Vietnam in ASEAN and Spratly conflict<\/p>\n
By Rizal Sukma<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
\n(ASEAN) decided to officially admit Vietnam as their seventh
\nmember in the next ASEAN ministerial meeting in July.<\/p>\n
The news is not surprising since Vietnam's incorporation into
\nASEAN has been foreseen for a long time, especially since the end
\nof that country's involvement in the Cambodian conflict.<\/p>\n
The end of the Cold War and reforms in Vietnam also served as
\nclear indications of a real \"reconciliation\" between ASEAN and
\nthe Indochinese states. Moreover, the establishment of a
\n\"friendly house of ten Southeast Asian countries\" has been a
\nlong-harbored goal of ASEAN.<\/p>\n
One of the most interesting and relevant questions to be
\nraised in this context concerns China and what it's reaction will
\nbe, especially considering the existing conflict between Beijing
\nand Hanoi over the Spratly Islands. Will China perceive that the
\nadmission of Vietnam into ASEAN as some sort of \"united front\"
\nagainst China in the South China Sea?<\/p>\n
Such a possibility is indeed imminent because of the existing
\nview on the Chinese side that Vietnam is playing an international
\ncard in this matter. Even though this view was expressed by a
\nChinese scholar, it prompted the Philippines' Foreign Minister
\nRomulo to refute such a view as \"paranoid\".<\/p>\n
The Chinese have not yet issued a formal statement in this
\nregard. However, it can be argued that it is not unlikely that
\nsome Chinese leaders may also fear that Vietnam's membership in
\nASEAN will pose some disadvantages to China's position in the
\nSpratly conflict. Hanoi's membership in the Association would
\nautomatically increase the number of ASEAN members claiming the
\nSpratly Islands.<\/p>\n
This Chinese fear is closely related to the possibility that
\nVietnam and other ASEAN claimant countries would develop a
\nunified stand against China. Moreover, since Beijing sees Taiwan
\nas a part of China, the Spratly dispute could be construed as a
\ndispute between China and four of the ASEAN countries.<\/p>\n
However, this line of thinking is antithetical to the ASEAN
\nway of conducting external behavior, as history has shown in the
\nlast 25 years that ASEAN has never been and will never be a
\ncoalition for ganging-up against one state or a group of states.<\/p>\n
There is no reason for ASEAN to become trapped in such a
\ndelicate problem of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
\nIt will be in the interest of ASEAN to treat the Spratly conflict
\noutside the ASEAN framework.<\/p>\n
For example, on its own initiative Indonesia has consistently
\nshown its goodwill in searching for a formula for cooperation
\namong the claimants. This initiative suggests that Indonesia, as
\na leading member of ASEAN, believes that solutions to the Spratly
\nconflict can be reached only through friendly dialog and not
\nthrough any other effort.<\/p>\n
It is also unlikely that ASEAN would let itself to be used by
\nany of its members to carry out their respective national
\ninterests. Of course, one could argue that a member of ASEAN
\ncould possibly use the excuse of \"ASEAN solidarity\" to urge other
\nmembers to support its own foreign policy agenda, though this too
\nis unlikely to happen.<\/p>\n
There is a strong believe among the ASEAN countries that the
\nAssociation has worked well over the past 25 years precisely
\nbecause it has been able to distinguish between issues that
\nshould be dealt with inside and outside of the ASEAN framework.
\nIn other words, it is difficult to imagine that members of ASEAN
\nthat have territorial claims in the South China Sea such as
\nIndonesia, Thailand and Singapore would be prepared to accept the
\nidea of ganging up against China.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, such an attitude on the part of ASEAN will be
\nconditional on China's future policies towards the South China
\nSea. If China shows unacceptable signs and resorts to force to
\nenforce its claim, then it is likely that non-claimant states in
\nASEAN would be forced to review their current neutral position.<\/p>\n
Even though the era of hostility between China and Southeast
\nAsia has long withered away, China still constitutes a source of
\nconcern for ASEAN. The so-called \"China threat\" is still being
\naired in some ASEAN capitals. Although the Chinese threat is ill-
\ndefined, the sheer size of China alone raises concern among ASEAN
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
If China resorts to force in solving the dispute, this could
\ndefinitely revive the old suspicion of China's real intention in
\nSoutheast Asia among some ASEAN countries. Seen in this light it
\nwill be in the interest of all if China cooperates with other
\nclaimants in searching for a peaceful solution to the dispute.
\nThe informal workshop on the South China Sea initiated by
\nIndonesia deserves more formal attention from all parties.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/vietnam-in-asean-and-spratly-conflict-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}