What the West has to know about Indonesia

What the West has to know about Indonesia

Western criticism of Indonesia is often based on a superficial reading of the country. Leonard C Sebastian looks at the issue.

On Aug. 17, Indonesia celebrated its 50th anniversary. In an era where we have seen multiethnic states like the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia collapse, the transformation of the massive and diverse Indonesian archipelago from an economic backwater to a lower-middle income country is an achievement of extraordinary proportions. The fact that this process has been achieved in a mere 28 years since the beginning of President Soeharto's tenure in 1967 is remarkable.

Yet, why has so little credit been given to the Soeharto New Order administration by the Western media? By and large, the Western media has failed to understand the political dilemmas faced by the Indonesian state in its attempts to consolidate this diverse country of 13,000 islands and more than 200 ethnic groups.

In this context, let us first begin by assessing the origins of the New Order. The violence that preceded the advent of the New Order needs to be understood carefully in the context of Indonesian society. Soeharto may have come to power because the state, in the form of the Army, effectively declared war on Indonesian communists in October 1965, after the murder of five of its generals on Sept. 30 that year. But the events of the time were not just a matter of the state warring with some of its citizenry. They also drew on and triggered complex rivalries throughout Javanese and Balinese society -- much of this was village against village and Moslem against perceived communist. This event has left an indelible imprint on the minds of Indonesians. Hence, the peril to ordinary people of a violent and bloody breakdown of the status quo cannot be disregarded. In this respect, there is a chasm between the experiences of the West and Indonesia.

The notion of the collapse of state authority, of civil war, of war of "all against all" is very remote from the Western experience. But think of the experience of an Indonesian born in 1930: until 1941, Dutch rule, very limited civil rights; 1941- 45, Japanese occupation; 1945-49, confrontation between the Dutch and Indonesian nationalists; late 1950s and early 1960s, regional rebellions plus growing tension and rivalry between communists and anti-communists, culminating in the 1965 disaster. If you were an Indonesian parent, when would you want your child to have been born? 1935? 1945? 1965? 1985? 1995? For all the problems of the Indonesian state, the latter dates would, of course, be preferred.

Indonesia's historical legacy and the complexities inherent in its society is a contributing factor in the combination of policies adopted by the Soeharto administration. If there has been a leitmotif in the approach adopted by Soeharto, it has been the concept of "order" (ketertiban). Accordingly, Soeharto has described stability, order and security "as an object of development itself, namely, to make (people)...feel physically secure and have peace of mind, free from fear of threats without and from worrying from within".

One of the fundamental justifications for the military's takeover of power in 1965 and the New Order's subsequent dismantling of political parties, trade unions and social organizations was the failure of civilians to maintain order in the economic and political spheres.

For Soeharto, one of the fundamental tenets of good government is the need to provide individuals with what they cannot provide for themselves: a safe and stable society for a secure life.

The Western media, in an attempt to paint the Soeharto administration as dictatorial, and oppressing its own population, ignores the complexities inherent in Indonesian society. It also does not provide an answer to what is a crucial issue: How to transform the present system to one that is more open without the changes giving rise to instability. With that in mind, it is important to emphasize that the Indonesian polity is a dynamic one. Not only has there been recognition by the state that change is necessary (for example, Soeharto's Keterbukaan [openness] policy), but Indonesians themselves are making efforts to transform their country.

There is a vigorous tradition of critical journalism in Indonesia. Similarly, there exists an energetic labor movement. There are also Indonesian environmentalists, writers, scholars and students all actively thinking about their society, seeking to reform and change it. Pressure to change will come from domestic contingencies and not from the West.

Soeharto can justifiably have a great sense of achievement in presiding over this year's Aug. 17 celebrations marking Indonesia's 50th year of independence. In his 28 years in power, he has nurtured a sense of nationhood often missing from archipelagic states, raised living standards and improved the welfare of the country's citizens. Soeharto was successful in creating major political institutions during the early years of his presidency.

As Indonesia braces itself on making the economic leap to middle-income status, a great challenge facing Soeharto will be his ability to reinvigorate existing institutions to meet the needs of a new urban proletariat. To his credit, the President has not been a passive observer to the changes taking place in Indonesian society. He still relies on tried and trusted approaches, like continuing to follow the Javanese principle of alon alon asal kelakon -- a step-by-step or incremental approach to problem-solving. One example has been the decision to reduce the military's appointed number of seats in the House of Representatives from 100 to 75. While still acknowledging the importance of the military, the President desires to make it less conspicuous, without eroding its effectiveness. This careful but considered progression is the right prescription for a society still volatile.

The overriding theme in this context over the next few years will be that of the state setting in place the conditions for its survival beyond Soeharto. Crucial to this will be the nurturing of a fresh stock of national leaders who will appeal to the various alirans (streams) in Indonesia's diverse society. Political stability has been one of the hallmarks of the Soeharto administration; but that is not the same thing as saying that Indonesia is stable. Before that claim can be made, it must be tested by a transition of power.

Leonard C. Sebastian is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.