When Political Consolidation Moves Faster Than Technocratic Governance

The proverb “spending more than one earns” seems relevant to the direction of governance today. On the one hand, the government calls for budget efficiency; on the other, the executive power structure continues to expand through the addition and reorganisation of positions.

A large government is not necessarily an effective one, just as a bloated Cabinet does not automatically make the state more agile. We should be wary of political energy being spent more on expanding the power structure than on strengthening bureaucratic capacity and ensuring policies work for the public.

In Indonesian politics, distributing posts is often part of the art of maintaining a coalition. But as political consolidation becomes increasingly dominant, it is important to question the boundary between the organisational needs of government and the demands of political accommodation.

Every public office should arise from a functional need, not merely a need for compromise. The state does not lack seats to fill; it needs officials who can make decisions based on technocratic principles, solve problems and be held accountable for their performance.

Indonesian politics seems to be an endless series. Politics today is no longer consumed solely by elites or adults; it has become part of public conversation, including among school-age children who encounter political issues on social media every day. The relentless flow of information makes political decisions and manoeuvres increasingly accessible to the public.

Who benefits from political consolidation?

On 20 October 2026, the government of President Prabowo Subianto and Vice-President Gibran Rakabuming Raka will mark two years since their inauguration on 20 October 2024. At the start of his term, Prabowo announced the Red and White Cabinet for 2024–2029, initially comprising seven coordinating ministers, 41 ministers, 55 deputy ministers and five officials at ministerial level.

As the government has proceeded, the executive power structure has continued to grow. Amid the budget-efficiency agenda, posts have been added and reorganised through the creation of coordinating ministries, appointments of presidential special advisers, special staff and special assistants, as well as various other support roles. Repeated Cabinet reshuffles have also changed the composition of officials, without necessarily answering questions about the effectiveness of government organisation.

The seventh reshuffle of President Prabowo’s Cabinet, on 1 October 2026, is the latest face of our government. The following day, the President also inaugurated 26 members of the Presidential Advisory Council (Wantimpres).

This series of changes shows that political consolidation and the restructuring of government remain important elements of Prabowo’s leadership. The question is whether this expansion is matched by stronger government capacity and better public services.

According to my assessment, following the Cabinet reshuffle on 1 October 2026, the structure contained 131 positions: eight coordinating ministers, four deputy coordinating ministers, 42 ministers, 51 deputy ministers, and 26 officials at ministerial level and heads of agencies. This figure does not include the 26 members of Wantimpres or the various other holders of special presidential posts.

The size of the government structure raises fundamental questions about the Cabinet’s institutional design. A large number of posts does not necessarily indicate a strong state capacity. If responsibilities, functions and performance indicators are not proportionately designed, a larger structure could add layers of coordination, lengthen decision-making chains and increase operating expenditure.

Compared with the Advanced Indonesia Cabinet during President Joko Widodo’s second term, President Prabowo Subianto’s government structure appears considerably larger, particularly when deputy ministers, officials at ministerial level and agency heads are included. This presents a governance paradox: while budget efficiency is being pursued under Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025, the Cabinet structure continues to grow.

The government should not merely demand that ministries and agencies cut spending; it should also assess whether the size of the executive power structure matches the country’s needs and fiscal capacity. Budget efficiency should address not only expenditure but also the technocratic rationale of the structure that generates it.

As I argued in an opinion piece published in Kontan on 13 February 2025, titled “Critiquing State Budget Efficiency”, an efficiency policy risks losing its substance if the government cuts spending in one area while continuing to expand the bureaucratic structure in another. The larger the Cabinet, the greater the potential operating costs that must be taken into account.

These costs include officials’ salaries and allowances, ministers’ operational funds (DOM), official facilities and other support for their roles. Every new position should therefore be based on an analysis of organisational need, an assessment of its fiscal consequences and measurable performance targets. Without all three, Cabinet expansion risks increasing the budget burden without adding commensurate value to public services.

The formation and composition of the Cabinet are indeed part of the President’s constitutional authority as head of government under the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. But that authority does not exempt Cabinet design from public scrutiny. The use of executive power must be justified by the needs of government, institutional effectiveness and the principles of fiscal accountability.

In this context, Francis Fukuyama’s book State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century is relevant once again. Fukuyama emphasises the importance of state capacity in carrying out government functions effectively.

A greater role for the state does not, by itself, indicate stronger state capacity. Expanding structures and powers without adequate institutional capabilities risks complicating coordination, weakening policy implementation and creating more scope for inefficiency and poor accountability.

In other words, building state capacity cannot be achieved simply by adding institutions or posts; it must also involve strengthening organisations’ ability to produce effective policies and public services. Applying this framework to the current government raises several fundamental questions. Does the Cabinet’s structure genuinely reflect the state’s technocratic needs, or does it chiefly accommodate the interests of political consolidation?

Furthermore, have responsibilities been allocated among ministries, agencies and government bodies according to clearly differentiated functions? Or is there still overlapping authority, duplicated programmes and multiple institutions working in similar areas without a clear division of responsibility?

