candidate. That
would perhaps compensate for Wahid's possible failure in his
drive to regain the presidency.

Such a pair could perhaps reduce the significance of picking a
vice presidential candidate from eastern Indonesia (which
comprises more than 66 percent of the total Indonesian territory)
in the way Susilo did with Kalla, because quantitatively Wahid's
NU claims a 40 million strong membership, a majority of which
will take part in the direct presidential election on July 5.

But given the fact that NU members are spread all over so many
political parties, this direction would be but one of many
Wiranto would need to take in garnering support for the final
showdown against candidates from other parties.

In practice, however, it is not easy to put Golkar and the
NU's political wing, the National Awakening Party (PKB), together
in the same basket. The same is true of Hamzah Haz' United
Development Party (PPP) due to reasons of prestige and different
orientations.

A comprehensive pie-sharing arrangement may have to be
considered should Wiranto win the upcoming presidential election.
This would be ever more true if the election was won by Susilo,
whose party is relatively new and relies on his personal charm
instead of any other party strengths. For despite his sudden rise
in popularity, Susilo's possible victory could lead to the
formation of a weak government due to legislative domination by
bigger and more experienced parties.

The next crucial scene to watch is the formation of political
coalitions prior to the July 5 presidential election. Whether
Indonesia will have a strong or a weak government depends on the
level of harmony the next president will have with the ruling
forces in the House of Representatives.

If one puts aside the aggressive maneuvers Amien Rais is
making to match his dreams with the painful reality his party
faces, it is tempting to assume that if the big parties fail to
take this direction, even if Susilo, Amien or Megawati won the
presidential election, the next government would not be as strong
and solid as expected because of the numerous concessions the new
president would need to make to satisfy the interests of
everybody on the stage.

Do we have to assume now that if Wiranto and Susilo should
emerge as the main contenders in the July 5 election, it would be
the story of two Army generals stealing the show, the story of a
military victory in a civilian democracy? Some say Indonesia's
democracy has entered a stage where the dichotomy of military
versus civilian is perhaps no longer relevant.

But, like it or not, what is happening is that at the peak of
Indonesian reform that started with the comprehensive dismantling
of military power, now stand two former Army generals stealing
the show in the race for Indonesia's top position.