Will Aceh turn into a battlefield again?

Will Aceh turn into a battlefield again?

Leo Suryadinata, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South-east Asian
Studies, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
were supposed to meet in Geneva on April 25 to restore peace in
the restive province. The meeting was scheduled by the Geneva-
based Henry Dunant Centre, which had acted as the "facilitator"
of the peace treaty between Jakarta and GAM in December last
year.

Just before the scheduled date, when junior Indonesian
officials were already in Geneva, and Chief Security Minister
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was about to depart for the Swiss city,
GAM called for the meeting to be postponed, to April 27.

Understandably, the Indonesian government felt insulted by the
last-minute postponement and refused to accept the new date.
Hawks in the administration were on the verge of resuming
military operations in the province, when President Megawati
Soekarnoputri decided to give GAM another chance.

Why GAM's sudden change? The official explanation has been
that GAM was not ready on that date because of administrative and
accommodation problems. But this was rejected by Jakarta.

Zaini Abdullah, the GAM wing leader based in Sweden, blamed
the Henry Dunant Centre for "unilaterally setting the date of the
meeting" and criticized Indonesia for "lack of sincerity".

This however ignores the fact that on Dec. 9 last year, it was
through the good offices of the Henry Dunant Centre that Jakarta
and GAM signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Geneva.

The pact marked the beginning of a possible peace in Aceh. It
prevented large-scale conflict, at least initially. Its terms
included an immediate ceasefire, the gradual disarming of GAM and
the gradual withdrawal of the Indonesian military from Aceh.

In addition, demilitarized zones were to be created and a
local election was to be held next year. The process was to be
monitored by the Joint Security Committee (JSC) comprising GAM,
the Indonesian government and international representatives.

Recent events have, however, put a damper on the prospects of
peace.

Both Indonesia and GAM continue to trade accusations about
violations of ceasefire. GAM has refused to disarm and is
reported to have ambushed Indonesian troops.

Jakarta, on its part, continues to reinforce its troops and
harass GAM. GAM accuses Jakarta of wanting to solve the problem
through "military means" rather than "dialogue"; Jakarta accuses
GAM of refusing to abandon the agenda for Aceh's independence.

While the Indonesian military is divided into hawks and doves,
both groups are committed to the unitary state of Indonesia.

The Indonesian government wants GAM to repudiate secessionist
ambitions and disarm before further negotiations can take place.
GAM wants negotiations "without preconditions".

To resolve the crisis, President Megawati held a limited
Cabinet meeting on April 28, immediately upon arriving back from
an overseas trip. It was decided that Jakarta would give GAM
another chance. Military operations would not resume immediately.
Only humanitarian and law-enforcement operations would be
initiated in Aceh.

If these measures failed to improve the situation in Aceh
within two weeks, "the government might decide to launch a
security restoration in the province".

The problem of Aceh is complex. Military abuse and suppression
during the Soeharto era, continuing armed conflict, economic
deprivation and high unemployment rates are fertile grounds for
Acehnese ethno-nationalism.

Jakarta has introduced some reforms but these appear to have
been too little, if not too late. Equally serious are the
different interpretations of the pact. GAM sees it as a means
towards independence, while Jakarta sees it as an acceptance of
the "autonomous province" status.

Many Acehnese ethno-nationalists still feel that independence
is their final goal. GAM spokesman and commander Sofyan Daud told
Tempo magazine on April 14 that the pact was only a first step
towards Aceh's independence.

According to him, GAM considers that the local election next
year will not be part of the Indonesian general and presidential
elections, but a referendum to decide whether Aceh would stay or
leave Indonesia. He maintained that three-fourths of the people
in Aceh would favor GAM, not knowing that the 2000 Indonesian
census shows that Acehnese constitute only 50 percent of the
population in the province -- concentrated in the northern
districts.

Jakarta is unlikely to let Aceh ethno-nationalists have their
way. If the conflict recurs, Aceh will become a battlefield
again. A long guerrilla warfare will be fought, and this will be
at the expense of both Acehnese and non-Acehnese.