As President Prabowo Subianto’s government approaches its second anniversary, an institutional review should be conducted systematically. It should assess each institution’s mandate, workload, staffing needs, coordination effectiveness and operating costs.

The government should also measure the relationship between expenditure and results. New posts and institutions should not be created solely for political reasons; they must be justified by technocratic needs and organisational rationale, and deliver measurable benefits.

The public demands a clear development agenda

Alongside debate over the size of the Cabinet, we should consider a more fundamental technical question: how can the government ensure its bureaucratic capacity is commensurate with the complexity of the challenges facing the country? The latest data from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) show that Indonesia’s economy grew by 5.29 per cent year on year in the second quarter of 2026.

In the same period, gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices reached Rp6,552.1 trillion, while GDP at constant 2010 prices stood at Rp3,576.2 trillion (BPS, 2026). These figures indicate that the national economy continues to grow relatively strongly. But aggregate growth does not, by itself, show whether prosperity is shared or whether all sections of society can withstand economic pressures.

Growth in the second quarter of 2026 also slowed from 5.61 per cent year on year in the first quarter. This fall of 0.32 percentage points does not necessarily indicate a downturn across all sectors, but it is a reminder that growth must be considered alongside other indicators, including job creation, purchasing power, industrial performance and the distribution of development gains.

Strong economic growth on paper is not enough if it has yet to translate fully into secure employment, higher incomes and improvements in people’s welfare. The government’s list of problems to solve is growing ever longer, as though the country’s outstanding challenges never run out.

The rupiah remains under pressure; job prospects are inadequate; industry faces difficulties and lay-offs; the middle class is increasingly squeezed; poverty remains a challenge; and law enforcement still needs reform.

Before one problem is resolved, another emerges: forest and land fires, a need to demonstrate progress on bureaucratic reform, debate over the expanding role of the military in civilian affairs, the need to improve the management of the Free Nutritious Meals programme (MBG), and recurring natural disasters that test the state’s preparedness. Government posts may keep multiplying, but the public’s problems are not diminishing.

In this situation, the public does not need merely more officials or convincing-sounding optimistic statements from a podium. It needs policies that work, coordination that does not involve agencies shifting blame, and a bureaucracy able to move faster than the problems it faces. The government must not be more nimble in consolidating power than in consolidating solutions.

People cannot pay their living costs with a bloated Cabinet, keep their jobs because there are more officials, or feel safe simply because the state has a larger government structure. Ultimately, the public judges not how many people sit within the circle of power, but how many problems they actually solve.

Many members of the public are also still asking about progress on the development of the new capital, Nusantara (IKN), a legacy of the Jokowi administration: “How far has it progressed, and what is the direction and timetable for moving the capital?” This question shows that people want clarity on the project’s direction, targets, schedule and outcomes.

The government cannot answer this through political messaging or optimistic narratives alone. The public needs measurable information on programme progress, budget use, implementation obstacles and the expected benefits for the national interest.

The challenges facing the government cannot be met through political consolidation and accommodating distributions of positions alone. Consolidation may help maintain government stability, but stability is a precondition, not an end in itself. The government must still prove that stability can produce well-targeted policies, an effective bureaucracy and solutions that people can feel in their lives.

The fundamental question is no longer how broad a political base the government has managed to assemble, but how ready it is to turn that support into the capacity to solve public problems. This is not an attempt to exaggerate the difficulties, but the reality is that the government’s agenda remains extensive. As Prabowo approaches two years in office, the government should no longer be preoccupied solely with building structures, reorganising institutions or internal consolidation.

This stage should be an opportunity to accelerate policy implementation, clarify development priorities and resolve problems against measurable targets and performance indicators. Time in office continues to pass, while the public’s problems cannot wait for political and bureaucratic processes to settle on an ideal form.

Addressing public anxiety

I am reminded of an opinion piece by Tere Liye in Kompas on 7 August 2026, which raised concerns about the possibility that society is experiencing collective psychological strain. That reflection is relevant to understanding the relationship between political dynamics and people’s everyday lives.

Politics is not merely a contest among elites or a debate in the corridors of power. Government decisions on the economy, employment, education, social assistance, law enforcement and public services also shape people’s sense of security and certainty. When fundamental problems remain unresolved while public debate is filled with political commotion, social exhaustion can become more acute.

I am not being pessimistic about the government; rather, I want to stress the importance of technocratic planning capable of addressing problems systematically. The government needs to set priorities according to urgency, strengthen coordination among agencies, allocate budgets according to need and measure success by tangible results. Easing public anxiety must begin with a government that performs optimally, provides certainty and delivers an impact people can feel in their daily lives.

As President Prabowo’s government approaches its second anniversary, the nation’s problem is ultimately not how many officials sit in the Cabinet, but how effectively they carry out their mandates. A strong government is not measured by the size of its organisational structure or the breadth of its political accommodation, but by its ability to make sound decisions, coordinate policies consistently, use public funds responsibly and deliver tangible benefits to society.

The state must not grow larger in structure without becoming stronger in capacity. Political consolidation must not move faster than technocratic consolidation. Nor should efficiency be demanded only of those who implement budgets, while the structure that determines the scale of spending escapes scrutiny.