The 'price of peace talks for troubled Aceh

The 'price of peace talks for troubled Aceh

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat and Tiarma Siboro, Jakarta

The wheels of diplomacy and bureaucracy are notoriously slow.
Apparently not so in the case of this weekend's peace talks
between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the government, in
Helsinki.

After talks broke down in 2003, the military, yet again,
launched an extensive operation to wipe out GAM forces. Prior to
the tsunamis, no resolution, ostensible or otherwise, was in
sight. Less than a month later, the two sides were suddenly
rushing to the Finnish capital for negotiations.

The scale of the devastation was clearly the catalyst of the
new talks, but the expedience with which the two sides agreed to
confer suggests more than that.

While the coming meeting is being facilitated by the Finland-
based Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), it is strongly believed
that Jakarta had privately contacted various GAM representatives,
even before the tsunami. The disaster of Dec. 26, in effect,
merely accelerated the process.

Various sources consistently point to the role of Vice
President Jusuf Kalla. In fact, even before Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono had been confirmed President, Kalla had privately
divulged that he had been tasked by his running-mate to pursue
peace talks on Aceh.

Kalla has certainly built a reputation as the "peacemaker"
through his relative success in Poso and Maluku; and, even as
coordinating minister, he had attempted to engage GAM officials
at home and abroad.

For the latest initiative, Kalla employed his close circle of
fellow Makassar aides along with Aceh-born officers to make
initial contact some two months ago.

Through a series of "middlemen", it is believed that
preliminary meetings were held with GAM allies and kin in
Malaysia who, it was hoped, could convince hard-line elements in
Aceh -- led by GAM Commander Muzakkir Manaf -- to at least
consider the proposals put forward.

It is not inconceivable, as some have suggested, that cash was
channeled to secure the meeting with either GAM allies in
Malaysia or the GAM commander.

Curiously, the meeting did not immediately take place. Sources
suggest two alternative accounts: the money was disbursed to
"brokers" but the intended meeting was never set up; or that GAM
representatives in Malaysia refused to meet with Kalla's people.

A meeting eventually did take place, however, about a week
before the tsunami struck, and after President Susilo dispatched
two respected Acehnese clerics.

It was during this meeting -- believed to be in Kuala Lumpur
-- that the latest proposals were relayed by the clerics.

Apart from the unimpressive pledge of ensuring the welfare of
the province, rebel leaders were offered amnesty and a safe
passage to foreign exile. In return, a one-time "compensation"
package, in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars -- if we
are to believe the accounts of some -- would be paid out.

In short, this was an attempt to buy off the rebels.

For the architects of this plan, the current GAM force could
be divided into three: the ideologists, the regular leaders and
the criminals.

The first and third were the minority. The first could not be
changed, no matter what, while the third group just needed to be
rounded up and jailed. Without the second group, it was
concluded, the rebellion would dwindle.

Where would that astronomical amount of money come from?

It is not difficult to imagine foreign donors with long term
natural-resource interests in Aceh pitching in to "buy" peace in
the province.

Whether such an offer is morally acceptable is debatable, but
if it is truly the only one on the table than negotiators in the
next three days will certainly reach an impasse.

It would become particularly complicated if GAM
representatives arrived in Helsinki with the perspective that the
talks were merely preliminary, with the simple intent of
confirming a cease-fire.

It is clear that Jakarta does not want to be dragged into
lengthy negotiations, which would only serve to raise GAM's
profile as a political entity.

For a military man like Susilo, it is also inconceivable to
accept anything less than a reaffirmation of Aceh as part of the
unitary state.

Hence, despite the high hopes, neither side seems to be
entering the talks with compromise in mind. Otherwise the
question could be as simple as "what price, then, is peace?".