The proverb \u201cspending more than one earns\u201d seems relevant to the\ndirection of governance today. On the one hand, the government calls for\nbudget efficiency; on the other, the executive power structure continues\nto expand through the addition and reorganisation of positions.<\/p>\n
A large government is not necessarily an effective one, just as a\nbloated Cabinet does not automatically make the state more agile. We\nshould be wary of political energy being spent more on expanding the\npower structure than on strengthening bureaucratic capacity and ensuring\npolicies work for the public.<\/p>\n
In Indonesian politics, distributing posts is often part of the art\nof maintaining a coalition. But as political consolidation becomes\nincreasingly dominant, it is important to question the boundary between\nthe organisational needs of government and the demands of political\naccommodation.<\/p>\n
Every public office should arise from a functional need, not merely a\nneed for compromise. The state does not lack seats to fill; it needs\nofficials who can make decisions based on technocratic principles, solve\nproblems and be held accountable for their performance.<\/p>\n
Indonesian politics seems to be an endless series. Politics today is\nno longer consumed solely by elites or adults; it has become part of\npublic conversation, including among school-age children who encounter\npolitical issues on social media every day. The relentless flow of\ninformation makes political decisions and manoeuvres increasingly\naccessible to the public.<\/p>\n
Who benefits from political consolidation?<\/strong><\/p>\n On 20 October 2026, the government of President Prabowo Subianto and\nVice-President Gibran Rakabuming Raka will mark two years since their\ninauguration on 20 October 2024. At the start of his term, Prabowo\nannounced the Red and White Cabinet for 2024\u20132029, initially comprising\nseven coordinating ministers, 41 ministers, 55 deputy ministers and five\nofficials at ministerial level.<\/p>\n As the government has proceeded, the executive power structure has\ncontinued to grow. Amid the budget-efficiency agenda, posts have been\nadded and reorganised through the creation of coordinating ministries,\nappointments of presidential special advisers, special staff and special\nassistants, as well as various other support roles. Repeated Cabinet\nreshuffles have also changed the composition of officials, without\nnecessarily answering questions about the effectiveness of government\norganisation.<\/p>\n The seventh reshuffle of President Prabowo\u2019s Cabinet, on 1 October\n2026, is the latest face of our government. The following day, the\nPresident also inaugurated 26 members of the Presidential Advisory\nCouncil (Wantimpres).<\/p>\n This series of changes shows that political consolidation and the\nrestructuring of government remain important elements of Prabowo\u2019s\nleadership. The question is whether this expansion is matched by\nstronger government capacity and better public services.<\/p>\n According to my assessment, following the Cabinet reshuffle on 1\nOctober 2026, the structure contained 131 positions: eight coordinating\nministers, four deputy coordinating ministers, 42 ministers, 51 deputy\nministers, and 26 officials at ministerial level and heads of agencies.\nThis figure does not include the 26 members of Wantimpres or the various\nother holders of special presidential posts.<\/p>\n The size of the government structure raises fundamental questions\nabout the Cabinet\u2019s institutional design. A large number of posts does\nnot necessarily indicate a strong state capacity. If responsibilities,\nfunctions and performance indicators are not proportionately designed, a\nlarger structure could add layers of coordination, lengthen\ndecision-making chains and increase operating expenditure.<\/p>\n Compared with the Advanced Indonesia Cabinet during President Joko\nWidodo\u2019s second term, President Prabowo Subianto\u2019s government structure\nappears considerably larger, particularly when deputy ministers,\nofficials at ministerial level and agency heads are included. This\npresents a governance paradox: while budget efficiency is being pursued\nunder Presidential Instruction No.\u00a01 of 2025, the Cabinet structure\ncontinues to grow.<\/p>\n The government should not merely demand that ministries and agencies\ncut spending; it should also assess whether the size of the executive\npower structure matches the country\u2019s needs and fiscal capacity. Budget\nefficiency should address not only expenditure but also the technocratic\nrationale of the structure that generates it.<\/p>\n As I argued in an opinion piece published in Kontan on 13 February\n2025, titled \u201cCritiquing State Budget Efficiency\u201d, an efficiency policy\nrisks losing its substance if the government cuts spending in one area\nwhile continuing to expand the bureaucratic structure in another. The\nlarger the Cabinet, the greater the potential operating costs that must\nbe taken into account.