When the Internet Goes Down, How Prepared Is Indonesia to Cope?

Jakarta (ANTARA) – Amid ambitions to accelerate digital transformation, one fundamental question must not be overlooked: what happens if the internet and electricity go down at the same time?

The effects would go beyond phones losing their signal or online activity grinding to a halt. People could struggle to access banking services, make transactions, obtain information, or contact family members and emergency responders. When the electricity supply is disrupted, telecommunications networks are also at risk because their equipment needs power to operate.

Indonesia’s experience shows that this risk is not merely hypothetical. In May 2026, power disruptions in Sumatra affected thousands of base transceiver station (BTS) sites. ANTARA reported that, at the height of the disruption on 24 May 2026, 10,713 sites across 10 provinces and 142 regencies and municipalities were affected. Telecommunications services were declared fully restored on 28 May 2026.

A similar situation arose during disaster response in Aceh in December 2025. Communications and Digital Affairs Minister Meutya Hafid said network recovery depended on the availability of electricity. While energy supplies remained disrupted, BTS recovery was also hampered. Yet during a disaster, telecommunications networks are needed to establish residents’ conditions, share information and reach isolated areas.

These two experiences demonstrate the close relationship between energy infrastructure and connectivity. Digital sovereignty, therefore, cannot be measured solely by the ability to build networks, master technology or manage data. Another measure is equally important: how capable is the state of maintaining essential services when digital infrastructure is disrupted?

Several countries treat cross-sector preparedness as part of national resilience. Finland, for example, has developed the TIETO exercises, bringing public authorities and the private sector together to address cyber disruptions, hybrid threats and information disruption. The TIETO26 programme is one example of this approach (Digipooli, 2025).

Estonia has also developed crisis-management exercises that test coordination between agencies, public communication and the continuity of essential services. Such practices show that preparedness cannot be demonstrated by procedural documents alone. Governments and service providers need to test whether those procedures can actually be carried out when a crisis occurs.

Indonesia has the foundations to do something similar. The National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) handles cybersecurity, the Communications and Digital Affairs Ministry (Komdigi) is responsible for communications and digital infrastructure, while state electricity company PLN is responsible for the power system. Various computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) also play a role in dealing with incidents within their respective remits.

The challenge is to connect these preparedness efforts. Simultaneous disruptions to electricity and telecommunications networks cannot be addressed by relying solely on each sector’s own procedures. Hospitals, government services, banks, telecommunications operators and local governments need to understand one another’s roles and dependencies.

In researching this article, no sufficient evidence was found to confirm that Indonesia routinely holds integrated national exercises simulating simultaneous power and internet outages, including their effects on public services and the community. The limits of this research do not prove that such exercises have never taken place. However, cross-sector testing deserves to be made a clearer agenda item and evaluated transparently.

No guarantee of resilience

Several international frameworks can serve as reference points. The Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024, helps organisations identify and manage cybersecurity risks, from governance through to recovery. NIST also issued SP 800-61 Rev. 3 in 2025, integrating cyber incident response with risk management (Pascoe, Quinn and Scarfone, 2024; Nelson et al., 2025).

Meanwhile, ISO 22301:2019 provides a standard for business continuity management systems. Its principles are relevant to public services and critical infrastructure companies: essential functions must continue operating or be recoverable within a planned timeframe.

Research by Moglen, Leibowicz and Kwasinski (2025) also highlights the interdependence between the recovery of electricity grids and wireless communications. Recovery of the two needs to be planned in a coordinated way. A study on the effects of internet outages in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (2023) likewise emphasises the importance of alternative procedures, stakeholder coordination and staff training.

These frameworks provide a foundation, but they do not automatically guarantee that services will continue to function. Their implementation requires measurable recovery targets, clear divisions of responsibility, and exercises suited to Indonesia’s geography and risks.

Real-world scenarios

Indonesia need not wait until all its digital infrastructure is perfect before testing its resilience. The government could begin digital resilience exercises in one regency or municipality, then expand their scope based on the results.

The exercises should involve local governments, telecommunications operators, PLN, hospitals, banks, regional disaster management agencies (BPBDs), digital service providers, the media and community groups. The aim is not merely to confirm that each party has procedures, but to test whether they can work together when several services are disrupted at once.

The scenario could be simple but realistic: the power is out for several hours, mobile networks are disrupted, digital transactions are unavailable, and unverified information begins to circulate. In such circumstances, can hospitals continue treating patients? How will residents obtain official information? Do local governments have alternative communication channels? How will people buy essential goods? Who will help older people, people with disabilities and residents without alternative means of communication?

Five areas need to be tested. First, backup power and connectivity. Batteries, generators, backup power supplies and alternative communication routes must be tested under operational conditions. Their presence on paper does not guarantee that they are ready to use.

Second, manual procedures. Hospitals, administrative services, the distribution of essential goods and certain public services need ways of operating when digital systems are unavailable.

Third, alternative public communications. Radio, loudspeakers, noticeboards, information posts and community communication networks remain necessary when the internet cannot be relied upon. Residents also need to know which sources provide official information and how to contact family members when networks are down.

Fourth, information resilience. The government must be able to verify and communicate information through multiple channels. When official explanations are unavailable, uncertainty can grow and unverified reports become harder to contain.

Fifth, outcome-based evaluation. Success should not be measured simply by whether a simulation took place. The government needs to measure service recovery times, how quickly official information is delivered, how many essential services remain operational, and which groups still struggle to obtain information. Evaluation must be followed by improvements that can be tested again.

Shared preparedness

Digital resilience does not depend solely on the government and operators. The public also needs to know the sources of official information, keep emergency numbers, prepare safe lighting and backup energy supplies, and agree on ways to communicate with family members when networks are down.

Research by Rizal et al. (2025) on community-based disaster communications in Pangandaran highlights the importance of connecting digital media with local knowledge, disaster education and community-based communications. Technology is more useful when people understand how to use it and are also prepared for situations in which it is unavailable.

Preparedness must also take account of differences in people’s circumstances. Residents in remote areas, older people, people with disabilities, and those who rely on digital services for work or access to social assistance may face different barriers. Restoring equipment does not necessarily mean that everyone has regained access to services.

This is why digital resilience exercises need to go beyond technical matters. The government must ensure that essential services remain accessible, that people can still obtain the information they need, and that the most vulnerable are not left behind when digital systems are disrupted.

Ultimately, the success of digital transformation is not determined solely by the reach of connectivity. Another measure is the ability to maintain services and protect the public when that connection is lost.