What the West has to know about Indonesia

What the West has to know about Indonesia

Western criticism of Indonesia is often based on a superficial
reading of the country. Leonard C Sebastian looks at the issue.

On Aug. 17, Indonesia celebrated its 50th anniversary. In an
era where we have seen multiethnic states like the former Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia collapse, the transformation of the massive
and diverse Indonesian archipelago from an economic backwater to
a lower-middle income country is an achievement of extraordinary
proportions. The fact that this process has been achieved in a
mere 28 years since the beginning of President Soeharto's tenure
in 1967 is remarkable.

Yet, why has so little credit been given to the Soeharto New
Order administration by the Western media? By and large, the
Western media has failed to understand the political dilemmas
faced by the Indonesian state in its attempts to consolidate this
diverse country of 13,000 islands and more than 200 ethnic
groups.

In this context, let us first begin by assessing the origins
of the New Order. The violence that preceded the advent of the
New Order needs to be understood carefully in the context of
Indonesian society. Soeharto may have come to power because the
state, in the form of the Army, effectively declared war on
Indonesian communists in October 1965, after the murder of five
of its generals on Sept. 30 that year. But the events of the time
were not just a matter of the state warring with some of its
citizenry. They also drew on and triggered complex rivalries
throughout Javanese and Balinese society -- much of this was
village against village and Moslem against perceived communist.
This event has left an indelible imprint on the minds of
Indonesians. Hence, the peril to ordinary people of a violent and
bloody breakdown of the status quo cannot be disregarded. In this
respect, there is a chasm between the experiences of the West and
Indonesia.

The notion of the collapse of state authority, of civil war,
of war of "all against all" is very remote from the Western
experience. But think of the experience of an Indonesian born
in 1930: until 1941, Dutch rule, very limited civil rights; 1941-
45, Japanese occupation; 1945-49, confrontation between the Dutch
and Indonesian nationalists; late 1950s and early 1960s, regional
rebellions plus growing tension and rivalry between communists
and anti-communists, culminating in the 1965 disaster. If you
were an Indonesian parent, when would you want your child to have
been born? 1935? 1945? 1965? 1985? 1995? For all the problems of
the Indonesian state, the latter dates would, of course, be
preferred.

Indonesia's historical legacy and the complexities inherent in
its society is a contributing factor in the combination of
policies adopted by the Soeharto administration. If there has
been a leitmotif in the approach adopted by Soeharto, it has been
the concept of "order" (ketertiban). Accordingly, Soeharto has
described stability, order and security "as an object of
development itself, namely, to make (people)...feel physically
secure and have peace of mind, free from fear of threats without
and from worrying from within".

One of the fundamental justifications for the military's
takeover of power in 1965 and the New Order's subsequent
dismantling of political parties, trade unions and social
organizations was the failure of civilians to maintain order in
the economic and political spheres.

For Soeharto, one of the fundamental tenets of good government
is the need to provide individuals with what they cannot provide
for themselves: a safe and stable society for a secure life.

The Western media, in an attempt to paint the Soeharto
administration as dictatorial, and oppressing its own population,
ignores the complexities inherent in Indonesian society. It also
does not provide an answer to what is a crucial issue: How to
transform the present system to one that is more open without the
changes giving rise to instability. With that in mind, it is
important to emphasize that the Indonesian polity is a dynamic
one. Not only has there been recognition by the state that change
is necessary (for example, Soeharto's Keterbukaan [openness]
policy), but Indonesians themselves are making efforts to
transform their country.

There is a vigorous tradition of critical journalism in
Indonesia. Similarly, there exists an energetic labor movement.
There are also Indonesian environmentalists, writers, scholars
and students all actively thinking about their society, seeking
to reform and change it. Pressure to change will come from
domestic contingencies and not from the West.

Soeharto can justifiably have a great sense of achievement in
presiding over this year's Aug. 17 celebrations marking
Indonesia's 50th year of independence. In his 28 years in power,
he has nurtured a sense of nationhood often missing from
archipelagic states, raised living standards and improved the
welfare of the country's citizens. Soeharto was successful in
creating major political institutions during the early years of
his presidency.

As Indonesia braces itself on making the economic leap to
middle-income status, a great challenge facing Soeharto will be
his ability to reinvigorate existing institutions to meet
the needs of a new urban proletariat. To his credit, the
President has not been a passive observer to the changes taking
place in Indonesian society. He still relies on tried and
trusted approaches, like continuing to follow the Javanese
principle of alon alon asal kelakon -- a step-by-step or
incremental approach to problem-solving. One example has
been the decision to reduce the military's appointed number of
seats in the House of Representatives from 100 to 75. While still
acknowledging the importance of the military, the President
desires to make it less conspicuous, without eroding its
effectiveness. This careful but considered progression is the
right prescription for a society still volatile.

The overriding theme in this context over the next few years
will be that of the state setting in place the conditions for its
survival beyond Soeharto. Crucial to this will be the nurturing
of a fresh stock of national leaders who will appeal to the
various alirans (streams) in Indonesia's diverse society.
Political stability has been one of the hallmarks of the Soeharto
administration; but that is not the same thing as saying that
Indonesia is stable. Before that claim can be made, it must be
tested by a transition of power.

Leonard C. Sebastian is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore.