What the West has to know about Indonesia<\/p>\n
Western criticism of Indonesia is often based on a superficial
\nreading of the country. Leonard C Sebastian looks at the issue.<\/p>\n
On Aug. 17, Indonesia celebrated its 50th anniversary. In an
\nera where we have seen multiethnic states like the former Soviet
\nUnion and Yugoslavia collapse, the transformation of the massive
\nand diverse Indonesian archipelago from an economic backwater to
\na lower-middle income country is an achievement of extraordinary
\nproportions. The fact that this process has been achieved in a
\nmere 28 years since the beginning of President Soeharto's tenure
\nin 1967 is remarkable.<\/p>\n
Yet, why has so little credit been given to the Soeharto New
\nOrder administration by the Western media? By and large, the
\nWestern media has failed to understand the political dilemmas
\nfaced by the Indonesian state in its attempts to consolidate this
\ndiverse country of 13,000 islands and more than 200 ethnic
\ngroups.<\/p>\n
In this context, let us first begin by assessing the origins
\nof the New Order. The violence that preceded the advent of the
\nNew Order needs to be understood carefully in the context of
\nIndonesian society. Soeharto may have come to power because the
\nstate, in the form of the Army, effectively declared war on
\nIndonesian communists in October 1965, after the murder of five
\nof its generals on Sept. 30 that year. But the events of the time
\nwere not just a matter of the state warring with some of its
\ncitizenry. They also drew on and triggered complex rivalries
\nthroughout Javanese and Balinese society -- much of this was
\nvillage against village and Moslem against perceived communist.
\nThis event has left an indelible imprint on the minds of
\nIndonesians. Hence, the peril to ordinary people of a violent and
\nbloody breakdown of the status quo cannot be disregarded. In this
\nrespect, there is a chasm between the experiences of the West and
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
The notion of the collapse of state authority, of civil war,
\nof war of "all against all" is very remote from the Western
\nexperience. But think of the experience of an Indonesian born
\nin 1930: until 1941, Dutch rule, very limited civil rights; 1941-
\n45, Japanese occupation; 1945-49, confrontation between the Dutch
\nand Indonesian nationalists; late 1950s and early 1960s, regional
\nrebellions plus growing tension and rivalry between communists
\nand anti-communists, culminating in the 1965 disaster. If you
\nwere an Indonesian parent, when would you want your child to have
\nbeen born? 1935? 1945? 1965? 1985? 1995? For all the problems of
\nthe Indonesian state, the latter dates would, of course, be
\npreferred.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's historical legacy and the complexities inherent in
\nits society is a contributing factor in the combination of
\npolicies adopted by the Soeharto administration. If there has
\nbeen a leitmotif in the approach adopted by Soeharto, it has been
\nthe concept of "order" (ketertiban). Accordingly, Soeharto has
\ndescribed stability, order and security "as an object of
\ndevelopment itself, namely, to make (people)...feel physically
\nsecure and have peace of mind, free from fear of threats without
\nand from worrying from within".<\/p>\n
One of the fundamental justifications for the military's
\ntakeover of power in 1965 and the New Order's subsequent
\ndismantling of political parties, trade unions and social
\norganizations was the failure of civilians to maintain order in
\nthe economic and political spheres.<\/p>\n
For Soeharto, one of the fundamental tenets of good government
\nis the need to provide individuals with what they cannot provide
\nfor themselves: a safe and stable society for a secure life.<\/p>\n
The Western media, in an attempt to paint the Soeharto
\nadministration as dictatorial, and oppressing its own population,
\nignores the complexities inherent in Indonesian society. It also
\ndoes not provide an answer to what is a crucial issue: How to
\ntransform the present system to one that is more open without the
\nchanges giving rise to instability. With that in mind, it is
\nimportant to emphasize that the Indonesian polity is a dynamic
\none. Not only has there been recognition by the state that change
\nis necessary (for example, Soeharto's Keterbukaan [openness]
\npolicy), but Indonesians themselves are making efforts to
\ntransform their country.<\/p>\n
There is a vigorous tradition of critical journalism in
\nIndonesia. Similarly, there exists an energetic labor movement.
\nThere are also Indonesian environmentalists, writers, scholars
\nand students all actively thinking about their society, seeking
\nto reform and change it. Pressure to change will come from
\ndomestic contingencies and not from the West.<\/p>\n
Soeharto can justifiably have a great sense of achievement in
\npresiding over this year's Aug. 17 celebrations marking
\nIndonesia's 50th year of independence. In his 28 years in power,
\nhe has nurtured a sense of nationhood often missing from
\narchipelagic states, raised living standards and improved the
\nwelfare of the country's citizens. Soeharto was successful in
\ncreating major political institutions during the early years of
\nhis presidency.<\/p>\n
As Indonesia braces itself on making the economic leap to
\nmiddle-income status, a great challenge facing Soeharto will be
\nhis ability to reinvigorate existing institutions to meet
\nthe needs of a new urban proletariat. To his credit, the
\nPresident has not been a passive observer to the changes taking
\nplace in Indonesian society. He still relies on tried and
\ntrusted approaches, like continuing to follow the Javanese
\nprinciple of alon alon asal kelakon -- a step-by-step or
\nincremental approach to problem-solving. One example has
\nbeen the decision to reduce the military's appointed number of
\nseats in the House of Representatives from 100 to 75. While still
\nacknowledging the importance of the military, the President
\ndesires to make it less conspicuous, without eroding its
\neffectiveness. This careful but considered progression is the
\nright prescription for a society still volatile.<\/p>\n
The overriding theme in this context over the next few years
\nwill be that of the state setting in place the conditions for its
\nsurvival beyond Soeharto. Crucial to this will be the nurturing
\nof a fresh stock of national leaders who will appeal to the
\nvarious alirans (streams) in Indonesia's diverse society.
\nPolitical stability has been one of the hallmarks of the Soeharto
\nadministration; but that is not the same thing as saying that
\nIndonesia is stable. Before that claim can be made, it must be
\ntested by a transition of power.<\/p>\n
Leonard C. Sebastian is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast
\nAsian Studies, Singapore.<\/p>",
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