The Precision of Law Enforcers in Closing Loopholes for Corruption Diversification
Jakarta (ANTARA) - The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia is facing a significant challenge following a series of sting operations (OTT) conducted by the Corruption Eradication Commission.
In January 2026, the public was shocked by the revelation of alleged bribery related to tax examinations at the North Jakarta Medium Tax Office (KPP Madya Jakarta Utara). The shock had not subsided when, in early February 2026, a similar case emerged through an OTT at the Banjarmasin Medium Tax Office, uncovering deviant practices in the tax restitution process—a right that taxpayers should be protected, yet was traded in deviant transactional relations.
This series of events should not be read as isolated incidents but as a mirror reflecting more fundamental issues in national fiscal governance. It serves as a warning signal demanding deeper reflection: whether the problems stem from the design of the system and bureaucratic practices that do not fully ensure accountability, regulatory gaps and weak oversight that open room for deviations, or the behavioural dimension of actors who abuse public authority for personal gain.
When discussing the “clean-up” agenda in the Ministry of Finance, almost all policy instruments have in fact been implemented. From the perspective of bureaucratic reform, the Ministry of Finance is among the most progressive: improvements in governance, strengthening of internal oversight systems, and remuneration policies through significant increases in performance allowances (Tukin).
Quantitatively, the number of Anti-Corruption Educators (PAKSI) in the Ministry of Finance is the largest compared to other ministries, institutions, or regional governments. This means that, in terms of anti-corruption education, the Ministry of Finance should be considered a mature institution.
It is at this point that a policy paradox emerges. When an institution that has gained legitimacy as a “Ministry with High Tukin” with relatively high welfare levels for its apparatus and more complete control infrastructure is still confronted with corruption cases, the normative assumption that raising civil servants’ salaries will linearly reduce corruption risk deserves re-evaluation.
In other words, corruption issues cannot be reduced solely to welfare problems but also touch on dimensions of incentives, integrity, organisational culture, and the effectiveness of sanction enforcement. This reflection is important so that remuneration policies are not seen as the sole solution but as part of a more comprehensive and accountability-oriented governance ecosystem.
Corruption Modus Operandi
In the context of corruption crime modus operandi, the current law enforcement challenges are increasingly complex. Corruption practices are no longer conventional, relying solely on cash transactions, but have diversified through the exploitation of various forms of assets. These assets include, among others, land certificates, gold bars, foreign currency, crypto assets, and other digital instruments and assets. This development demands a more adaptive law enforcement approach, particularly in aspects of proof, asset tracking, and state loss recovery.
A concrete example is when the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) designated former Director General of Taxation official at the Ministry of Finance, Rafael Alun, as a suspect in money laundering offences, who disguised corruption assets through the use of cryptocurrency.
The latest case that has sparked public outrage is the OTT conducted by the KPK against several parties allegedly involved in corruption offences related to goods imports within the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DJBC). The KPK revealed that these corruption practices were not incidental but carried out on a massive and organised scale.
From the results of the OTT, the KPK found a bribery modus to allow illegal imported goods to pass. Furthermore, the KPK also uncovered the existence of an apartment used as a safe house to store the proceeds of crime. The secured evidence shows a complex pattern of asset diversification, from cash in rupiah, US dollars, Japanese yen, luxury watches worth hundreds of millions of rupiah, to gold bars weighing 5.3 kilograms.
If analysed more deeply, the pattern of corruption asset diversification through the use of foreign currency, gold bars, and safe houses indicates that this criminal act has been designed systematically and meticulously. These characteristics strengthen the suspicion that this corruption practice qualifies as grand corruption, namely large-scale corruption with fantastic potential state losses, from billions to trillions of rupiah. Such high-level corruption essentially benefits only a handful of actors, while its impact is borne by society at large, through economic distortions, declining public trust, and disruption to state governance.
In its Strategic Plan (Renstra) 2011–2015, the KPK outlines four main criteria for grand corruption. First, involving policy or regulatory decision-makers. Second, involving law enforcement apparatus. Third, having broad impacts on national interests. Fourth, the crime occurring systemically and organised (ACLC KPK, 2023). Based on these indicators, the corruption case in the DJBC shows strong alignment with the characteristics of grand corruption.
Grand corruption often emerges as a result of collusive practices between business actors and public decision-makers in order to engage in state capture. State capture is a form of systemic corruption where private interests actively influence the process of formulating state policies and regulations for the benefit of certain groups. In this context, corruption is no longer merely an individual deviation but has transformed into a structured mechanism that damages the foundations of government governance and the rule of law.