<\/p>\n These costs include officials\u2019 salaries and allowances, ministers\u2019\noperational funds (DOM), official facilities and other support for their\nroles. Every new position should therefore be based on an analysis of\norganisational need, an assessment of its fiscal consequences and\nmeasurable performance targets. Without all three, Cabinet expansion\nrisks increasing the budget burden without adding commensurate value to\npublic services.<\/p>\n The formation and composition of the Cabinet are indeed part of the\nPresident\u2019s constitutional authority as head of government under the\n1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. But that authority does\nnot exempt Cabinet design from public scrutiny. The use of executive\npower must be justified by the needs of government, institutional\neffectiveness and the principles of fiscal accountability.<\/p>\n In this context, Francis Fukuyama\u2019s book State-Building:\nGovernance and World Order in the 21st Century<\/em> is relevant once\nagain. Fukuyama emphasises the importance of state capacity in carrying\nout government functions effectively.<\/p>\n A greater role for the state does not, by itself, indicate stronger\nstate capacity. Expanding structures and powers without adequate\ninstitutional capabilities risks complicating coordination, weakening\npolicy implementation and creating more scope for inefficiency and poor\naccountability.<\/p>\n In other words, building state capacity cannot be achieved simply by\nadding institutions or posts; it must also involve strengthening\norganisations\u2019 ability to produce effective policies and public\nservices. Applying this framework to the current government raises\nseveral fundamental questions. Does the Cabinet\u2019s structure genuinely\nreflect the state\u2019s technocratic needs, or does it chiefly accommodate\nthe interests of political consolidation?<\/p>\n Furthermore, have responsibilities been allocated among ministries,\nagencies and government bodies according to clearly differentiated\nfunctions? Or is there still overlapping authority, duplicated\nprogrammes and multiple institutions working in similar areas without a\nclear division of responsibility?<\/p>\n As President Prabowo Subianto\u2019s government approaches its second\nanniversary, an institutional review should be conducted systematically.\nIt should assess each institution\u2019s mandate, workload, staffing needs,\ncoordination effectiveness and operating costs.<\/p>\n The government should also measure the relationship between\nexpenditure and results. New posts and institutions should not be\ncreated solely for political reasons; they must be justified by\ntechnocratic needs and organisational rationale, and deliver measurable\nbenefits.<\/p>\n The public demands a clear development agenda<\/strong><\/p>\n Alongside debate over the size of the Cabinet, we should consider a\nmore fundamental technical question: how can the government ensure its\nbureaucratic capacity is commensurate with the complexity of the\nchallenges facing the country? The latest data from Statistics Indonesia\n(BPS) show that Indonesia\u2019s economy grew by 5.29 per cent year on year\nin the second quarter of 2026.<\/p>\n In the same period, gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices\nreached Rp6,552.1 trillion, while GDP at constant 2010 prices stood at\nRp3,576.2 trillion (BPS, 2026). These figures indicate that the national\neconomy continues to grow relatively strongly. But aggregate growth does\nnot, by itself, show whether prosperity is shared or whether all\nsections of society can withstand economic pressures.<\/p>\n Growth in the second quarter of 2026 also slowed from 5.61 per cent\nyear on year in the first quarter. This fall of 0.32 percentage points\ndoes not necessarily indicate a downturn across all sectors, but it is a\nreminder that growth must be considered alongside other indicators,\nincluding job creation, purchasing power, industrial performance and the\ndistribution of development gains.<\/p>\n Strong economic growth on paper is not enough if it has yet to\ntranslate fully into secure employment, higher incomes and improvements\nin people\u2019s welfare. The government\u2019s list of problems to solve is\ngrowing ever longer, as though the country\u2019s outstanding challenges\nnever run out.<\/p>\n The rupiah remains under pressure; job prospects are inadequate;\nindustry faces difficulties and lay-offs; the middle class is\nincreasingly squeezed; poverty remains a challenge; and law enforcement\nstill needs reform.<\/p>\n Before one problem is resolved, another emerges: forest and land\nfires, a need to demonstrate progress on bureaucratic reform, debate\nover the expanding role of the military in civilian affairs, the need to\nimprove the management of the Free Nutritious Meals programme (MBG), and\nrecurring natural disasters that test the state\u2019s preparedness.