The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go
\nsomething like this. Whatever a government, despotic or
\nJP\/6\/E00
\nbusiness. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core
\nprincipal the \"non-interference in the internal affairs\" of
\nanother member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy
\ndeal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in
\nmainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially
\nkeen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of
\nsummary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented
\nthreat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over
\npolitical repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape
\nregional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar
\nfrom ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic
\nsanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.<\/p>\n
When Myanmar gained ASEAN membership in 1997 the military
\nregime in Rangoon won the benefits of regional cooperation, but
\naccepted no constraints on repression at home. The political map
\nof Southeast Asia, however, has been shifting since the 1980s as
\nmore affluent populations have demanded accountable and
\ndemocratic governments. The recent election of the reformist
\nSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in Indonesia and Abdullah
\nAhmad Badawi as prime minister in Malaysia has tipped the balance
\ninside ASEAN. Malaysia, due to assume the rotating chairmanship
\nlater this year, is maneuvering to have Myanmar, next in line for
\n2006, passed over for the ASEAN chairmanship. Malaysia's
\nParliament will also demand the release of Myanmar's pro-
\ndemocracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.<\/p>\n
Whether ASEAN will manage to speak as one on Myanmar is not
\nyet clear. Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines have
\nexpressed their dismay over Myanmar's intransigence. But
\nThailand, now a mainly stable democracy, is wary of stoking
\nopposition inside Myanmar which may spill, as it has before,
\nacross its borders. Many powerful Thais also have lucrative
\nbusiness interests linked to Myanmar's junta. China, too, is an
\nimportant player. Beijing is keen to reap the benefits of access
\nto Myanmar's rich natural resources. The increasing integration
\nof ASEAN economies with China's booming markets means Beijing may
\nbe able to pressure Malaysia to back off. ASEAN, however, also
\nrealizes its continuing tolerance of Myanmar could damage ties to
\nthe European Union and the United States, both of which promise a
\ncomprehensive boycott if Myanmar manages to assume the ASEAN
\nchairmanship. Australia, with its recently enhanced links to
\nASEAN, should amplify this message.
\nUnseating Myanmar's junta<\/p>\n
The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go
\nsomething like this. Whatever a government, despotic or
\notherwise, chooses to do within the privacy of its borders is its
\nbusiness. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core
\nprincipal the \"non-interference in the internal affairs\" of
\nanother member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy
\ndeal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in
\nmainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially
\nkeen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of
\nsummary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented
\nthreat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over
\npolitical repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape
\nregional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar
\nfrom ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic
\nsanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.<\/p>\n
When Myanmar gained ASEAN membership in 1997 the military
\nregime in Rangoon won the benefits of regional cooperation, but
\naccepted no constraints on repression at home. The political map
\nof Southeast Asia, however, has been shifting since the 1980s as
\nmore affluent populations have demanded accountable and
\ndemocratic governments. The recent election of the reformist
\nSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in Indonesia and Abdullah
\nAhmad Badawi as prime minister in Malaysia has tipped the balance
\ninside ASEAN. Malaysia, due to assume the rotating chairmanship
\nlater this year, is maneuvering to have Myanmar, next in line for
\n2006, passed over for the ASEAN chairmanship. Malaysia's
\nParliament will also demand the release of Myanmar's pro-
\ndemocracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.<\/p>\n
Whether ASEAN will manage to speak as one on Myanmar is not
\nyet clear. Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines have
\nexpressed their dismay over Myanmar's intransigence. But
\nThailand, now a mainly stable democracy, is wary of stoking
\nopposition inside Myanmar which may spill, as it has before,
\nacross its borders. Many powerful Thais also have lucrative
\nbusiness interests linked to Myanmar's junta. China, too, is an
\nimportant player. Beijing is keen to reap the benefits of access
\nto Myanmar's rich natural resources. The increasing integration
\nof ASEAN economies with China's booming markets means Beijing may
\nbe able to pressure Malaysia to back off. ASEAN, however, also
\nrealizes its continuing tolerance of Myanmar could damage ties to
\nthe European Union and the United States, both of which promise a
\ncomprehensive boycott if Myanmar manages to assume the ASEAN
\nchairmanship. Australia, with its recently enhanced links to
\nASEAN, should amplify this message.
\n;;
\nANPAk..r..
\nOtherOp-China-Asian
\nThe rise of China and Asian stability
\nJP\/06\/Other<\/p>\n
The rise of China and Asian stability<\/p>\n
China is no longer shy at counting itself among the world's great
\npowers. Yet, for all China's market magnetism, a claim to
\nregional leadership in East Asia will long remain premature.
\nChina's impressive economic growth hides a multitude of problems,
\nincluding increasingly resented disparities between rich and
\npoor, rampant corruption and capricious party rule. Should the
\neconomy falter for any reason, China's political stability is far
\nfrom assured. And as the region's biggest antidemocratic hold-out
\nby far, come a crunch, China's policies are not going to be
\ndriven by a concern for the greater good, whether of the Chinese
\npeople or the region as a whole, but by what is good for
\nmaintaining party control. That makes it harder to bet with
\nconfidence on a stable future for East Asia. An authoritarian
\nChina will always be less easy for the neighbors to get along
\nwith. Even those in awe of the China market are far less enamored
\nof China's growing military muscle. Predictions of China's
\nregional primacy are likely to be overdone: they will be
\ncontested energetically both by Japan, China's natural local
\nrival and by the United States, which, while not an East Asian
\npower by geography, is very much an Asia-Pacific power and one
\nwith no intention of pulling either its troops or its influence
\nback across the water.
\n-- The Economist, London<\/p>",
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