Vietnam in ASEAN and Spratly conflict

Vietnam in ASEAN and Spratly conflict

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decided to officially admit Vietnam as their seventh member in the next ASEAN ministerial meeting in July.

The news is not surprising since Vietnam's incorporation into ASEAN has been foreseen for a long time, especially since the end of that country's involvement in the Cambodian conflict.

The end of the Cold War and reforms in Vietnam also served as clear indications of a real "reconciliation" between ASEAN and the Indochinese states. Moreover, the establishment of a "friendly house of ten Southeast Asian countries" has been a long-harbored goal of ASEAN.

One of the most interesting and relevant questions to be raised in this context concerns China and what it's reaction will be, especially considering the existing conflict between Beijing and Hanoi over the Spratly Islands. Will China perceive that the admission of Vietnam into ASEAN as some sort of "united front" against China in the South China Sea?

Such a possibility is indeed imminent because of the existing view on the Chinese side that Vietnam is playing an international card in this matter. Even though this view was expressed by a Chinese scholar, it prompted the Philippines' Foreign Minister Romulo to refute such a view as "paranoid".

The Chinese have not yet issued a formal statement in this regard. However, it can be argued that it is not unlikely that some Chinese leaders may also fear that Vietnam's membership in ASEAN will pose some disadvantages to China's position in the Spratly conflict. Hanoi's membership in the Association would automatically increase the number of ASEAN members claiming the Spratly Islands.

This Chinese fear is closely related to the possibility that Vietnam and other ASEAN claimant countries would develop a unified stand against China. Moreover, since Beijing sees Taiwan as a part of China, the Spratly dispute could be construed as a dispute between China and four of the ASEAN countries.

However, this line of thinking is antithetical to the ASEAN way of conducting external behavior, as history has shown in the last 25 years that ASEAN has never been and will never be a coalition for ganging-up against one state or a group of states.

There is no reason for ASEAN to become trapped in such a delicate problem of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It will be in the interest of ASEAN to treat the Spratly conflict outside the ASEAN framework.

For example, on its own initiative Indonesia has consistently shown its goodwill in searching for a formula for cooperation among the claimants. This initiative suggests that Indonesia, as a leading member of ASEAN, believes that solutions to the Spratly conflict can be reached only through friendly dialog and not through any other effort.

It is also unlikely that ASEAN would let itself to be used by any of its members to carry out their respective national interests. Of course, one could argue that a member of ASEAN could possibly use the excuse of "ASEAN solidarity" to urge other members to support its own foreign policy agenda, though this too is unlikely to happen.

There is a strong believe among the ASEAN countries that the Association has worked well over the past 25 years precisely because it has been able to distinguish between issues that should be dealt with inside and outside of the ASEAN framework. In other words, it is difficult to imagine that members of ASEAN that have territorial claims in the South China Sea such as Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore would be prepared to accept the idea of ganging up against China.

Nevertheless, such an attitude on the part of ASEAN will be conditional on China's future policies towards the South China Sea. If China shows unacceptable signs and resorts to force to enforce its claim, then it is likely that non-claimant states in ASEAN would be forced to review their current neutral position.

Even though the era of hostility between China and Southeast Asia has long withered away, China still constitutes a source of concern for ASEAN. The so-called "China threat" is still being aired in some ASEAN capitals. Although the Chinese threat is ill- defined, the sheer size of China alone raises concern among ASEAN countries.

If China resorts to force in solving the dispute, this could definitely revive the old suspicion of China's real intention in Southeast Asia among some ASEAN countries. Seen in this light it will be in the interest of all if China cooperates with other claimants in searching for a peaceful solution to the dispute. The informal workshop on the South China Sea initiated by Indonesia deserves more formal attention from all parties.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.