Why the East Asian Summit matters

Why the East Asian Summit matters

Barry Desker, Singapore

The Kuala Lumpur meeting of regional leaders on Dec. 14 was a
historic event whose future impact is likely to be as significant
as the first ASEAN Summit held in Bali in February 1976.

The first Bali Summit led to the emergence of a cohesive ASEAN
5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)
in the aftermath of the emergence of communist regimes in Indo-
China. Today, the presence of a rising China and resurgent India
in Kuala Lumpur and the absence of the United States, which has
played the role of an Asia-Pacific hegemon since the end of the
Second World War, suggest that we are on the cusp of a new era.

The East Asian Summit (EAS) will be held at a time when East
Asia demonstrates a new vitality following its recovery from the
trauma of the Asian financial meltdown and subsequent economic
crisis in 1997-1998 while the United States is distracted by its
commitment in Iraq.

The Dec. 14 meeting is significant because it goes beyond
narrow geographical definitions or ethnic/racial identity in
attempting to lay the groundwork for a new regional institution.
The annual ASEAN Summit, separate meetings of the ASEAN leaders
with their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea and the
holding of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit involving the
leaders of the Ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea,
has preceded it. The inclusion of India, Australia and New
Zealand and the presence of Vladimir Putin of Russia demonstrate
an outward-looking, inclusive approach to participation in the
emerging East Asian regionalism.

This broader inclusive identity is likely to subsume the
earlier focus on an East Asia comprising the ASEAN Ten plus
China, Japan and South Korea.

The center of gravity would move away from Southeast to
Northeast Asia, an unwelcome development from an ASEAN
perspective. This led to a desire to include other states that
had substantial inter-actions with the region. The participation
of India, Australia and New Zealand was seen as ensuring that
ASEAN remained at the center of any emerging East Asian
community. India was also perceived as a balance to China.
Indonesia, for example, sought to avoid aligning with China while
retaining friendly ties to other powers such as the United
States, a classic "hedging" strategy.

Growing antagonism between China and Japan will make Southeast
Asians wary of being enmeshed in a new regional cold war.

While ASEAN members have had four decades of institutional
experience in regional reconciliation, Northeast Asians have
focused on bilateral ties and multilateral forums such as the Six
Party Talks with a specific agenda. The EAS provides an
opportunity for informal confidence building and discussions on
broad strategic issues that concern the region.

For the United States, the EAS represents a diplomatic
challenge. Although the U.S. is a leading trading partner of all
EAS participants and has security relationships with significant
players including Japan, the U.S. is not able to participate in
the summit, as it is unwilling to accede to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation.

Given current White House priorities, it is also unlikely that
the U.S. President could be persuaded to make an annual trans-
Pacific visit barely a month after the APEC Leaders' Meeting. The
U.S. alliance system, APEC and the ARF are therefore currently
the key institutions for the management of U.S. relations with
the region. But a re-assessment of U.S. participation in the EAS
is warranted as the EAS will form part of a network of regional
institutions.

The U.S. concern with the marginalization of Taiwan has led
the U.S. to downplay the significance of China's initiative to
organize a meeting of APEC Foreign Ministers in Santiago in 2004.
However, given East Asia's emerging cooperative security
architecture, it would be in the American interest to support a
larger political and security role for APEC. Such a revitalized
APEC need not be competitive with the EAS or APT but would be
complementary. The overlapping membership of these institutions
includes a core that brings together key hubs in the Asia-
Pacific.

While there already are APEC Directors responsible for non-
traditional security issues such as counter-terrorism and
infectious diseases, APEC should consider appointing program
directors to handle trade-related political, social and security
issues such as supply chain security, maritime security, energy
and the environment. A broader agenda for APEC would be fitting
as APEC is the only Asia-Pacific institution which meets at the
heads of government level.

U.S. analysts such as John Mearsheimer of the University of
Chicago fret about the risk of confrontation with a rising China
and the desirability of developing relationships with states on
the periphery of China that could balance China such as Japan,
India and Vietnam.

I would argue that it is probably more important today to
develop trans-Pacific institutions, which could enmesh China in a
web of cooperative relationships in the region. In this context,
the decision to engage North Korea through the Six Party Talks is
positive as U.S. leverage on North Korea is much lower than that
of traditional allies such as China and Russia.

Similarly, greater attention should be given to the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) process. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice's decision to skip this year's ARF meeting was a mistake.
Although the risks of conflict are greater in East Asia, U.S.
policy remains more focused on Europe.

During the Cold War, ASEAN was clearly identified with the
West although nominally non-aligned. Today, as sophisticated
Chinese diplomacy leads to the establishment of multiple regional
organizations, ASEAN is developing closer linkages with China.
These relationships are perceived as a balance against U.S.
unilateralism.

Some of the newer members of ASEAN such as Myanmar, Laos and
Cambodia have benefited from Chinese largesse and are supportive
of Chinese concerns within ASEAN. Older members such as Malaysia
and Thailand are beginning to bandwagon with China.

For ASEAN states that prefer a regional balance of power, a
regional security architecture that is outward-looking and
promotes the observance of international norms and codes of
conduct is preferable to one dominated by a single power.

An active U.S. presence enables this vision of the region's
future to be sustained. In future years, the U.S. should
therefore participate in the EAS as it is likely to emerge as the
key institution for East Asian community-building.

Barry Desker is currently the Director of the Institute of
Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore.

This article is based on a paper delivered at a conference on
the Regional Security Architecture in Asia held in Washington, DC
on Dec. 14.