Vietnam in ASEAN and Spratly conflict

Vietnam in ASEAN and Spratly conflict

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) decided to officially admit Vietnam as their seventh
member in the next ASEAN ministerial meeting in July.

The news is not surprising since Vietnam's incorporation into
ASEAN has been foreseen for a long time, especially since the end
of that country's involvement in the Cambodian conflict.

The end of the Cold War and reforms in Vietnam also served as
clear indications of a real "reconciliation" between ASEAN and
the Indochinese states. Moreover, the establishment of a
"friendly house of ten Southeast Asian countries" has been a
long-harbored goal of ASEAN.

One of the most interesting and relevant questions to be
raised in this context concerns China and what it's reaction will
be, especially considering the existing conflict between Beijing
and Hanoi over the Spratly Islands. Will China perceive that the
admission of Vietnam into ASEAN as some sort of "united front"
against China in the South China Sea?

Such a possibility is indeed imminent because of the existing
view on the Chinese side that Vietnam is playing an international
card in this matter. Even though this view was expressed by a
Chinese scholar, it prompted the Philippines' Foreign Minister
Romulo to refute such a view as "paranoid".

The Chinese have not yet issued a formal statement in this
regard. However, it can be argued that it is not unlikely that
some Chinese leaders may also fear that Vietnam's membership in
ASEAN will pose some disadvantages to China's position in the
Spratly conflict. Hanoi's membership in the Association would
automatically increase the number of ASEAN members claiming the
Spratly Islands.

This Chinese fear is closely related to the possibility that
Vietnam and other ASEAN claimant countries would develop a
unified stand against China. Moreover, since Beijing sees Taiwan
as a part of China, the Spratly dispute could be construed as a
dispute between China and four of the ASEAN countries.

However, this line of thinking is antithetical to the ASEAN
way of conducting external behavior, as history has shown in the
last 25 years that ASEAN has never been and will never be a
coalition for ganging-up against one state or a group of states.

There is no reason for ASEAN to become trapped in such a
delicate problem of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
It will be in the interest of ASEAN to treat the Spratly conflict
outside the ASEAN framework.

For example, on its own initiative Indonesia has consistently
shown its goodwill in searching for a formula for cooperation
among the claimants. This initiative suggests that Indonesia, as
a leading member of ASEAN, believes that solutions to the Spratly
conflict can be reached only through friendly dialog and not
through any other effort.

It is also unlikely that ASEAN would let itself to be used by
any of its members to carry out their respective national
interests. Of course, one could argue that a member of ASEAN
could possibly use the excuse of "ASEAN solidarity" to urge other
members to support its own foreign policy agenda, though this too
is unlikely to happen.

There is a strong believe among the ASEAN countries that the
Association has worked well over the past 25 years precisely
because it has been able to distinguish between issues that
should be dealt with inside and outside of the ASEAN framework.
In other words, it is difficult to imagine that members of ASEAN
that have territorial claims in the South China Sea such as
Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore would be prepared to accept the
idea of ganging up against China.

Nevertheless, such an attitude on the part of ASEAN will be
conditional on China's future policies towards the South China
Sea. If China shows unacceptable signs and resorts to force to
enforce its claim, then it is likely that non-claimant states in
ASEAN would be forced to review their current neutral position.

Even though the era of hostility between China and Southeast
Asia has long withered away, China still constitutes a source of
concern for ASEAN. The so-called "China threat" is still being
aired in some ASEAN capitals. Although the Chinese threat is ill-
defined, the sheer size of China alone raises concern among ASEAN
countries.

If China resorts to force in solving the dispute, this could
definitely revive the old suspicion of China's real intention in
Southeast Asia among some ASEAN countries. Seen in this light it
will be in the interest of all if China cooperates with other
claimants in searching for a peaceful solution to the dispute.
The informal workshop on the South China Sea initiated by
Indonesia deserves more formal attention from all parties.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.