The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go

Wed, 30 Mar 2005

The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go something like this. Whatever a government, despotic or JP/6/E00 business. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core principal the "non-interference in the internal affairs" of another member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy deal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in mainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially keen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of summary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented threat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over political repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape regional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar from ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic sanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.

When Myanmar gained ASEAN membership in 1997 the military regime in Rangoon won the benefits of regional cooperation, but accepted no constraints on repression at home. The political map of Southeast Asia, however, has been shifting since the 1980s as more affluent populations have demanded accountable and democratic governments. The recent election of the reformist Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in Indonesia and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as prime minister in Malaysia has tipped the balance inside ASEAN. Malaysia, due to assume the rotating chairmanship later this year, is maneuvering to have Myanmar, next in line for 2006, passed over for the ASEAN chairmanship. Malaysia's Parliament will also demand the release of Myanmar's pro- democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

Whether ASEAN will manage to speak as one on Myanmar is not yet clear. Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines have expressed their dismay over Myanmar's intransigence. But Thailand, now a mainly stable democracy, is wary of stoking opposition inside Myanmar which may spill, as it has before, across its borders. Many powerful Thais also have lucrative business interests linked to Myanmar's junta. China, too, is an important player. Beijing is keen to reap the benefits of access to Myanmar's rich natural resources. The increasing integration of ASEAN economies with China's booming markets means Beijing may be able to pressure Malaysia to back off. ASEAN, however, also realizes its continuing tolerance of Myanmar could damage ties to the European Union and the United States, both of which promise a comprehensive boycott if Myanmar manages to assume the ASEAN chairmanship. Australia, with its recently enhanced links to ASEAN, should amplify this message. Unseating Myanmar's junta

The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go something like this. Whatever a government, despotic or otherwise, chooses to do within the privacy of its borders is its business. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core principal the "non-interference in the internal affairs" of another member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy deal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in mainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially keen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of summary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented threat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over political repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape regional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar from ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic sanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.

The rise of China and Asian stability

China is no longer shy at counting itself among the world's great powers. Yet, for all China's market magnetism, a claim to regional leadership in East Asia will long remain premature. China's impressive economic growth hides a multitude of problems, including increasingly resented disparities between rich and poor, rampant corruption and capricious party rule. Should the economy falter for any reason, China's political stability is far from assured. And as the region's biggest antidemocratic hold-out by far, come a crunch, China's policies are not going to be driven by a concern for the greater good, whether of the Chinese people or the region as a whole, but by what is good for maintaining party control. That makes it harder to bet with confidence on a stable future for East Asia. An authoritarian China will always be less easy for the neighbors to get along with. Even those in awe of the China market are far less enamored of China's growing military muscle. Predictions of China's regional primacy are likely to be overdone: they will be contested energetically both by Japan, China's natural local rival and by the United States, which, while not an East Asian power by geography, is very much an Asia-Pacific power and one with no intention of pulling either its troops or its influence back across the water. -- The Economist, London

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