Why the East Asian Summit matters<\/p>\n
Barry Desker, Singapore<\/p>\n
The Kuala Lumpur meeting of regional leaders on Dec. 14 was a
\nhistoric event whose future impact is likely to be as significant
\nas the first ASEAN Summit held in Bali in February 1976.<\/p>\n
The first Bali Summit led to the emergence of a cohesive ASEAN
\n5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)
\nin the aftermath of the emergence of communist regimes in Indo-
\nChina. Today, the presence of a rising China and resurgent India
\nin Kuala Lumpur and the absence of the United States, which has
\nplayed the role of an Asia-Pacific hegemon since the end of the
\nSecond World War, suggest that we are on the cusp of a new era.<\/p>\n
The East Asian Summit (EAS) will be held at a time when East
\nAsia demonstrates a new vitality following its recovery from the
\ntrauma of the Asian financial meltdown and subsequent economic
\ncrisis in 1997-1998 while the United States is distracted by its
\ncommitment in Iraq.<\/p>\n
The Dec. 14 meeting is significant because it goes beyond
\nnarrow geographical definitions or ethnic\/racial identity in
\nattempting to lay the groundwork for a new regional institution.
\nThe annual ASEAN Summit, separate meetings of the ASEAN leaders
\nwith their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea and the
\nholding of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit involving the
\nleaders of the Ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea,
\nhas preceded it. The inclusion of India, Australia and New
\nZealand and the presence of Vladimir Putin of Russia demonstrate
\nan outward-looking, inclusive approach to participation in the
\nemerging East Asian regionalism.<\/p>\n
This broader inclusive identity is likely to subsume the
\nearlier focus on an East Asia comprising the ASEAN Ten plus
\nChina, Japan and South Korea.<\/p>\n
The center of gravity would move away from Southeast to
\nNortheast Asia, an unwelcome development from an ASEAN
\nperspective. This led to a desire to include other states that
\nhad substantial inter-actions with the region. The participation
\nof India, Australia and New Zealand was seen as ensuring that
\nASEAN remained at the center of any emerging East Asian
\ncommunity. India was also perceived as a balance to China.
\nIndonesia, for example, sought to avoid aligning with China while
\nretaining friendly ties to other powers such as the United
\nStates, a classic \"hedging\" strategy.<\/p>\n
Growing antagonism between China and Japan will make Southeast
\nAsians wary of being enmeshed in a new regional cold war.<\/p>\n
While ASEAN members have had four decades of institutional
\nexperience in regional reconciliation, Northeast Asians have
\nfocused on bilateral ties and multilateral forums such as the Six
\nParty Talks with a specific agenda. The EAS provides an
\nopportunity for informal confidence building and discussions on
\nbroad strategic issues that concern the region.<\/p>\n
For the United States, the EAS represents a diplomatic
\nchallenge. Although the U.S. is a leading trading partner of all
\nEAS participants and has security relationships with significant
\nplayers including Japan, the U.S. is not able to participate in
\nthe summit, as it is unwilling to accede to the Treaty of Amity
\nand Cooperation.<\/p>\n
Given current White House priorities, it is also unlikely that
\nthe U.S. President could be persuaded to make an annual trans-
\nPacific visit barely a month after the APEC Leaders' Meeting. The
\nU.S. alliance system, APEC and the ARF are therefore currently
\nthe key institutions for the management of U.S. relations with
\nthe region. But a re-assessment of U.S. participation in the EAS
\nis warranted as the EAS will form part of a network of regional
\ninstitutions.<\/p>\n
The U.S. concern with the marginalization of Taiwan has led
\nthe U.S. to downplay the significance of China's initiative to
\norganize a meeting of APEC Foreign Ministers in Santiago in 2004.
\nHowever, given East Asia's emerging cooperative security
\narchitecture, it would be in the American interest to support a
\nlarger political and security role for APEC. Such a revitalized
\nAPEC need not be competitive with the EAS or APT but would be
\ncomplementary. The overlapping membership of these institutions
\nincludes a core that brings together key hubs in the Asia-
\nPacific.<\/p>\n
While there already are APEC Directors responsible for non-
\ntraditional security issues such as counter-terrorism and
\ninfectious diseases, APEC should consider appointing program
\ndirectors to handle trade-related political, social and security
\nissues such as supply chain security, maritime security, energy
\nand the environment. A broader agenda for APEC would be fitting
\nas APEC is the only Asia-Pacific institution which meets at the
\nheads of government level.<\/p>\n
U.S. analysts such as John Mearsheimer of the University of
\nChicago fret about the risk of confrontation with a rising China
\nand the desirability of developing relationships with states on
\nthe periphery of China that could balance China such as Japan,
\nIndia and Vietnam.<\/p>\n
I would argue that it is probably more important today to
\ndevelop trans-Pacific institutions, which could enmesh China in a
\nweb of cooperative relationships in the region. In this context,
\nthe decision to engage North Korea through the Six Party Talks is
\npositive as U.S. leverage on North Korea is much lower than that
\nof traditional allies such as China and Russia.<\/p>\n
Similarly, greater attention should be given to the ASEAN
\nRegional Forum (ARF) process. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza
\nRice's decision to skip this year's ARF meeting was a mistake.
\nAlthough the risks of conflict are greater in East Asia, U.S.
\npolicy remains more focused on Europe.<\/p>\n
During the Cold War, ASEAN was clearly identified with the
\nWest although nominally non-aligned. Today, as sophisticated
\nChinese diplomacy leads to the establishment of multiple regional
\norganizations, ASEAN is developing closer linkages with China.
\nThese relationships are perceived as a balance against U.S.
\nunilateralism.<\/p>\n
Some of the newer members of ASEAN such as Myanmar, Laos and
\nCambodia have benefited from Chinese largesse and are supportive
\nof Chinese concerns within ASEAN. Older members such as Malaysia
\nand Thailand are beginning to bandwagon with China.<\/p>\n
For ASEAN states that prefer a regional balance of power, a
\nregional security architecture that is outward-looking and
\npromotes the observance of international norms and codes of
\nconduct is preferable to one dominated by a single power.<\/p>\n
An active U.S. presence enables this vision of the region's
\nfuture to be sustained. In future years, the U.S. should
\ntherefore participate in the EAS as it is likely to emerge as the
\nkey institution for East Asian community-building.<\/p>\n
Barry Desker is currently the Director of the Institute of
\nDefense and Strategic Studies, Singapore.<\/p>\n
This article is based on a paper delivered at a conference on
\nthe Regional Security Architecture in Asia held in Washington, DC
\non Dec. 14.<\/p>",
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