'The road to substantive democracy will remain rocky and full

'The road to substantive democracy will remain rocky and full
of glitches until Indonesia quadruples its GDP per capita and the
size of its middle class.'

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Military-Indonesia
Military reform and defense planning
JP/6/JUW

Part 1 of 2

Military reform and defense planning

Juwono Sudarsono
London

Six years after "the cessation of office" by President
Soeharto on May 21, 1998, the Indonesian Military (TNI) remains
the most powerful instrument of governance that has the ability
to keep the country together. Despite the plethora of political
reforms launched by presidents B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid
and Megawati Soekarnoputri all committed to building an
accountable military, subject to a democratic "civilian control",
the residual de facto power of the TNI in politics remains strong
for at least the medium term.

Six years of civilian-based party politics has not resulted in
any measurable degree of effective "civilian supremacy", much
less "civilian control". On paper, there has been much
declaratory formalisms of politically correct rhetoric on
civilian supremacy: A "return to the barracks" commitment to
political neutralism, reduction of the military's role in the
national parliament and a myriad of laws passed acknowledging the
imperative for civilian authority.

But seasoned politicians and political observers acknowledge
that TNI influence, if not power, retains a strong hold over the
entire polity. The after effects of dwi-fungsi (dual function) of
the military, going back to July 5, 1959, when President Sukarno
decreed a return to the 1945 Constitution formalizing the TNI as
an integral participant of national politics, lingers pervasively
on.

There are several reasons why effective civilian control, as
distinct from the formalities of civilian authority, remains both
vague and weak.

First and foremost, organized civilian politics at
governmental, legislative and the grass roots levels is still
largely disjointed, disorganized and often in disarray. Having
been instilled with a strong dose of the doctrine of military
supremacy over the civilians for over half of their lifetime, the
TNI officer corps remain reluctant to respect and adhere to
civilian control of the military so long as the civilian
politicians have little inclination or ability to control and
consolidate their party organizations.

Secondly, presidents Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati
all kept hold of the Soeharto-period format of maintaining the
presence of the Commander of the TNI and the Chief of the
National Police (Polri) in cabinet sessions, acknowledging them
on a parallel with, rather than answerable to, the defense
minister and the interior minister. Even the legislative reforms
following on the "New Paradigm" on the roles of the military and
police sanctify this hybrid arrangement. Significantly, all chief
ministers of security during the post Soeharto cabinets (Wiranto
and Soerjadi Sudirdja under Habibie and Wahid; Ssusilo Bambang
Yudhoyono and Agum Gumelar under Wahid; Yudhoyono and Hari
Sabarno under Megawati) has been held by officials with military
backgrounds.

The all-important interior minister, that ultimate symbol of
civilian power, has to date been always held by a retired general
(Syarwan Hamid under Habibie, Soerjadi Sudirdja under Wahid, Hari
Sabarno under Megawati). All come from the Army, the most
politically powerful service. At the provincial, district and
local levels, a high percentage of the district and local levels
are held by retired military officers. All in all, civilian
authority and management skills remain weak.

Third and not least important, the TNI retains a powerful
independent financial base, partly funded through the government
budget through the ministry of finance and the ministry of
defense but independently supplemented by a myriad of
foundations, cooperatives and enterprises. The history of these
off-budget sources of funding reaches back to the early 1950s
when most commands and tactical units in each service were left
to themselves to find ways and means to supplement the
government's inadequate defense and security budgets.

The proportion of government- to non-government-funded
military budgets over the years is a matter of contention among
analysts, with estimates differing about the percentage (30:70;
40:60) depending on the benchmarking of calculations.

Against this background, the following is a proposed agenda
for a national commitment for military reform and defense
planning:

o Strengthening political party and civilian institutions:

A major priority for effective military reform requires a
stronger institutional capacity of political parties and civic
institutions who understand the urgency to build an accountable,
transparent and professional defense force. A major concerted
effort is required to build strong civilian political
institutions that can effectively challenge and eventually
supplant the TNI's long dominant role over the sinews of
political power at all levels of political governance.

Indonesia has a long way to go before the required social and
economic institutional underpinnings that facilitate the
strengthening of political parties and civic organizations.

The "magic figure" ascribing readiness for political
democracy is that at least 30 percent of the population are
members of the middle class, defined as earning at least US$3-
4,000 per capita annual income. Since the economic crisis of
1997-1998, Indonesia's per capita annual income has fallen from
$1,300 to $850, leading to a sharp downturn in social stability
and to increased political unrest and violence during the
difficult years of 1998-2001.

Though economic recovery since 2001 has helped restored
political stability and social reconciliation there remains much
anger and frustration among those who are despondent and
desperate as a result of job losses. The road to substantive
democracy will remain rocky and full of glitches until Indonesia
quadruples both its GDP per capita and the size of its middle
class.

Political party and civic leaders must understand that
strengthening political and civic institutions are imperative if
the general problem of democratic governance, especially in times
of widespread poverty and unemployment, is to be seriously
addressed.

In the past, acceptance of military dominance in the
commanding heights of government had been justified by civilian
incompetence, intra-party bickering and policy paralysis. Until
there is clear, coherent and consistent civilian political
leadership and party building, the TNI's effective power will
remain unchallenged. Until there are strong civilian
institutions, military reform will be largely decided by the
military.

The writer is an Ambassador to the United Kingdom and former
minister of defense. This article is personal view