TNI reforms: Between expectation and reality<\/p>\n
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\nThere has been intense discourse on the importance of reforming
\nthe Indonesian Military (TNI) for the sake of democratization in
\nIndonesia. Yet, the nation has been in disagreement whether the
\nTNI has done enough to reform itself. The Jakarta Post's
\nImanuddin Razak was among the 16-member Indonesian delegation to
\na three-week workshop on Good Governance and the Position & Role
\nof the Armed Forces in a Democracy co-organized by the Institute
\nfor the Defense and Strategic Studies on Indonesia (Lesperssi)
\nand the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, the
\nClingendael, in The Hague, from Feb. 18 to March 10, 2003.
\n-----------------------------------------------------------------<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak, The Jakarta Post, The Hague<\/p>\n
Unbeknownst to most Indonesians, internal deliberations and
\ndiscussions on reforming the Indonesian Military (TNI) actually
\nbegan immediately after Soeharto stepped down from the presidency
\nin May 1998.<\/p>\n
While the TNI's initial move to reform itself was to let the
\nNational Police become an independent institution separated from
\nthe TNI in April 1999, the TNI's apparent commitment for reforms
\nwas shown at the closing of the People's Consultative Assembly
\n(MPR) Annual Session on Aug. 11, 2002 when the Assembly, which
\nalso comprised TNI and police legislators as well as those of the
\npolitical parties, issued a historic recommendation for the
\nmilitary and the police to give up their appointed seats in both
\nthe House of Representatives (DPR) and the MPR.<\/p>\n
According to this decision, military and police personnel, who
\nhad over the past three decades enjoyed \"free\" seats in the
\nlegislature without having to contest in the general elections,
\nwill now have the full right to vote and will be required to
\nleave the service if they wish to enter politics.<\/p>\n
Despite this apparent willingness to quit politics, the TNI,
\nhowever, has not yet been able to professionally perform its
\ntasks as stipulated in Law No. 3\/2002 on Defense as its personnel
\nare still actively involved in a wide variety of side businesses,
\nincluding the management of firms under its cooperatives and
\nproviding security protection for individuals and companies,
\ninstead of focusing on its defense role.<\/p>\n
The recent success story of four Air Force's F-16 jet fighter
\npilots in engaging with and intercepting five U.S. F-18 jet
\nfighters flying over the Bawean island in the Java Sea on July 3,
\n2003 could perhaps be an evident example of how the military's
\nprofessionalism should be established and maintained. Despite the
\nlimited or even unavailability of spare parts for the F-16s due
\nto the military embargo imposed by the United States, the Force's
\nyoung pilots were still able to perform well.<\/p>\n
The TNI is also criticized for maintaining its territorial
\nrole over suspicion that maintaining the territorial commands
\n(active bases and outposts with armed soldiers in every province,
\nregency, village and hamlet in the entire country) would
\nundoubtedly retain or even expand the military's involvement in
\nits businesses.<\/p>\n
Col. Bambang Suparmono, a participant from the Indonesian
\ndefense ministry to the workshop defended the territorial command
\nstructure, by saying it was necessary because the country did not
\nhave strong, up-to-date arms and military equipment to deal with
\nexternal threats.<\/p>\n
\"We cannot deal with them (external threats) with our existing
\narms and equipment ... We, therefore, rely on the territorial
\nconcept to protect our country,\" he explained.<\/p>\n
It has become an open secret that the regional military
\ncommand posts (Kodam) are like little fiefdoms in each region,
\nwhich generate their own income through its unaccounted for
\nbusinesses, in addition to their normal salary from the central
\ngovernment. Some generals and commanders have argued that troops
\nrequire side jobs as their salary was not sufficient to cover all
\ntheir needs.<\/p>\n
Still the TNI must be able to prove that the presence of
\nmilitary command posts in every village is really focused on
\nhelping the police in maintaining security and order in their
\nrespective regions as regulated in the Law No. 2\/2002 on the
\nPolice and the Law No. 3\/2002 itself and establishing a people-
\nbased alert system against any external threats -- or terrorism
\nthreat -- as the territorial commands are said to be for.<\/p>\n
The presence of the military commands should not be used to
\ncurb the people's political freedom as was the case during the
\nNew Order era under President Soeharto nor to establish legal or
\nillegal businesses that will generate unaccounted non-budgetary
\nincome.<\/p>\n
There have been proposed measures on efforts to provide
\nguidelines, monitor and make the troops concentrate on their
\ntasks as a defense force only.<\/p>\n
One basic element is to have professional and dedicated troops
\nfrom the time of their recruitment at the military academy. It is
\na common practice in the recruitment for Indonesian military
\ncadets here that certain seats in the academy are reserved for
\nthose with the backing of the military's top brass or top
\ngovernment officials.<\/p>\n
A practical example of tight recruitment and evaluation system
\nat the Dutch Military Academy in Breda, where at least two of
\nIndonesia's top generals studied, including Gen. (ret) Abdul
\nHarris Nasution and Gen. (ret) Rudini, could be adopted in our
\nmilitary education system here.<\/p>\n
\"We do not tolerate incapable cadets here. If they do not
\nperform well in their first year here, they will be dismissed.
\nThere is no such thing as a second chance for them to stay here
\nif they fail,\" Maj. Gen. C.J.G. Hilderink, Commander of the Dutch
\nMilitary Academy at Breda, said.<\/p>\n
\"We evaluate our cadets' performance on a weekly basis. And
\nthis is my personal decision whether a cadet passes or not,\" he
\nadded.<\/p>\n
Another possible entry that may help Indonesian military
\ntroops concentrate on their professionalism is the idea that they
\nshould be well-paid, otherwise \"external temptations\" will lead
\nto the side jobs, which they are not supposed do -- to augment
\ntheir salaries.<\/p>\n
\"If our Air Force pilots are not paid well, they will
\ncertainly move to KLM,\" KTZ Gert de Nooij, Director for
\nDepartment of International Cooperation and Arms Control Treaties
\nat the Dutch Ministry of Defense, told the visiting Indonesian
\ndelegation while referring to the Dutch flag carrier.<\/p>\n
The final thing to do is to control the military budget in
\naccordance with the real conditions and demands.<\/p>\n
Dr. R.A.W. Thuis, Director of Finance and Control of the Dutch
\nMinistry of Defense, said any budget proposal from the defense
\nministry will have gone through a tight deliberation process,
\ninvolving internal deliberation at the defense ministry itself
\nand the cabinet before it goes to the parliament.<\/p>\n
He said that after serious deliberations this year, the
\ngovernment decided to reduce the defense budget.<\/p>\n
\"We (Ministry of Defense) have done a sloppy job. We had a
\nbudget surplus and now need to cut our defense budget by 750
\nmillion euros... That means we'll have to dismiss 12,000 of our
\ntroops,\" he said.<\/p>\n
The above examples and values introduced by the Dutch defense
\nministry and parliament are applicable for implementation in
\nIndonesia in order to reform the Indonesian security sector, in
\nthis case the military.<\/p>\n
Perhaps, it is interesting to pay attention to a suggestion by
\nRichard P. van Eijsden, Deputy Director of Training of the
\nClingendael, who points out that Indonesians themselves are the
\nones who need to decide on the military reforms. \"There are many
\nexamples of (military) reforms, but Indonesians will remain the
\nones eligible to adopt them into your own system or to set up
\nyour own system.\"<\/p>",
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