Trump, Putin and Xi at the Centre of Iran War Scenario Planning

China had not yet completed the ceremonial preparations for Donald Trump when Vladimir Putin had already landed in Beijing on 19 May 2026. Putin’s visit to Beijing came about a week after Trump’s visit to China, at a time when the United States was entangled in a war with Iran that has entangled it with no clear end.

There appears to be a major question about the projection of a war between the US and Israel against Iran that remains a puzzle. From the perspective of futures studies, the most important question that is rarely raised in the national media is no longer whether Trump can press China to help America, but rather which scenario is most likely to project the future of the Iran war after that meeting.

At present, war, energy crisis, financial turmoil, and political polarization come in tandem in what some foresight scholars describe as metaruptions, i.e., layered systemic disruptions that are no longer adequately read with the old vocabulary of disruption.

Within this framework, the Iran war and the behaviour of its actors, including visits by Putin and Trump to China, is not merely a matter of military or political conflict, but a knot that brings together superpower rivalry, energy security, and political resilience, even the contest for a global order.

Putin’s visit to Beijing after Trump delivered a strong message to Iran also represents a calculation of how the war scenario between Iran and the United States together with Israel is formed, and which of its probabilities is most likely in the arena.

FOUR SCENARIOS

There are at least four major scenarios arising from two main uncertainties: how far China, and Moscow, are willing to sustain Iran amid American pressure, and how far Washington is prepared to escalate to force Tehran to change its behaviour. From these two axes, at least four broad paths may unfold in the post-Putin-and-Trump-in-Beijing situation.

TACTICAL DE-ESCALATION VIA BEIJING

Scenario one, China decides that the costs of a protracted conflict have become too expensive for energy stability and its economic interests, so Beijing moves more actively as a mediator. This scenario was once played out by Xi Jinping in mediating Iran and Saudi Arabia. Trump could return home with a diplomatic claim that Washington has succeeded in pushing Xi to press Iran to reduce tensions in the Hormuz Strait and to open up space for dialogue.

For Iran, this scenario carries pressure as well as opportunity. Tehran is still asked to reduce escalation, limit proxy manoeuvres, and show signals of compromise. However, as compensation it still gains an economic breathing space through Chinese oil purchases and certain political protections. In Tehran’s logic, this scenario could be a credible exit: Iran could claim to endure Western pressure while buying time to consolidate internally.

Nevertheless, this scenario only yields a pause, not a solution. The root causes of the conflict such as Iran’s nuclear programme, Israel’s concerns, and regional power competition remain unresolved. Tactical de-escalation will reduce intensity temporarily, but not change the underlying structure of hostility that sustains the conflict.

MULTI-LAYERED PRESSURE, CHINA HALF-HEARTED SUPPORT

Scenario two as the baseline, because it best fits the limitations of all parties. It seems this has the highest probability. The United States needs a hard image against Iran, but has little incentive to become trapped in a long war that is politically and militarily costly. China continues to need Iran as an energy and geopolitical partner, but does not wish to challenge Washington so directly as to undermine its broader trade and financial interests.

In this scenario, the US continues a maximised version of pressure: sanctions, restrictions on financial access, diplomatic pressure, and threats of limited military action continue, but without steps towards invasion or large-scale open war. The aim is not final victory, but to keep Iran in a state of pressure so its power projection remains constrained.

At the same time, China plays the role of a half-hearted backer. Beijing continues to buy Iranian oil and maintain economic ties, but tends to operate through indirect networks, intermediary companies, and more cautious schemes to avoid direct clashes with American sanctions. The message sent is dual: Iran is not abandoned, but also not defended without limits.

This appears to be Iran’s dilemma scenario. Iran’s economy does not collapse completely, but is forced to live in a state of