Why election in Aceh will not be democratic

Why election in Aceh will not be democratic

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Civil Society Alliance
for Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta

Pro-democracy activists are convinced that as a political
system, democracy also serves as a mechanism capable of
transforming a violent clash (war) into a peaceful conflict.
This, however, is only true if people are allowed to live by
democratic values, including pluralism, tolerance, transparency
and negotiation.

In the context of Aceh, now firmly under martial law, the
questions have arisen about the possibility of whether the
general election of 2004 will proceed democratically. Anyone
committed to democracy will return with the query: Do the
Acehnese live in an atmosphere imbued with the social ethics of
pluralism, tolerance, openness and negotiation?

This atmosphere involves horizontal social relations between
individuals and groups, as well as vertical relations between
individuals and groups on one side and the government on the
other.

Under normal circumstances, social relations in Aceh are
egalitarian in nature. But under martial law -- in which the
local administration is in the hands of soldiers from outside --
egalitarian relationships are being changed into those
characterized by commanded centralism, a polarization and the
spirit of destruction.

In an undemocratic militaristic government system, people have
no sovereignty. Social structures are subordinate to military
ranks. The local people have to become part of the separatist
movement or the militaristic nationalists. Under such conditions,
floating masses will follow the agenda set forth for them by the
military authorities. For instance, they must participate in a
pledge-of-allegiance ceremony, followed later by a protest
demonstration against peace, a demand for militaristic life and a
rally to get everyone fired up to hunt for separatists.

Pluralism offers a way out of this social divisiveness. Ethnic
differences have been emphasized so that a split occurs along the
lines of Aceh's coastal regions and Gayo (with its many
transmigrants from outside of Sumatra) areas fomenting a state of
confusion characterized by inter-Acehnese mistrust, and then the
historical similarities can easily be replaced by militaristic
nationalism. Tolerance that reflects appreciation for fellow
humans is turned into "our" solidarity and "yours" (enemy's).

Organizations previously based on the awareness of the
importance of upholding human rights and applying a democratic
and peaceful system are substituted by those founded on
militaristic nationalism and an uncompromising system seeking
settlement by force -- a sign of the revival of pseudo-military
(militia) power. In other words, egalitarian social relations at
the horizontal level are disrupted for the establishment of
commanded relations.

Vertical ties in the context of martial law are, as a whole,
hypocritical. The attitudes and behavior of the local population
are designed to suit the situation for survival. The experiences
during general elections in the military operation zone (DOM)
era, in 1992 and 1997, are relevant in this case. Some people
participated in a pledge of loyalty to the unitary state, others
joined a militia rally with the consent of local Muslim clerics
and still others moved as a shield in the siege of Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) strongholds.

The current political situation is designed for the Acehnese
to be "reeducated" back to the way of thinking during the DOM
period (after several years of relative peace/democracy), through
mobilization for mass pledges, militia rallies, military raids,
and possession of party membership cards (especially for parties
affiliated with the military). Such activities are expected to be
seen as soldiers' successful attempts to "win the hearts" of the
Acehnese. In their entirety, the DOM and martial law political
milieus offer nothing new in the general election context except
for the local administration's military control.

The general election of 2004 constitutes a political arena for
the old, crooked elite and militia. Lists of candidates for the
regional representatives council and the provincial legislature
reveal many of the old faces from the heyday of the DOM
bureaucracy and political parties. Some of the candidates are
known as former GAM deserters and/or pro-Jakarta militia leaders.
Others are infamous for their flawed social morality. Only a tiny
number do not fall into one or more of these categories. Such
candidates result from the military administration's
deconstruction of democratic groups and the labeling of critical
figures as GAM supporters (with all its attendant dangers).

Under this reign of soldiers, it is in fact pointless to link
the 2004 election in Aceh with democracy, let alone the
connection of this election with conflict transformation in Aceh.
The 2004 election's relationship with the upholding of human
rights in Aceh is even more remote.

Therefore, instead of asking whether or not the election in
Aceh can be seen as a true democratic expression, the only
legitimate question that can be asked is: Will the Acehnese
participate in such an election with only one type of candidate?
The answer is: That will be a 110 percent success, they will go
to the polls with all the sincerity that they go to the loyalty
rallies, unless the militaristic nationalists foresee some kind
of negative reaction and call it off.