Jakarta (ANTARA) \u2013 Amid ambitions to accelerate digital\ntransformation, one fundamental question must not be overlooked: what\nhappens if the internet and electricity go down at the same time?<\/p>\n
The effects would go beyond phones losing their signal or online\nactivity grinding to a halt. People could struggle to access banking\nservices, make transactions, obtain information, or contact family\nmembers and emergency responders. When the electricity supply is\ndisrupted, telecommunications networks are also at risk because their\nequipment needs power to operate.<\/p>\n
Indonesia\u2019s experience shows that this risk is not merely\nhypothetical. In May 2026, power disruptions in Sumatra affected\nthousands of base transceiver station (BTS) sites. ANTARA reported that,\nat the height of the disruption on 24 May 2026, 10,713 sites across 10\nprovinces and 142 regencies and municipalities were affected.\nTelecommunications services were declared fully restored on 28 May\n2026.<\/p>\n
A similar situation arose during disaster response in Aceh in\nDecember 2025. Communications and Digital Affairs Minister Meutya Hafid\nsaid network recovery depended on the availability of electricity. While\nenergy supplies remained disrupted, BTS recovery was also hampered. Yet\nduring a disaster, telecommunications networks are needed to establish\nresidents\u2019 conditions, share information and reach isolated areas.<\/p>\n
These two experiences demonstrate the close relationship between\nenergy infrastructure and connectivity. Digital sovereignty, therefore,\ncannot be measured solely by the ability to build networks, master\ntechnology or manage data. Another measure is equally important: how\ncapable is the state of maintaining essential services when digital\ninfrastructure is disrupted?<\/p>\n
Several countries treat cross-sector preparedness as part of national\nresilience. Finland, for example, has developed the TIETO exercises,\nbringing public authorities and the private sector together to address\ncyber disruptions, hybrid threats and information disruption. The\nTIETO26 programme is one example of this approach (Digipooli, 2025).<\/p>\n
Estonia has also developed crisis-management exercises that test\ncoordination between agencies, public communication and the continuity\nof essential services. Such practices show that preparedness cannot be\ndemonstrated by procedural documents alone. Governments and service\nproviders need to test whether those procedures can actually be carried\nout when a crisis occurs.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has the foundations to do something similar. The National\nCyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) handles cybersecurity, the Communications\nand Digital Affairs Ministry (Komdigi) is responsible for communications\nand digital infrastructure, while state electricity company PLN is\nresponsible for the power system. Various computer security incident\nresponse teams (CSIRTs) also play a role in dealing with incidents\nwithin their respective remits.<\/p>\n
The challenge is to connect these preparedness efforts. Simultaneous\ndisruptions to electricity and telecommunications networks cannot be\naddressed by relying solely on each sector\u2019s own procedures. Hospitals,\ngovernment services, banks, telecommunications operators and local\ngovernments need to understand one another\u2019s roles and dependencies.<\/p>\n
In researching this article, no sufficient evidence was found to\nconfirm that Indonesia routinely holds integrated national exercises\nsimulating simultaneous power and internet outages, including their\neffects on public services and the community. The limits of this\nresearch do not prove that such exercises have never taken place.\nHowever, cross-sector testing deserves to be made a clearer agenda item\nand evaluated transparently.<\/p>\n
No guarantee of resilience<\/strong><\/p>\n Several international frameworks can serve as reference points. The\nCybersecurity Framework 2.0, issued by the National Institute of\nStandards and Technology (NIST) in 2024, helps organisations identify\nand manage cybersecurity risks, from governance through to recovery.\nNIST also issued SP 800-61 Rev.\u00a03 in 2025, integrating cyber incident\nresponse with risk management (Pascoe, Quinn and Scarfone, 2024; Nelson\net al., 2025).<\/p>\n Meanwhile, ISO 22301:2019 provides a standard for business continuity\nmanagement systems. Its principles are relevant to public services and\ncritical infrastructure companies: essential functions must continue\noperating or be recoverable within a planned timeframe.