What RI stability means to the ASEAN region<\/p>\n
By Daljit Singh<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE: Indonesian stability has been such an accepted
\nphenomenon in the past 30 years that it has come to be taken for
\ngranted. It is, however, crucial to the region and to ASEAN.<\/p>\n
After the abortive pro-communist coup of Sept. 30, 1965, the
\nnew political forces headed by General Soeharto moved quickly to
\nseek regional reconciliation. Confrontation against Malaysia and
\nSingapore was formally ended in 1966 and ASEAN was established in
\n1967. The birth of the regional grouping was above all an
\nexpression and a symbol of this reconciliation between regional
\nneighbors. ASEAN has, of course, grown enormously in strength and
\ninfluence since then.<\/p>\n
A cursory look at the map would show the place Indonesia
\noccupies in South-east Asia, over nearly 50 degrees of longitude
\nfrom west to east, by far the largest member of ASEAN both in
\nland area and in population. But size does not necessarily
\ntranslate into commensurate influence in a regional organization.
\nOn the contrary, size can arouse fears of domination among the
\nsmaller members, impeding rather than advancing regional co-
\noperation.<\/p>\n
How was it possible for ASEAN to build the level of intramural
\nconfidence that it now enjoys when one of its members was not
\nonly dominant in terms of size but had recently mounted a
\nConfrontation policy against two of its immediate neighbors?<\/p>\n
The most important reason was that Indonesia, conscious of the
\nburdens of size and history, chose a low-key approach in its
\ndealings with its ASEAN partners. It was able to show to them
\nthrough word and practice that it had no wish to be a hegemony,
\nthat it valued consultations and consensus.<\/p>\n
This was not a matter of tactical expediency. Indonesia was
\nable to demonstrate to its ASEAN partners that it was willing to
\nput on hold, for a long time to come, its regional ambitions for
\nthe sake of regional harmony and its own economic development.
\nThis self-denial was based on calculations of enlightened self-
\ninterest: influence commensurate with size would come naturally
\nwith economic success, within the framework of international
\nrules and norms, and through acceptance of Indonesia's role by
\nregional neighbors.<\/p>\n
In ASEAN, no country claims to be a leader and that may be the
\nsecret of its success. But Indonesia has been a key player, the
\nfirst among equals. Its voice has always carried weight,
\nespecially on issues of regional security and the development of
\nregionalism.<\/p>\n
Indonesia inspired confidence not just by its conduct in ASEAN
\nand in bilateral relations towards neighbors. It did so also by
\nthe way it conducted its own national affairs from 1966. In New
\nOrder Indonesia, economics rather than politics was in command.
\nWestern trained economists were given the task of rescuing and
\nthen expanding the economy. They pursued rational economic
\npolicies which were subject to the usual constraints imposed by
\nforeign governments and international bankers who provided the
\ncapital for rehabilitation and development. The result has been
\nperhaps the most impressive economic success story in Asia.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's military modernization over the years has been
\nvery restrained and modest. There have been no discernible
\nimpulses to match size with the most modern military forces. The
\nbulk of the Indonesian armed forces still remain geared to
\ninternal security. This served to reinforce the perception of a
\ncountry pursuing external policies of moderation and peace.<\/p>\n
All this has been in sharp contrast to the early 1960s under
\nthe previous order when the emphasis was on political rhetoric
\nand mobilization and military build-ups while the economy was run
\nto the ground.<\/p>\n
To achieve its economic development goals, the New Order had
\nto curb the political excesses of the past and provide the
\nnecessary political stability for investors to put their money
\ninto the country. The formula by which politics was reordered for
\nthe sake of stability served Indonesia well for 30 years,
\ntransforming the economic and social landscape. In recent years,
\nit has aroused criticism among Indonesians, with many arguing
\nthat the changed circumstances require a more flexible, open and
\nresponsive political system.<\/p>\n
Thus, how Indonesia manages the transition to the post-
\nSoeharto period, even if, as expected, the President seeks and
\nobtains another term in office in 1998, is of great importance to
\nASEAN, and in particular to Indonesia's immediate neighbors,
\nMalaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.<\/p>\n
Most observers of the Indonesian scene do not think that
\ndomestic events will affect the fundamentals of Indonesian
\npolicies in relation to ASEAN and South-east Asia for they are
\naccepted by the majority of the civilian and military elites in
\nJakarta.<\/p>\n
Still, domestic developments will be watched closely by ASEAN
\nneighbors, as well as by outside powers. As Indonesia itself has
\ntaught others, domestic instability drains national resilience
\nand also weakens regional resilience. This would be especially so
\nif the instability were to take place in a pivotal ASEAN country
\nlike Indonesia.<\/p>\n
An Indonesia beset by prolonged civil unrest or weak
\ngovernment would thus be a minus for ASEAN. It could affect the
\nstanding of ASEAN and its effectiveness at a time of momentous
\nchanges and challenges in South-east Asia and the Asia-Pacific.
\nThese include adjusting to the changing relations between the
\nmajor powers, consolidating the ASEAN-10, adjusting to the
\nrequirements of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, advancing confidence
\nbuilding and preventive diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum,
\npushing Asia-Pacific regionalism through the Asia Pacific
\nEconomic Cooperation forum, and strengthening Asia-Europe
\ndialogue and cooperation.<\/p>\n
Compared with 30 years ago, Indonesia today is much more
\nintegrated with the international and regional economies. This
\nhas been happening both at the bilateral levels and, in the case
\nof South-east Asia, through sub-regional \"growth triangles\". AFTA
\nwill further accelerate the process, while providing greater
\naccess to South-east Asia's largest market. Any protracted
\ninstability in this vast country could affect this web of
\ncommerce and investments. If growth rates in Indonesia plummet as
\na result there could also be accelerated migration of people to
\nneighboring countries.<\/p>\n
Daljit Singh is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast
\nAsian Studies, Singapore and Editor of Trends.<\/p>",
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