What RI stability means to the ASEAN region

What RI stability means to the ASEAN region

By Daljit Singh

SINGAPORE: Indonesian stability has been such an accepted
phenomenon in the past 30 years that it has come to be taken for
granted. It is, however, crucial to the region and to ASEAN.

After the abortive pro-communist coup of Sept. 30, 1965, the
new political forces headed by General Soeharto moved quickly to
seek regional reconciliation. Confrontation against Malaysia and
Singapore was formally ended in 1966 and ASEAN was established in
1967. The birth of the regional grouping was above all an
expression and a symbol of this reconciliation between regional
neighbors. ASEAN has, of course, grown enormously in strength and
influence since then.

A cursory look at the map would show the place Indonesia
occupies in South-east Asia, over nearly 50 degrees of longitude
from west to east, by far the largest member of ASEAN both in
land area and in population. But size does not necessarily
translate into commensurate influence in a regional organization.
On the contrary, size can arouse fears of domination among the
smaller members, impeding rather than advancing regional co-
operation.

How was it possible for ASEAN to build the level of intramural
confidence that it now enjoys when one of its members was not
only dominant in terms of size but had recently mounted a
Confrontation policy against two of its immediate neighbors?

The most important reason was that Indonesia, conscious of the
burdens of size and history, chose a low-key approach in its
dealings with its ASEAN partners. It was able to show to them
through word and practice that it had no wish to be a hegemony,
that it valued consultations and consensus.

This was not a matter of tactical expediency. Indonesia was
able to demonstrate to its ASEAN partners that it was willing to
put on hold, for a long time to come, its regional ambitions for
the sake of regional harmony and its own economic development.
This self-denial was based on calculations of enlightened self-
interest: influence commensurate with size would come naturally
with economic success, within the framework of international
rules and norms, and through acceptance of Indonesia's role by
regional neighbors.

In ASEAN, no country claims to be a leader and that may be the
secret of its success. But Indonesia has been a key player, the
first among equals. Its voice has always carried weight,
especially on issues of regional security and the development of
regionalism.

Indonesia inspired confidence not just by its conduct in ASEAN
and in bilateral relations towards neighbors. It did so also by
the way it conducted its own national affairs from 1966. In New
Order Indonesia, economics rather than politics was in command.
Western trained economists were given the task of rescuing and
then expanding the economy. They pursued rational economic
policies which were subject to the usual constraints imposed by
foreign governments and international bankers who provided the
capital for rehabilitation and development. The result has been
perhaps the most impressive economic success story in Asia.

Indonesia's military modernization over the years has been
very restrained and modest. There have been no discernible
impulses to match size with the most modern military forces. The
bulk of the Indonesian armed forces still remain geared to
internal security. This served to reinforce the perception of a
country pursuing external policies of moderation and peace.

All this has been in sharp contrast to the early 1960s under
the previous order when the emphasis was on political rhetoric
and mobilization and military build-ups while the economy was run
to the ground.

To achieve its economic development goals, the New Order had
to curb the political excesses of the past and provide the
necessary political stability for investors to put their money
into the country. The formula by which politics was reordered for
the sake of stability served Indonesia well for 30 years,
transforming the economic and social landscape. In recent years,
it has aroused criticism among Indonesians, with many arguing
that the changed circumstances require a more flexible, open and
responsive political system.

Thus, how Indonesia manages the transition to the post-
Soeharto period, even if, as expected, the President seeks and
obtains another term in office in 1998, is of great importance to
ASEAN, and in particular to Indonesia's immediate neighbors,
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.

Most observers of the Indonesian scene do not think that
domestic events will affect the fundamentals of Indonesian
policies in relation to ASEAN and South-east Asia for they are
accepted by the majority of the civilian and military elites in
Jakarta.

Still, domestic developments will be watched closely by ASEAN
neighbors, as well as by outside powers. As Indonesia itself has
taught others, domestic instability drains national resilience
and also weakens regional resilience. This would be especially so
if the instability were to take place in a pivotal ASEAN country
like Indonesia.

An Indonesia beset by prolonged civil unrest or weak
government would thus be a minus for ASEAN. It could affect the
standing of ASEAN and its effectiveness at a time of momentous
changes and challenges in South-east Asia and the Asia-Pacific.
These include adjusting to the changing relations between the
major powers, consolidating the ASEAN-10, adjusting to the
requirements of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, advancing confidence
building and preventive diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum,
pushing Asia-Pacific regionalism through the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum, and strengthening Asia-Europe
dialogue and cooperation.

Compared with 30 years ago, Indonesia today is much more
integrated with the international and regional economies. This
has been happening both at the bilateral levels and, in the case
of South-east Asia, through sub-regional "growth triangles". AFTA
will further accelerate the process, while providing greater
access to South-east Asia's largest market. Any protracted
instability in this vast country could affect this web of
commerce and investments. If growth rates in Indonesia plummet as
a result there could also be accelerated migration of people to
neighboring countries.

Daljit Singh is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore and Editor of Trends.