<\/p>\n Research by Moglen, Leibowicz and Kwasinski (2025) also highlights\nthe interdependence between the recovery of electricity grids and\nwireless communications. Recovery of the two needs to be planned in a\ncoordinated way. A study on the effects of internet outages in the\nInternational Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (2023) likewise\nemphasises the importance of alternative procedures, stakeholder\ncoordination and staff training.<\/p>\n These frameworks provide a foundation, but they do not automatically\nguarantee that services will continue to function. Their implementation\nrequires measurable recovery targets, clear divisions of responsibility,\nand exercises suited to Indonesia\u2019s geography and risks.<\/p>\n Real-world scenarios<\/strong><\/p>\n Indonesia need not wait until all its digital infrastructure is\nperfect before testing its resilience. The government could begin\ndigital resilience exercises in one regency or municipality, then expand\ntheir scope based on the results.<\/p>\n The exercises should involve local governments, telecommunications\noperators, PLN, hospitals, banks, regional disaster management agencies\n(BPBDs), digital service providers, the media and community groups. The\naim is not merely to confirm that each party has procedures, but to test\nwhether they can work together when several services are disrupted at\nonce.<\/p>\n The scenario could be simple but realistic: the power is out for\nseveral hours, mobile networks are disrupted, digital transactions are\nunavailable, and unverified information begins to circulate. In such\ncircumstances, can hospitals continue treating patients? How will\nresidents obtain official information? Do local governments have\nalternative communication channels? How will people buy essential goods?\nWho will help older people, people with disabilities and residents\nwithout alternative means of communication?<\/p>\n Five areas need to be tested. First, backup power and connectivity.\nBatteries, generators, backup power supplies and alternative\ncommunication routes must be tested under operational conditions. Their\npresence on paper does not guarantee that they are ready to use.<\/p>\n Second, manual procedures. Hospitals, administrative services, the\ndistribution of essential goods and certain public services need ways of\noperating when digital systems are unavailable.<\/p>\n Third, alternative public communications. Radio, loudspeakers,\nnoticeboards, information posts and community communication networks\nremain necessary when the internet cannot be relied upon. Residents also\nneed to know which sources provide official information and how to\ncontact family members when networks are down.<\/p>\n Fourth, information resilience. The government must be able to verify\nand communicate information through multiple channels. When official\nexplanations are unavailable, uncertainty can grow and unverified\nreports become harder to contain.<\/p>\n Fifth, outcome-based evaluation. Success should not be measured\nsimply by whether a simulation took place. The government needs to\nmeasure service recovery times, how quickly official information is\ndelivered, how many essential services remain operational, and which\ngroups still struggle to obtain information. Evaluation must be followed\nby improvements that can be tested again.<\/p>\n Shared preparedness<\/strong><\/p>\n Digital resilience does not depend solely on the government and\noperators. The public also needs to know the sources of official\ninformation, keep emergency numbers, prepare safe lighting and backup\nenergy supplies, and agree on ways to communicate with family members\nwhen networks are down.<\/p>\n Research by Rizal et al.\u00a0(2025) on community-based disaster\ncommunications in Pangandaran highlights the importance of connecting\ndigital media with local knowledge, disaster education and\ncommunity-based communications. Technology is more useful when people\nunderstand how to use it and are also prepared for situations in which\nit is unavailable.<\/p>\n Preparedness must also take account of differences in people\u2019s\ncircumstances. Residents in remote areas, older people, people with\ndisabilities, and those who rely on digital services for work or access\nto social assistance may face different barriers. Restoring equipment\ndoes not necessarily mean that everyone has regained access to\nservices.<\/p>\n This is why digital resilience exercises need to go beyond technical\nmatters. The government must ensure that essential services remain\naccessible, that people can still obtain the information they need, and\nthat the most vulnerable are not left behind when digital systems are\ndisrupted.<\/p>\n Ultimately, the success of digital transformation is not determined\nsolely by the reach of connectivity. Another measure is the ability to\nmaintain services and protect the public when that connection is\nlost.<\/p>",
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