Will Indonesia Embrace a Free and Open Indo-Pacific?

Will Indonesia Embrace a Free and Open Indo-Pacific?

Note: This article is a personal opinion of the author and does not reflect the views of the CNBCIndonesia.com editorial team.

The recent visit by Japanese Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi to Honolulu to meet with the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command signals a clear shift in Japan’s regional strategy.

After decades of adhering to a cautious approach, Tokyo is now actively encouraging ‘like-minded’ Indo-Pacific countries to move beyond strategic ambiguity and towards building a more concrete coalition to counter China’s growing regional aggression.

This shift is evident. Japan has deepened its defense ties with the Philippines, while Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held snap elections to capitalize on strong public support for her tougher stance on China in security issues.

The United States is also following a similar pattern. The new national defense strategy released on January 24, 2026, details plans to expand US military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen its ‘ability to trade and interact from a position of strength’.

However, for Indonesia, this shift by Japan presents a strategic opportunity that should not be ignored. Japan’s commitment to accelerating the development of a regional coalition gives Indonesia the opportunity to strengthen military and technical cooperation with high-capability partners, while Indonesia retains full control over how and where this cooperation is implemented.

Although Indonesia has a long-standing commitment to the principle of Independent and Active Diplomacy, a non-aligned doctrine that underpins Indonesia’s foreign policy, strategic autonomy has never meant strategic passivity. This doctrine is designed to maintain Jakarta’s freedom of action and avoid formal entanglement with any major power, not to limit Indonesia’s ability to defend its maritime interests.

Under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto, who advocates a more proactive and security-oriented approach, Indonesia is transforming its defense posture. Prabowo has shifted the focus from the Jokowi era’s emphasis on infrastructure development to a much greater emphasis on strategic defense, including military equipment for combat readiness.

This shift is highly relevant in the maritime domain. Although security attention in the Indo-Pacific is currently focused on increasing Chinese military activity around Taiwan, Indonesia itself faces ongoing pressure from Beijing in the North Natuna Sea.

Although both governments continue to assert that there is no territorial dispute in the area, China’s claims based on the nine-dash line overlap with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and even within Beijing’s claims, it covers about 30% of Indonesia’s EEZ.

Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard ships repeatedly enter these waters, a pattern that has intensified during the presidency of Joko Widodo (Jokowi).

This is where the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework offers Jakarta a credible diplomatic template to address this pressure. Cooperation with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners, especially in the field of maritime surveillance, will allow Indonesia to deter coercive behavior by the Chinese navy without being drawn into formal alliance commitments.

FOIP will not restrict the principle of Independent and Active Diplomacy; on the contrary, FOIP operationalizes this principle for the era of naval competition in the gray zone. This framework does not advocate for the interests of a specific group of countries; instead, FOIP emphasizes inclusiveness and respect for the strategic preferences of each member, rather than bloc-based alignment.

This step seems appropriate. President Prabowo’s commitment to expanding Indonesia’s role in cooperative defense is becoming increasingly explicit. Jakarta will host Super Garuda Shield in 2025, an annual military exercise involving troops from the US, Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom.

Indonesia has also demonstrated greater ambition in developing its own naval capabilities. At a meeting between PM Takaichi and Foreign Minister Sugiono, Indonesia expressed interest in acquiring medium-sized submarines and frigates from Japan.

This interest builds on existing maritime cooperation. Tokyo has delivered two high-speed patrol boats to Indonesia through the Official Security Assistance (OSA) program and is currently building an offshore patrol vessel for the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla RI).

Indonesia’s push to enhance its defense capabilities aligns naturally with the trajectory of Japan’s strategy. The Takaichi administration places greater emphasis on modernizing Japan’s overall defense posture.

Defense Minister Koizumi has warned that Japan faces the most severe and complex security environment since World War II. Caution has now given way to the execution of strategy in fact.

Japan’s defense budget is expected to exceed 945 trillion rupiah for the first time. Of this record amount, about 105 trillion rupiah is specifically allocated for the development of stand-off missiles, aimed at expanding Japan’s long-range strike capabilities.

Tokyo is also seeking to strengthen its unmanned naval presence, allocating 28.3 trillion rupiah for the procurement of large-scale drone technology. Deeper coordination between Japan and Indonesia is also becoming increasingly apparent.