\nGovernment posts may keep multiplying, but the public\u2019s problems are not\ndiminishing.<\/p>\n In this situation, the public does not need merely more officials or\nconvincing-sounding optimistic statements from a podium. It needs\npolicies that work, coordination that does not involve agencies shifting\nblame, and a bureaucracy able to move faster than the problems it faces.\nThe government must not be more nimble in consolidating power than in\nconsolidating solutions.<\/p>\n People cannot pay their living costs with a bloated Cabinet, keep\ntheir jobs because there are more officials, or feel safe simply because\nthe state has a larger government structure. Ultimately, the public\njudges not how many people sit within the circle of power, but how many\nproblems they actually solve.<\/p>\n Many members of the public are also still asking about progress on\nthe development of the new capital, Nusantara (IKN), a legacy of the\nJokowi administration: \u201cHow far has it progressed, and what is the\ndirection and timetable for moving the capital?\u201d This question shows\nthat people want clarity on the project\u2019s direction, targets, schedule\nand outcomes.<\/p>\n The government cannot answer this through political messaging or\noptimistic narratives alone. The public needs measurable information on\nprogramme progress, budget use, implementation obstacles and the\nexpected benefits for the national interest.<\/p>\n The challenges facing the government cannot be met through political\nconsolidation and accommodating distributions of positions alone.\nConsolidation may help maintain government stability, but stability is a\nprecondition, not an end in itself. The government must still prove that\nstability can produce well-targeted policies, an effective bureaucracy\nand solutions that people can feel in their lives.<\/p>\n The fundamental question is no longer how broad a political base the\ngovernment has managed to assemble, but how ready it is to turn that\nsupport into the capacity to solve public problems. This is not an\nattempt to exaggerate the difficulties, but the reality is that the\ngovernment\u2019s agenda remains extensive. As Prabowo approaches two years\nin office, the government should no longer be preoccupied solely with\nbuilding structures, reorganising institutions or internal\nconsolidation.<\/p>\n This stage should be an opportunity to accelerate policy\nimplementation, clarify development priorities and resolve problems\nagainst measurable targets and performance indicators. Time in office\ncontinues to pass, while the public\u2019s problems cannot wait for political\nand bureaucratic processes to settle on an ideal form.<\/p>\n Addressing public anxiety<\/strong><\/p>\n I am reminded of an opinion piece by Tere Liye in Kompas<\/em> on\n7 August 2026, which raised concerns about the possibility that society\nis experiencing collective psychological strain. That reflection is\nrelevant to understanding the relationship between political dynamics\nand people\u2019s everyday lives.<\/p>\n Politics is not merely a contest among elites or a debate in the\ncorridors of power. Government decisions on the economy, employment,\neducation, social assistance, law enforcement and public services also\nshape people\u2019s sense of security and certainty. When fundamental\nproblems remain unresolved while public debate is filled with political\ncommotion, social exhaustion can become more acute.<\/p>\n I am not being pessimistic about the government; rather, I want to\nstress the importance of technocratic planning capable of addressing\nproblems systematically. The government needs to set priorities\naccording to urgency, strengthen coordination among agencies, allocate\nbudgets according to need and measure success by tangible results.\nEasing public anxiety must begin with a government that performs\noptimally, provides certainty and delivers an impact people can feel in\ntheir daily lives.<\/p>\n As President Prabowo\u2019s government approaches its second anniversary,\nthe nation\u2019s problem is ultimately not how many officials sit in the\nCabinet, but how effectively they carry out their mandates. A strong\ngovernment is not measured by the size of its organisational structure\nor the breadth of its political accommodation, but by its ability to\nmake sound decisions, coordinate policies consistently, use public funds\nresponsibly and deliver tangible benefits to society.<\/p>\n The state must not grow larger in structure without becoming stronger\nin capacity. Political consolidation must not move faster than\ntechnocratic consolidation. Nor should efficiency be demanded only of\nthose who implement budgets, while the structure that determines the\nscale of spending escapes scrutiny.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/when-political-consolidation-moves-faster-than-technocratic-governance-1792119086",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}