What RI stability means to the ASEAN region

What RI stability means to the ASEAN region

By Daljit Singh

SINGAPORE: Indonesian stability has been such an accepted phenomenon in the past 30 years that it has come to be taken for granted. It is, however, crucial to the region and to ASEAN.

After the abortive pro-communist coup of Sept. 30, 1965, the new political forces headed by General Soeharto moved quickly to seek regional reconciliation. Confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore was formally ended in 1966 and ASEAN was established in 1967. The birth of the regional grouping was above all an expression and a symbol of this reconciliation between regional neighbors. ASEAN has, of course, grown enormously in strength and influence since then.

A cursory look at the map would show the place Indonesia occupies in South-east Asia, over nearly 50 degrees of longitude from west to east, by far the largest member of ASEAN both in land area and in population. But size does not necessarily translate into commensurate influence in a regional organization. On the contrary, size can arouse fears of domination among the smaller members, impeding rather than advancing regional co- operation.

How was it possible for ASEAN to build the level of intramural confidence that it now enjoys when one of its members was not only dominant in terms of size but had recently mounted a Confrontation policy against two of its immediate neighbors?

The most important reason was that Indonesia, conscious of the burdens of size and history, chose a low-key approach in its dealings with its ASEAN partners. It was able to show to them through word and practice that it had no wish to be a hegemony, that it valued consultations and consensus.

This was not a matter of tactical expediency. Indonesia was able to demonstrate to its ASEAN partners that it was willing to put on hold, for a long time to come, its regional ambitions for the sake of regional harmony and its own economic development. This self-denial was based on calculations of enlightened self- interest: influence commensurate with size would come naturally with economic success, within the framework of international rules and norms, and through acceptance of Indonesia's role by regional neighbors.

In ASEAN, no country claims to be a leader and that may be the secret of its success. But Indonesia has been a key player, the first among equals. Its voice has always carried weight, especially on issues of regional security and the development of regionalism.

Indonesia inspired confidence not just by its conduct in ASEAN and in bilateral relations towards neighbors. It did so also by the way it conducted its own national affairs from 1966. In New Order Indonesia, economics rather than politics was in command. Western trained economists were given the task of rescuing and then expanding the economy. They pursued rational economic policies which were subject to the usual constraints imposed by foreign governments and international bankers who provided the capital for rehabilitation and development. The result has been perhaps the most impressive economic success story in Asia.

Indonesia's military modernization over the years has been very restrained and modest. There have been no discernible impulses to match size with the most modern military forces. The bulk of the Indonesian armed forces still remain geared to internal security. This served to reinforce the perception of a country pursuing external policies of moderation and peace.

All this has been in sharp contrast to the early 1960s under the previous order when the emphasis was on political rhetoric and mobilization and military build-ups while the economy was run to the ground.

To achieve its economic development goals, the New Order had to curb the political excesses of the past and provide the necessary political stability for investors to put their money into the country. The formula by which politics was reordered for the sake of stability served Indonesia well for 30 years, transforming the economic and social landscape. In recent years, it has aroused criticism among Indonesians, with many arguing that the changed circumstances require a more flexible, open and responsive political system.

Thus, how Indonesia manages the transition to the post- Soeharto period, even if, as expected, the President seeks and obtains another term in office in 1998, is of great importance to ASEAN, and in particular to Indonesia's immediate neighbors, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.

Most observers of the Indonesian scene do not think that domestic events will affect the fundamentals of Indonesian policies in relation to ASEAN and South-east Asia for they are accepted by the majority of the civilian and military elites in Jakarta.

Still, domestic developments will be watched closely by ASEAN neighbors, as well as by outside powers. As Indonesia itself has taught others, domestic instability drains national resilience and also weakens regional resilience. This would be especially so if the instability were to take place in a pivotal ASEAN country like Indonesia.

An Indonesia beset by prolonged civil unrest or weak government would thus be a minus for ASEAN. It could affect the standing of ASEAN and its effectiveness at a time of momentous changes and challenges in South-east Asia and the Asia-Pacific. These include adjusting to the changing relations between the major powers, consolidating the ASEAN-10, adjusting to the requirements of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, advancing confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum, pushing Asia-Pacific regionalism through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and strengthening Asia-Europe dialogue and cooperation.

Compared with 30 years ago, Indonesia today is much more integrated with the international and regional economies. This has been happening both at the bilateral levels and, in the case of South-east Asia, through sub-regional "growth triangles". AFTA will further accelerate the process, while providing greater access to South-east Asia's largest market. Any protracted instability in this vast country could affect this web of commerce and investments. If growth rates in Indonesia plummet as a result there could also be accelerated migration of people to neighboring countries.

Daljit Singh is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore and Editor of Trends.