The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go

Wed, 30 Mar 2005, 00:00 WIB

The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go
something like this. Whatever a government, despotic or
JP/6/E00
business. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core
principal the "non-interference in the internal affairs" of
another member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy
deal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in
mainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially
keen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of
summary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented
threat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over
political repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape
regional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar
from ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic
sanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.

When Myanmar gained ASEAN membership in 1997 the military
regime in Rangoon won the benefits of regional cooperation, but
accepted no constraints on repression at home. The political map
of Southeast Asia, however, has been shifting since the 1980s as
more affluent populations have demanded accountable and
democratic governments. The recent election of the reformist
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in Indonesia and Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi as prime minister in Malaysia has tipped the balance
inside ASEAN. Malaysia, due to assume the rotating chairmanship
later this year, is maneuvering to have Myanmar, next in line for
2006, passed over for the ASEAN chairmanship. Malaysia's
Parliament will also demand the release of Myanmar's pro-
democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

Whether ASEAN will manage to speak as one on Myanmar is not
yet clear. Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines have
expressed their dismay over Myanmar's intransigence. But
Thailand, now a mainly stable democracy, is wary of stoking
opposition inside Myanmar which may spill, as it has before,
across its borders. Many powerful Thais also have lucrative
business interests linked to Myanmar's junta. China, too, is an
important player. Beijing is keen to reap the benefits of access
to Myanmar's rich natural resources. The increasing integration
of ASEAN economies with China's booming markets means Beijing may
be able to pressure Malaysia to back off. ASEAN, however, also
realizes its continuing tolerance of Myanmar could damage ties to
the European Union and the United States, both of which promise a
comprehensive boycott if Myanmar manages to assume the ASEAN
chairmanship. Australia, with its recently enhanced links to
ASEAN, should amplify this message.
Unseating Myanmar's junta

The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go
something like this. Whatever a government, despotic or
otherwise, chooses to do within the privacy of its borders is its
business. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core
principal the "non-interference in the internal affairs" of
another member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy
deal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in
mainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially
keen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of
summary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented
threat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over
political repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape
regional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar
from ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic
sanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.

The rise of China and Asian stability

China is no longer shy at counting itself among the world's great
powers. Yet, for all China's market magnetism, a claim to
regional leadership in East Asia will long remain premature.
China's impressive economic growth hides a multitude of problems,
including increasingly resented disparities between rich and
poor, rampant corruption and capricious party rule. Should the
economy falter for any reason, China's political stability is far
from assured. And as the region's biggest antidemocratic hold-out
by far, come a crunch, China's policies are not going to be
driven by a concern for the greater good, whether of the Chinese
people or the region as a whole, but by what is good for
maintaining party control. That makes it harder to bet with
confidence on a stable future for East Asia. An authoritarian
China will always be less easy for the neighbors to get along
with. Even those in awe of the China market are far less enamored
of China's growing military muscle. Predictions of China's
regional primacy are likely to be overdone: they will be
contested energetically both by Japan, China's natural local
rival and by the United States, which, while not an East Asian
power by geography, is very much an Asia-Pacific power and one
with no intention of pulling either its troops or its influence
back across the water.
-- The Economist, London

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