TNI reforms: Between expectation and reality

TNI reforms: Between expectation and reality

----------------------------------------------------------------- There has been intense discourse on the importance of reforming the Indonesian Military (TNI) for the sake of democratization in Indonesia. Yet, the nation has been in disagreement whether the TNI has done enough to reform itself. The Jakarta Post's Imanuddin Razak was among the 16-member Indonesian delegation to a three-week workshop on Good Governance and the Position & Role of the Armed Forces in a Democracy co-organized by the Institute for the Defense and Strategic Studies on Indonesia (Lesperssi) and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, the Clingendael, in The Hague, from Feb. 18 to March 10, 2003. -----------------------------------------------------------------

Imanuddin Razak, The Jakarta Post, The Hague

Unbeknownst to most Indonesians, internal deliberations and discussions on reforming the Indonesian Military (TNI) actually began immediately after Soeharto stepped down from the presidency in May 1998.

While the TNI's initial move to reform itself was to let the National Police become an independent institution separated from the TNI in April 1999, the TNI's apparent commitment for reforms was shown at the closing of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Annual Session on Aug. 11, 2002 when the Assembly, which also comprised TNI and police legislators as well as those of the political parties, issued a historic recommendation for the military and the police to give up their appointed seats in both the House of Representatives (DPR) and the MPR.

According to this decision, military and police personnel, who had over the past three decades enjoyed "free" seats in the legislature without having to contest in the general elections, will now have the full right to vote and will be required to leave the service if they wish to enter politics.

Despite this apparent willingness to quit politics, the TNI, however, has not yet been able to professionally perform its tasks as stipulated in Law No. 3/2002 on Defense as its personnel are still actively involved in a wide variety of side businesses, including the management of firms under its cooperatives and providing security protection for individuals and companies, instead of focusing on its defense role.

The recent success story of four Air Force's F-16 jet fighter pilots in engaging with and intercepting five U.S. F-18 jet fighters flying over the Bawean island in the Java Sea on July 3, 2003 could perhaps be an evident example of how the military's professionalism should be established and maintained. Despite the limited or even unavailability of spare parts for the F-16s due to the military embargo imposed by the United States, the Force's young pilots were still able to perform well.

The TNI is also criticized for maintaining its territorial role over suspicion that maintaining the territorial commands (active bases and outposts with armed soldiers in every province, regency, village and hamlet in the entire country) would undoubtedly retain or even expand the military's involvement in its businesses.

Col. Bambang Suparmono, a participant from the Indonesian defense ministry to the workshop defended the territorial command structure, by saying it was necessary because the country did not have strong, up-to-date arms and military equipment to deal with external threats.

"We cannot deal with them (external threats) with our existing arms and equipment ... We, therefore, rely on the territorial concept to protect our country," he explained.

It has become an open secret that the regional military command posts (Kodam) are like little fiefdoms in each region, which generate their own income through its unaccounted for businesses, in addition to their normal salary from the central government. Some generals and commanders have argued that troops require side jobs as their salary was not sufficient to cover all their needs.

Still the TNI must be able to prove that the presence of military command posts in every village is really focused on helping the police in maintaining security and order in their respective regions as regulated in the Law No. 2/2002 on the Police and the Law No. 3/2002 itself and establishing a people- based alert system against any external threats -- or terrorism threat -- as the territorial commands are said to be for.

The presence of the military commands should not be used to curb the people's political freedom as was the case during the New Order era under President Soeharto nor to establish legal or illegal businesses that will generate unaccounted non-budgetary income.

There have been proposed measures on efforts to provide guidelines, monitor and make the troops concentrate on their tasks as a defense force only.

One basic element is to have professional and dedicated troops from the time of their recruitment at the military academy. It is a common practice in the recruitment for Indonesian military cadets here that certain seats in the academy are reserved for those with the backing of the military's top brass or top government officials.

A practical example of tight recruitment and evaluation system at the Dutch Military Academy in Breda, where at least two of Indonesia's top generals studied, including Gen. (ret) Abdul Harris Nasution and Gen. (ret) Rudini, could be adopted in our military education system here.

"We do not tolerate incapable cadets here. If they do not perform well in their first year here, they will be dismissed. There is no such thing as a second chance for them to stay here if they fail," Maj. Gen. C.J.G. Hilderink, Commander of the Dutch Military Academy at Breda, said.

"We evaluate our cadets' performance on a weekly basis. And this is my personal decision whether a cadet passes or not," he added.

Another possible entry that may help Indonesian military troops concentrate on their professionalism is the idea that they should be well-paid, otherwise "external temptations" will lead to the side jobs, which they are not supposed do -- to augment their salaries.

"If our Air Force pilots are not paid well, they will certainly move to KLM," KTZ Gert de Nooij, Director for Department of International Cooperation and Arms Control Treaties at the Dutch Ministry of Defense, told the visiting Indonesian delegation while referring to the Dutch flag carrier.

The final thing to do is to control the military budget in accordance with the real conditions and demands.

Dr. R.A.W. Thuis, Director of Finance and Control of the Dutch Ministry of Defense, said any budget proposal from the defense ministry will have gone through a tight deliberation process, involving internal deliberation at the defense ministry itself and the cabinet before it goes to the parliament.

He said that after serious deliberations this year, the government decided to reduce the defense budget.

"We (Ministry of Defense) have done a sloppy job. We had a budget surplus and now need to cut our defense budget by 750 million euros... That means we'll have to dismiss 12,000 of our troops," he said.

The above examples and values introduced by the Dutch defense ministry and parliament are applicable for implementation in Indonesia in order to reform the Indonesian security sector, in this case the military.

Perhaps, it is interesting to pay attention to a suggestion by Richard P. van Eijsden, Deputy Director of Training of the Clingendael, who points out that Indonesians themselves are the ones who need to decide on the military reforms. "There are many examples of (military) reforms, but Indonesians will remain the ones eligible to adopt them into your own system or to set up your own system."