The Helsinki deal on Aceh: An arrangement likely to work

The Helsinki deal on Aceh: An arrangement likely to work

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Helsinki

After a total of 25 days of negotiating, the Helsinki talks on
Aceh have reached a historic phase. For the first time, Indonesia
is about to end its war with a separatist rebellion through a
political settlement. Although the full details have yet to be
disclosed, the deal, if successfully implemented, will be a
milestone.

Three myths seem to have hampered a clear understanding of the
talks on Aceh in Helsinki.

The first is the claim -- to ease public acceptance of the
peace talks -- that these were just a series of "informal talks".

Since any deal reached should be upheld by the parties,
obviously it could hardly be informal-- not least for the Crisis
Management Initiative (CMI) chief, Martti Ahtisaari, who acted as
facilitator. Indeed, a ceremony on Aug. 15 will bind Indonesia
and the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and, separately, between them
and the European Union (EU) and ASEAN in two formal agreements.

The second myth is the view that the talks made Aceh an
international issue. In fact, it has long been an international
issue because of past human rights abuses and the tsunami.
Whether Aceh could become another East Timor is beside the point.

The third and most widespread myth is the confusion about a
"local political party". Is it a party GAM wanted for itself, a
number of local parties, or a party or parties Jakarta offered on
its own terms? Crucially, which of these will be genuinely
democratic, for example; fully addressing the aspirations of the
Acehnese?

The Indonesian delegates initially came with a firm rejection
of GAM's demand for local parties and a bid offering GAM to
nominate its candidates for local chiefs to be supported by 10 of
the existing national parties in the next Aceh elections. GAM
rejected that, calling it, "not transparent, and by special
appointment".

As Jakarta proposed an "Aceh-based national party", the
atmosphere improved, but the talks almost became deadlocked. A
source close to the negotiations said, the insertion of the word
"national" in a faxed message from Jakarta had caused much
trouble. GAM resisted the conditions for political parties as
stipulated by Law No. 31/2002. It took about 7 hours to discuss
it at the July 16 session and lasted for 12 hours with 5 breaks
and several calls to Jakarta. The latter was "the longest and
toughest session we had", RI chief delegate Hamid Awaluddin said.

Underlying the differences were the centralistic versus local
approach to the matter. Indonesia had apparently taken for
granted GAM's February compromise to give up its demand for
independence, ignoring, it seems, what should have since become
obvious -- that political participation was one of GAM's key
priorities. GAM wanted to have more parties for Aceh, while
Jakarta -- and most of the media for that matter -- read it as
GAM simply wanting a party for itself.

What is at stake here, Martti Ahtisaari told Radio
Netherlands, is a principle of democracy. "No one argued, not
least GAM, (to) want to have a political party of their own. The
question was principled: anyone who wants to participate will
have to be facilitated. There are existing parties already in
Aceh and new ones will definitely come forward," the CMI chief
explained.

Thus, for GAM to accept the nomination of GAM candidates by
Jakarta-based parties, they said, is "to corrupt a supposedly
democratic process". It would appear that GAM has suddenly
changed from a rebel movement to a champion of democracy. But it
has also been understood that it should be possible for Indonesia
to introduce local parties without contradicting her Constitution
that is based on the philosophy of the unitary state.

Both sides finally reformulated and made Jakarta's proposal
acceptable. The deal -- agreeing in principle that Aceh will have
local political parties -- needs to be ratified by the Indonesian
national legislature within a period of 18 months. Based on this
pledge, both parties put their initials on the eight-page
Memorandum of Understanding. It is the price Jakarta paid for
GAM's setting aside its independence demand.

The other basic commitment is the withdrawal of Indonesia's
non-organic troops and paramilitary police, in addition to the
collection and destruction of GAM's weapons within four months,
from September to December. Former GAM members will be offered
amnesty and reintegrated into Acehnese society.

The accord thus stands on key commitments on political
participation and security arrangements. For two parties,
burdened by a mutual distrust after three decades of war, the two
commitments constitute a big promise.

Clearly the proof in the pudding will be in the eating.
Promises are hard to sell in post-war Aceh. Provoked incidents
like those in Langsa and Takengon in 2003 contributed to the
failure of an accord. Observers, with East Timor violence in 1999
in mind, recall the difficulties for troops to retreat if and
when at the same time they feel they have been cheated.

But, the tsunami has made many people press for the peace that
so many locals have longed for no matter who has finally "won"
the war. And the Army has been instructed to restrain itself. The
EU-ASEAN monitoring team, marking Europe's first peace mission in
Asia, will have to watch and manage the development on the
ground.

If the deal works, as it seems likely, it will be the first
time in years that an internal armed conflict is resolved by a
peaceful settlement. Since most rebellions, with much less
popular support and arms -- from the RMS in Maluku (1950), the
Darul Islam (1950s), the PRRI-Permesta (late 1950s) to the OPM in
Papua (since 1965) - were crushed by force, Aceh's experience
should be a huge lesson for Indonesia.

The accord will have implications for party oligarchies and
some military businesses. It could push post-Soeharto reforms to
forge ahead and revive Indonesia's 1950s local democracy, even
though federalism remains taboo.

The writer is a journalist with Radio Netherlands.